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NOVA ET VETUSTA


A RETURN TO DUALISM

BY

SCOTUS NOVANTICUS

[Simon Somerville Laurie]

SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND EXTENDED



WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON
AND 20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

IN the first edition I dealt in a brief, if not perfunctory, way, with the mental experiences which precede the emergence of Reason, being anxious to hasten to my main argument. In this second edition I speak more fully of the phenomena of Feeling, and I have been led, in this connection, to modify my view as to the source of the consciousness of Being. This affects the language in several chapters, and has made necessary a revised statement of the categories.

The improvements and additions made I need not specify here, as they will speak for themselves. The argument of the book remains what it was, but the statement is fuller and largely recast. As to the argument itself, I would only add, in the words of Professor Seth,¹ "All that can be

¹ *From Kant to Hegel*, p. 66.

asked of philosophy is, by the help of the most complete analysis to present a reasonable synthesis of the world as we find it."

In his admirable *Study of Religion* Dr. Martineau criticises some of my positions. I have not formally replied to him; but, taking the advice of Professor Flint in *Mind*, I have, in view of Dr. Martineau's objections, written a little less concisely than in the first edition.

S. S. LAURIE.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,

April 1889

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

“EACH individual must go through a process of reflection for himself in order to realize [the definite principles at the root of knowledge]; but in so doing he rises above his mere individual experience and puts himself in the sphere of universal knowledge for Man. He unites himself with Mind in Humanity. There is no mere individualism in such a system: there is rather the lifting up of the individual from his narrow sphere to the realm of the universal and the eternal.”¹

This quotation might almost serve by itself as a preface to the following *Excursus*, but I will add a few words:—

The synthesis required for the perception of objects was the aim of Kant's *Analytic*, and he

¹ Professor Veitch's *Hamilton*.

certainly was right in maintaining that such synthesis was impossible to mere Sensibility. It seems to me, however, that he was wrong in concluding that there was no possible real *content* of knowledge save in and through Sensibility (*à priori* and *à posteriori*). Not only do we know the functions of Reason as such, but (as I shall attempt to show) these functions throw into Consciousness pure percepts which are themselves real and true content of knowledge; and which, further, are not merely regulative, but constitutive, of the external.

I do not pretend to find, or to shoot from a pistol, any fundamental idea of Reason out of which all diversity is derivable by inner determination. This would be Speculation. My standpoint is psychological, and my metaphysic is psychological or phenomenological metaphysic. I know of no way of ascertaining truth regarding Mind save by looking steadily and long at Mind and recording what I see. The reduction of all truth of nature and spirit alike to a unity is perhaps a logical possibility; but, before it can be even attempted, we must first humbly seek

and loyally accept from nature and spirit the facts of nature and spirit.

On the other hand, let me say, that, while I would designate the following investigation phenomenological or psychological metaphysic, I am not to be understood as holding that either scientific Psychology or Ethics is possible save as grounded in Metaphysic; or rather, I might say, a true metaphysic (not "in the air") is at bottom psychology, and a true psychology is fundamentally metaphysic.

May 1884.

CONTENTS.

FIRST PART.

	PAGE
CHAP. I.—EVOLUTION OF MIND	1
CHAP. II.—GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE RISE OF REASON IN THE CONSCIOUS SUBJECT	28
CHAP. III.—THE ACT OF PERCIPIENCE	33
CHAP. IV.—THE FORM OF PERCIPIENCE	40
CHAP. V.—THE PRIMARY LAWS OF REASON IN RELATION TO THE FORM OF PERCIPIENCE	49
CHAP. VI.—SEPARATING AND NAMING	52
CHAP. VII.—SENSATION AND PERCEPTION	57
CHAP. VIII.—UNITY IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE MANIFOLD. THE SENSE-SYNTHESIS OR CONCEPT	60

SECOND PART.

DUALISM.—I. <i>Extension and Externality.</i> II. <i>Knowledge of the External Object.—Relativity.</i> III. <i>The Phenomenal is ipso facto Relative—Not so.</i> IV. <i>Recapitulation</i>	70
--	----

THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.—THE COMMON OR GENERAL—THE PROCESS GENERALLY	92
CHAP. II.—THE NATURE OF THE ACT OF PERCEIVING THE COMMON OR GENERAL MORE FULLY CONSIDERED	97

	PAGE
CHAP. III.—THE ABSTRACT-PERCEPT, AND THE ABSTRACT- CONCEPT	102
CHAP. IV.—FORM OF MEDIATION AS THE FORM OF PERCEPTION, COMPARISON, ABSTRACTION, GENERALIZATION, REASONING, AND CAUSAL INDUCTION	115
CHAP. V.—MEDIATION AS GENERAL FORM OF PERCIPIENCE OR KNOWING (<i>Repetition</i>)	122

FOURTH PART.

THE MATTER AND SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.—1. <i>Phenomena of Inner and Outer Sense.</i> 2. <i>Natural History of the Consciousness of Space.</i> 3. <i>On the Locus of à priori Percepts</i>	127
---	-----

FIFTH PART.

DIALECTIC PERCEPTS OR SYNTHETIC PREDICATIONS À PRIORI (<i>Intellectual Intuitions</i>). <i>Preliminary</i>	141
CHAP. I.—BEING OR SUBSTANCE IN FEELING AND IN THE DIALECTIC OF PERCIPIENCE	145
CHAP. II.—BEING, UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY	154
CHAP. III.—BEING : POTENTIALITY : THE ABSOLUTO-INFINITE	156
CHAP. IV.—THE SENSUOUS INFINITE—SPACE	165
CHAP. V.—DURATION AND TIME : NECESSARINESS AND INFINITENESS OF THESE	168
<i>Further Remarks on the Sensuous Infinite</i>	176
CHAP. VI.—CAUSE AS A DIALECTIC PERCEPT OR SYNTHETIC À PRIORI PREDICATE. 1. <i>The Causal Predicate.</i> 2. <i>The Causal Nexus.</i> 3. <i>The Law of Uniformity in Nature</i>	180
CHAP. VII.—END	199

SIXTH PART.

	PAGE
ON THE CATEGORIES :—	
CHAP. I.—GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE CATEGORIES	203
CHAP. II.—PARALLELISM OF SENSE AND REASON	209
CHAP. III.—THE CATEGORIES :—	
A. <i>Categories of Recipience</i>	216
B. <i>Categories of Percipience—Dialectic Percepts or Synthetic</i> <i>à priori Categories</i>	220
<i>Categories of Percipience or à priori Synthetic Predicates</i>	225
CHAP. IV.—REDUCTION TO UNITY	229

SEVENTH PART.

CHAP. I.—THING—ESSENCE—IDEA—DEFINITION :—	
1. <i>Thing.</i> 2. <i>Essence.</i> 3. <i>Idea—(a) In reference to</i> <i>Abstract-Percept ; (b) In reference to Abstract-Concept.</i>	
4. <i>Essence (continued).</i> 5. <i>Definition</i>	237
CHAP. II.—RETROSPECT	257
CHAP. III.—NATURE	260

EIGHTH PART.

CHAP. I.—TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS (SO CALLED) AND SOLUTION OF THE INSOLUBLE	266
1. <i>Conditions of Perceiving—(a) Synthesis in Quantity ;</i> <i>(b) Synthesis in Time ; (c) The Atom ; (d) Identity.</i>	
2. <i>Sensualizing the Dialectic—(a) The Causal Predicate ;</i> <i>(b) Being ; (c) Ens realissimum ; (d) Kant's Psycho-</i> <i>logical Paralogism.</i>	
CHAP. II.—THE TRANSCENDENT AND THE IDEAL	288

FIRST PART.

CHAP. I.—EVOLUTION OF MIND.

1. To define Consciousness, save negatively—or, if positively, otherwise than by equivalent terms,—is impossible. An organism which is “aware of” other things than itself is conscious. But if we would simplify still further the description by expressing it more fundamentally, we should have to give it a wider sweep and say that every organism that *feels* is conscious. Feeling is a comprehensive term. Again, we might say, negatively, that consciousness, in the wide sense, is that state of an organic being which cannot be explained as purely mechanical or dynamical. Positively, again, we may say that consciousness, in the more restricted sense, is a feeling in an organism of something as being not that which feels—although this “other” may be within the organism.

For present purposes it is enough to say that Consciousness in its most general sense is Feeling, and that outside this feeling a man cannot go in his endeavour to explain himself and the series or system of which he is a part. I may also add, *consensu omnium*, that where there is consciousness there is *Mind* as distinguished from Matter (whatever matter may be).

E.g. we are conscious of hunger and thirst, and fatigue and vigour, of pain and pleasure, of hope, of despair, of anger and fear, of motives, of resistance, of the varied external world, etc. etc.

2. There are successive grades or stages of consciousness from the lowest animal form of it to Man. These stages are infinitely graduated. We shall content ourselves with differentiating the important movements as these present themselves to the observer—the critical points in the progress of Consciousness, the mind-crises in the infinitely graduated evolution.

3. Both in the mechanical and organic world there is action and reaction—there is the impression of one thing on another, and resistance to that impression. In the organic world we see this impression and reaction against impression in a highly complex form; *e.g.* the sensitive plant, physiological processes in plants and animals, etc.

Plants and animals receive impressions and react upon them without Feeling—that is to say, mechanically or dynamically. This response to an outer or inner stimulus (stimulus arising *within* the organism) is called reflex or automatic action. It may be regarded as a kind of anticipation of Consciousness.

4. Inasmuch as in a conscious organism the impression necessarily precedes the feeling in time, we may now describe Consciousness in its rudimentary stage as

reflex-action in and through Feeling. The impression¹ made on the organic subject is no longer merely dynamical; it is felt; that is to say, it passes into the recipient basis of Feeling, and is thrown out from it as a felt *there*—an object.

Note.—This feeling is dim, obscure, and groping in its initial forms, as we may see by watching animals during the first hours and days of their existence.

5. The stages of consciousness are accompanied by stages of nerve-development. And it is only in animals whose nerve-system has a centre, *i.e.* cephalous animals, that we can be said to find the rudiments of positive feeling or consciousness, *e.g.* the snail and whelk. The transition from purely dynamical reflex action to this rudimentary consciousness we can only note: we cannot explain it.

6. The first or rudimentary stage of feeling, as consciousness, seems to be a feeling of a *unit of sensation* only, as when a snail puts forth its horns and becomes aware of an object in its path. This stage of Feeling—the feeling of a unit only—I may call (for want of a better word) SENSIBILITY. This is Sensation in its simplest form. The feeling is *within* the organism of the snail, but it reflects that feeling into the external.

¹ It is impossible to avoid using the word "impression"; but all I mean to convey by it is that a non-subject *becomes* for the subject.

But the external stimulus cannot yet strictly be called an "object" to the snail a "subject." A step has been taken towards this, and that is all.

Note.—Some day, when the psychology of animals has been thoroughly investigated in correlation with their nerve-structure, it may be possible to trace the gradual ascent from this elementary sensation to that much higher stage of which the next paragraph treats.

7. At the same stage as that at which animals become provided with developed avenues for different kinds of external impressions, especially with eyes (*e.g.* dogs and horses), a vast number of units of impression pass into their brains and are *felt*,—*i.e.* find their terminus in the conscious being—the central unity of the organism.

8. At the stage of elementary sensation (or consciousness as sensibility) a unit of impression finds its terminus in a unitary basis of receptivity or feeling. At the advanced stage of which I am now speaking, numerous, or rather innumerable, units of impression proceeding from external objects find their terminus in a beënt¹ basis of feeling which, itself a unity, receives the complex many as a single. The multitude of units are aggregated into a one object outside, and they are received, as so aggregated in a single, within the basis of receptivity.

9. This basis and capacity of receptivity in general

¹ I have to apologise for this awkwardly constructed word first used by Dr. Hutchison Stirling; "essent" might be misleading.

exists before it acts, as does also the basis of consciousness as sensibility. As existing prior to emergence into activity in response to a stimulus, it is to be called Consciousness, or Mind, potential.

10. Consciousness at the advanced stage (7), in which it receives and reflects a complex of units as a single, is to be likened to a mirror. It is a reacting or reflecting mirror in this sense, however, that it has not only in itself a feeling of an impression, a "somewhat not itself," but further reacts so as to place that impression outside itself as an "object" in the place from which it came. The cohering units of sensation, which constitute the impression α , are felt more or less vaguely in the receptive consciousness, and then flung out into space. This α is localised at its point of origination, *e.g.* a stone—a stone *there* precisely as it is felt.

Consciousness-proper now operates; it is a feeling of an impression as a "somewhat there," an *object*. The stone *there* exists as I feel it within here, but it may be said to have been raised in the scale of being by becoming an object not simply in relation to other material objects in space, but an object in, to, and for, a consciousness or mind.

Consciousness-proper, then, may be said to be the capacity of an organism to feel what is not itself as not itself, and implies a duality, viz., the recipient one basis of feeling and a thing felt as *not* that basis of feeling, but something else and other than it.

By what process a potential feeling-basis is so

affected by a force from without as to be transformed into the actual feeling of an external object unlike itself, is unintelligible. We have to speak of the process in metaphorical language.

11. Observe now what has happened: the cohering units of sensation *there* are co-ordinated as a "single in many" in my recipient consciousness—received as synchronous and co-ordinated, as a "many in a single," in consciousness as in a mirror. The result on the side of consciousness may be called a synopsis. For this act—the consciousness of the complex object as an object-there, I reserve the name of Sense-attuition—the completed form of sensation. [The feeling of a many-in-a-single got by merely looking *at* it naïvely.] Consciousness in this its attitudinal stage is consciousness-proper, as I have said. The term Attuition, in fact, covers the whole sphere of Mind prior to the appearance of Reason.

12. To say that I am now conscious of an object is an imperfect record: I feel the object as *being*, the being of the object.

Sense-attuition, or simply "attuition," is a *feeling* of the Being of an object which, by reflection or reaction, is placed outside me at its point of origination. This feeling of the *being* of the object may be called the consciousness of immediateness of being *so* and *there*.

13. But the feeling of the immediateness of the being of the object outside is not *knowledge* of that

object : it is simply vague, indefinite, obscure feeling ; and that is all. If we take the object in all its complexity, but as a single synopsis, it may be said to be thrown on the sensorium as a figure is thrown from a magic-lantern on a sheet.

It is the mirror-like receiving and reflection of a complex object as *being* which I wish to denote by the term attuition.

14. The resultant of attitudinal consciousness, *e.g.* a stone or a stick, a man or a moon—a many in a single,—I have called a synopsis of the object : it may be also called an attuit, since it is the achieved outcome of consciousness as attitudinal or attuent.

15. This attuition is the form of all subsequent knowledge of the real—that is to say, of all that Recipience can yield to mind, prior to knowing or reason.

16. The feeling of Being is not simply an inner feeling of Being, but of Being reflected into the outer, into that which is not *my* feeling. This at the mere attitudinal stage of Mind. [The activity of Reason has yet to emerge, to yield us the *positive affirmation* of the “being-there.”] I am not concerned then about what becomes of particular Being when I turn my back on it and look in another direction. It is first *felt* there as an external substantive, and then subsequently (when reason emerges) *affirmed* there. I should be much surprised to learn that there was a possibility of its

not being there always independently of me. Doubtless, I am convinced that if I am absent others will see it; but this is not the ground of my conviction and certainty of its independent thereness, but a consequence of it. But here I anticipate somewhat.¹

17. Through feeling, in the form of attuition, we get the *Real*, *i.e.* Phenomenon generally.

18. The whole range of pure receptivity is merely this sense-attuition; and man, if he were to be summed up as a consciousness at this stage of the evolution of mind in nature, would be merely an animal—an attuent living organism, like a Dog. But, Man KNOWS.

19. Not only to the highest form of sensation, viz., attuition, does what I say apply, but also in a rudimentary way even to its initial form as sensibility (8).

I have said that bare reflex action in response to

¹ That the reality of Being (as distinguished from Nothing) lies in a "presupposition of relations" is, I understand, the argument of Lotze (p. 33). If a babe opens his eyes for the first time on an object, he sees certainly what, as a matter of fact, he subsequently knows in a vague way to exist as a system of relations; but he feels the *being* of that confused object quite irrespective of these relations, or rather through them, or any unit in them. Lotze seems here to affirm as a fundamental category of perception, and, consequently, of all knowledge, that there is an *a priori* Form of Relation; in other words, of parts, and an organised totality of parts. How else, indeed, could there be *presupposition*? According to Lotze, there could be no feeling of the being of a unit: consequently, no legitimate affirmation of the being of a unit. From which it surely follows that, as there cannot be being of a unit, there can also be no being of relations; for relations arise only as a system of units.

stimulus may be regarded as a kind of anticipation or prediction of consciousness. We see in sensibility the first emergence of mind in nature; and its modus is that of reflex action. A basis of recipient feeling is stimulated by impact or impression outside itself, and reacts; but *now* reacts in and through the *feeling* of that impression as not itself—as *there*.

This “basis” feels the “being-so-and-there” in its immediateness.

How am I to regard this receptive basis? If the reader grant me the fact of Being-universal, I then *must* regard it as simply Being which, advancing beyond the fetters of the merely mechanical determination in the inorganic and the vegetable organic, is now individuated (nucleated) in and through a material organism, in such a way as to *feel* the being of things—consequently to react only after and through the *feeling*.

In short, we have Being-individuated which feels “being so and there” (*i.e.* the various sense-impressions), in its immediateness.

20. All our attuits are within us. Of course; how else could we feel except by feeling? But by and in the very same process by and in which we feel the being of the attuits we reflexly place them outside us in space as beings, or characters or qualities of a being, independent of us, the recipients—in brief (as has been already said) as *objects*.

21. The primary function, then, of the feeling-basis at the stage of consciousness-proper is not a simple

matter. There is first Being individuated (this, of course, as a subsequent discovery), lying in the slumber of potentiality as recipient unitary basis: there is then an impression or impact which stirs the recipient basis from without, and thereupon the potential passes into the actual in this form, viz., reflex action throws out the impression into space as a not-here but a *there*, and so constitutes it Object, and in the same movement feels it as "being-so" (determined in one way and not in another—a somewhat). We know nothing of what goes on until the emergence of this complex result, viz., the feeling of being "so and there." These three elements "being," "so," and "there" are all contained in the first entry of consciousness-proper on the theatre of existence. The impression becomes an "object" in the very act, moment, and crisis of re-flection and the co-relative "subject" is at once therein and there-through made possible and *felt*.

22. This reflex action of the recipient unitary basis is not pure activity—an activity originating in that which acts—but a mere response to stimulus in and through feeling: therefore passivo-active activity.

23. Inner feeling also, embracing all the passions and affections, no less than feelings of outer things, arise in us on presentation of a stimulus—some shape or movement or condition. They reach the consciousness or feeling-basis as impressions. So with the involuntary images or representations of what has once been presented to consciousness or feeling. But we do not

confound such subject-objects with real objects except in abnormal conditions of the organism.

24. The pure activities of consciousness also (of which we shall soon speak) become part of our experience as *felt* by us and as being. The whole realm of experience is in truth a record of Feeling—primarily a presentation to, or datum in feeling or consciousness; and, secondarily, representation and imagination.

25. The basis of Receptivity or Feeling is always essentially passivo-active in its form or mode. This basis—receptive passivo-active attuent basis—we may now distinguish once for all by the name “Conscious Subject”—the term “Subject” now emerging *because* there is an “Object.” As *correlatives* the one is necessarily *nil* without the other. But it is the greatest of metaphysical fallacies to conclude that the individual Subject is constituted by the Object, or, *vice versa*, the Object by the Subject.

26. Man, as a merely conscious subject, is an animal; the *highest* animal, because his capacities for feeling are more potent, more subtle, delicate, sensitive, and various than are those of other animals. But it is only in degree that he differs, thus far, from a horse or a dog. The infant man is in the purely animal or attuent passivo-active state, though in him there is the sum of all nature and the potentiality of reason.

27. Man, then, in so far as he is merely a conscious

subject, is nothing more than a receptive and reacting basis of impressions: and as such an entity—a thing that *is* reflecting things that *are*: a unit of being, Being individuated reflecting the real or phenomenal shapes that *be*. A stone is alone in its desolate isolation—the conscious subject holds communication with all created things.

28. True, it may be said that the sensibility (or capacity for feeling) contains the form of all sensibles. For sensibles can be sensed only to the extent to which the finite subject can sense, and in the way in which it senses. Of course, God Himself can be only *as He is*. But it is a wholly illegitimate conclusion that sense is not a true reflection of that which is sensed, but rather to be regarded as a constituting of the object by sense at the solicitation of some prick or pricks of stimulation. That feeling as a sense-capacity makes the object possible for feeling (an identical proposition) does not carry with it the conclusion that the said object is constituted *by* feeling out of *x, y, z*. The object is constituted *for* the subject in and through feeling: that is all. So understood, the subject as sense is the form of all sensibles (Aristotle), just as (we shall in the sequel see) the Subject as activity is the pure (transcendental) form of all activities.

When I make self an object to self, and so am conscious of self, I am conscious of the object as the subject and the subject as the object. Very different, nay, quite other, is the record of mere sense.

29. As conscious subject man is not yet rational. The characteristic note of the experience of the mere subject is immediateness. To say that at this stage man and the higher animals are wholly destitute of "Reason," is, however, to draw too hard and fast a line between the non-rational and the rational. There is in nature an "infinite" gradation (I here use the word "infinite" in the sense that the gradation is such as to be non-determinable by finite reason); and there is also in the sphere of consciousness, which is the sphere of mind as distinguished from matter, a similar infiniteness of gradation. The prominent and essential note of Reason, when it emerges clearly, is that it attains its end (as we shall see) *mediately*.

30. There is, as all may see, in the merely conscious pre-rational subject an adaptation of itself and its needs to its environment, which is an anticipation of Reason, just as reflex nerve-action in the plant or acephalous mollusc is an anticipation of rudimentary consciousness. In many acts of animals we find an inference, in others we find a medium used for the attainment of an end, as when a parrot takes a stick to scratch the back of his head where his claw cannot reach, or an elephant throws leaves on his back to protect it from the heat of the sun, and so forth. But all this is (like the experience of the conscious subject generally) immediate. The inference is an immediate inference from the particular to the particular. There is here, however, the germ or anticipation of Reason.

31. The non-rational conscious subject, if restricted to its own proper sphere, may even attain to a keener sensibility, and consequently a more ready adaptation of itself to its own experiences and environment, than the rational subject. The explanation of this is that the introduction of what we call "Reason" inevitably leads to the exercise of mind *on* the experiences of the subject: it thus supersedes the full natural activity of feeling-adaptations. Reason intercepts the teachings of nature, so to speak, and suspends the full intensity of the capacities and aptitudes of the subject as a merely conscious entity fighting its way in a crowd. By observation of the higher animals we are able to see how great a command of his experiences man, if he were non-rational, might attain to. If *they* can accomplish so much, and through heredity hand down an aptitude once attained (it matters not whether this tradition be in the molecules of the embryo, or acquired by imitation, and so transmitted to the embryo), how much more than they might not Man, as the most delicately organised of all animals, attain to, if he had not reason!

32. These are questions of the highest importance, viz., *What, how much, and how*, the immediate experience of the conscious subject is, prior to the emergence of Reason? To find answers to these questions is the task of the psychologist, and it is only in the process of time that, by the investigations of successive inquirers, the answers can be fully given. But we may venture to summarise in general terms a certain answer

to these questions quite sufficient for the purposes of Metaphysic.

33. I say that the answers to the above questions—the general answer, not the details, either psychological or physiological—are of the highest importance; and this because, until we have clear conceptions regarding the functions of the conscious subject, simply as such, in providing us with the materials—the real—of our experience through Feeling, as a merely recipient reacting or reflex subject, we shall not be in a position to avoid attributing to Reason what Reason does not truly contribute. This defect in prior analysis leads, and must inevitably lead, to endless confusion as to the specific functions of Reason in man, and a misreading of its revelations to him as interpreter of his experience and guide of his life. Nor can it be doubted that the painful and harassing confusion of psychological writers is largely due to the ignoring of the respective spheres of the non-rational and the rational in mind-products.

34. The conscious subject, simply as such, is recipient, and recipient and re-flective only. Any activity which it displays is (as I have said) passive activity. It reflects what impresses it in the form and shape in which it is impressed (*i.e.* it is only by some subsequent discovery that I can possibly doubt this). The stone outside me impresses me as a coherent aggregate of units of sensation or impression which the subject throws back into the space out of which it has emerged in the form in

which it has impressed it, that is to say as a single in many—a totality—a synopsis. (Not yet as a “one” or unity.)

35. Everything that reaches my consciousness from the outer reaches it as spaced or extended. Individual objects are spaced and they are in a surrounding space. But this surrounding space is not space in any sense other than the space of the particular object, *e.g.* the stone. It is as much a “thing” as the space in, or of, the stone is a thing. By this I do not mean that space is a thing, but merely that space, in whatever form it reaches my consciousness, reaches it as a spaced or extended “somewhat,” or a “somewhat” extended, though there be yet in it no differentiation. In short, space is, like all the impressions made on consciousness from without,—a Predicate. There is no such “thing” as abstract space *in rerum natura*; abstract space as conceived when Reason comes on the field is, like any other abstract, an outcome of a process of abstraction from reality, not itself reality.

36. I am conscious, in fact, merely of a mass of predicates variously presented to me in innumerable objects. I feel a manifold of impressions; but I do more: for it has been pointed out that in the very act of so feeling I place them outside me by the reflex action to which I have already more than once adverted. The feeling of an impression is thus a feeling of the impression *as a being and object or phenomenal shape outside there.*

The *attuit* is a thing of consciousness, but it is also an external object, and an object precisely *as it is an attuit*, unless I can, when Reason emerges, *show that it is otherwise* than as I primarily feel it and naïvely reflect it.

37. The primary experience has, as I have said, a look of simplicity, but it is not simple. It is a feeling in my subject but also a synchronous reflection; it is this feeling which, in the act or crisis of reflection, becomes an object.

38. But this is not all. If it were, the conscious subject would be only the surface on which played an endless phantasmagoria. As a matter of fact (as has already been said), there is in every feeling of an object a feeling of the *BEING* of the object. So there is a feeling of the *being* of the subject, but not as yet raised out of the vagueness (little more than potentiality) of a basis or ground (because it is not yet an "object").

39. It is this feeling of the *being* of an object which is the feeling or consciousness of its actuality, as distinguished from its phenomenality (reality). It is as *being* that it is a *res* or thing, and not phantasmagoria. Whatever may be the difficulties which Reason afterwards may raise, and having (often perversely) raised, attempt to solve, the primary experience contains the feeling of an object as *beënt* or actual. The object *is*; through its *isness* it is an actual.

40. The primary experience, then, of the conscious subject is, as I have already pointed out, threefold—the feeling of an impression; the feeling of that impression as not itself, but separate from itself, outside there, *i.e.* as object; and the feeling of that object as being or actual. The feeling of Being is universal, and it is immediate; by which last term I mean that it belongs to the merely conscious or attitudinal subject as such, and is not mediated by any act of Reason; but is wholly prior to the emergence of Reason.

41. If we desire to gather together the various communications made to consciousness through feeling, and as merely a Recipient, we cannot, probably, do better than take the classification of all such *data* given by Aristotle in his Predicaments; better, perhaps, as modified in the sequel.

42. I have been speaking as yet almost wholly of outer sense or feeling—of those impressions which we receive through our external senses, including the impressions of our own bodies as extended things, not ourselves. But besides outer sense we have materials presented to our consciousness by inner sense. Here we encounter in a very pronounced form the question of conscious entity or mind and material or physical entity, which is not in itself mind but merely extension or motion. The one is not the other, and yet they are so mutually involved (as being the phenomenon constituting one actuality) that we cannot say that any act

even of pure reason (when it finally emerges) does not implicate what is called (the real of sense) "matter"; while again there are certain movements of matter—of the cerebral nerve tissue—which originate, through memory and association, the activity of Reason, just as an actual presentation does. But even prior to the emergence of Reason we can say that wherever consciousness is, however it may be stimulated into life, *there* is mind. For the demonstration that mind is the prius of matter, we are dependent on other considerations than those afforded to us by the merely æsthetic consciousness. Were it not for the subsequent emergence of Reason, which is interpreter and guide, we should not be in a position even to start the question as to the duality of mind and body—spirit and matter.

43. But our chief concern at present is to ascertain what contributions inner sense or feeling makes to the matter in consciousness. When we contemplate these we find them to be difficult of enumeration in detail. But generally we may say: There are first the feelings which our bodies as organisms by their external affections or inner motions originate: these may be called organo-genetic, and admit of being generalised as Bodily Complacency or Displacency. Among such feelings are the pains and pleasures of our bodies, caused by external relations, such as cold, warmth, and injuries and benefits generally, also hunger and thirst, and the pain and pleasure of their dissatisfaction or satisfaction. These organic feelings we place outside ourselves in our

bodies as not ourselves—at least, when we attain to self-consciousness in reason ; but they differ from other affections and impressions of the external in this, that we cannot escape them. They proceed from the matter which is bound up with us as part of our composite nature. As minds we say that they are presented *to* us just as outer nature is: they assail us: they are in us but not *of* us. They are of the nature of stimuli which call forth reflex action. As subjects of these objects (both in the primary and secondary sense of the term subject) we are part of the scheme of the natural life-mechanism of the world.

44. Then there are other feelings which, though arising in our consciousness without our intervention, and simply on the presentation of certain objects—things or acts—are yet regarded as *of* the constitution of the conscious mind, and not merely presented *to* it and so affecting it. Such are those feelings which are generally spoken of as affections, passions, and emotions.

45. Now, if we keep strictly within the æsthetic or attuent consciousness—the mind common to us with animals—we shall perhaps be able to ascertain the simple and rudimentary form of those feelings prior to any interposition of Reason in us. Indeed it is only by the help of comparative psychology, it seems to me, that we can be quite sure of discriminating these various feelings in their elementary simplicity. Proceeding on these lines we may hope to discriminate the primary

feelings, but this, like other inductive investigations, can find its conclusion only after much attentive inquiry. I do not, at all, pretend to be able to furnish a complete list of them.

46. But enough is ascertainable even now for metaphysical purposes. There are, for example, the primary feelings of Fear, Resistance, Sympathy, Love of others, Love of the love of others, Hate, Expectation, Effort, Joy in expectation or fulfilment, and Grief in expectation or failure, the pleasing feeling of Calm in equilibrium and the painful feeling of Disturbance when the equilibrium is shaken, the feeling of submission and dependence in the presence of manifest Power, which seems to me to be not wholly and alone Fear. All these affective feelings are exhibited by animals (in some form or other) as well as by man. Just as, however, man's power (prior to the appearance of Reason) of receiving and re-acting on external impressions, and so relating himself to the external, is, by virtue of his higher organism, much greater and more subtle—quantitatively and qualitatively greater—than that of animals; so, in the field of inner affections, he is quantitatively and qualitatively the superior of other animals. In this, as in all his feelings, capacities and aptitudes he is the paragon of "animals."¹

47. When Reason emerges (if I may here for a

¹ To classify feelings under the categories Pleasure and Pain is an empty generalisation. It is content we want. We might as well classify them under Affirmation and Negation—Yes and No.

moment anticipate), these inner affections, being penetrated by it, assume under it higher forms than the rudimentary manifestation of them in animals or babes. Expectation for example becomes Hope, Resistance becomes Courage, Submission to superior power becomes Awe and Reverence; Sympathy, Love, and Love of the Love of others extend their bounds, and modify their character; and other transformations are effected by the intrusion of Reason and Purpose, while by our infinitely various relations to objects the most complex states arise.

Practical ethics is the regulation and direction of the chaos of inner feeling as motive-forces of action under universals prescribed by Reason; just as Knowledge is the regulation and direction of the whole sphere of inner and outer feelings with a view to possession under universals or categories prescribed by the same Reason. Were we only æsthetic entities we should move, or rather be moved, from feeling to feeling simply as particulars, just as we should in relation to external presentations pass from particulars to particulars. Experience would no doubt teach us lessons and increase our aptitudes for satisfactory correlation of ourselves with the chaos of forces which drive us hither and thither; but that is all.

48. It is evident that Knowledge must precede action if it is to be the action of a Reason-endowed organism; just as feeling or stimulus must precede action in a non-rational organism. And I may so far

again anticipate as to say that if there be such a faculty as Reason differentiating the man from the animal, it will introduce fresh facts and feelings into consciousness which must have a dominant place in determining conduct inasmuch as it proceeds from a supreme source.

49. Impressions of inner and outer sense once truly made are retained. This retention of impressions is called memory. It would appear that just as impressions are made through the channel of the nerve-system, so they are retained for reproduction in the nerve-system. Impressions seem to effect certain molecular changes on the cerebral tissue which, though displaced by others, yet are held in reserve by the brain for future use. (In the present state of physical science our language must be here very general.) It would appear that if the motions in the brain whereby impression *a* was conveyed repeat themselves in the ordinary conscious life of the organism when the object is absent, *a* again makes its appearance in consciousness as an image of a reality now no longer present. Without this memory there could be no mental progress. Memory is mother of the Muses. The permanent retention of an impression depends (speaking still exclusively of the æsthetic consciousness) on its quantity and quality, that is to say, on the frequency of the repetition and the intensity or vividness of the impression.

50. This storehouse of impressions, out of which are presented continually to consciousness images of past

realities without the intervention of any extraneous agency, is subject to certain laws or rules of appearance. That is to say, there is a tendency for certain impressions when they recur to suggest through some community of cerebral action other impressions previously concurrent with them. Thus the continual movement of images of the past over the mirror of consciousness is not arbitrary, but like other processes of nature subject to certain rules. These we call the laws of suggestion, or association of ideas (images, representations).

51. The record of merely attuent consciousness is not in the preceding paragraphs exhausted. Nothing is as yet brought to light in the empirical record of the outer, so far as we have gone, save Quantity, Quality, and Motion. There is also, however, Time and Relation. But it is difficult to deal with these aspects of the recipient consciousness without reference to the action of Reason. They will gradually come more clearly into view as we go on with the registration of the facts of Mind in its larger meaning.

52. The record of the æsthetic recipient or attuent Consciousness has yielded these results as mere matter of fact: Feeling-ground or Conscious Entity; the Feeling of an impression; the feeling of that impression as Being; the feeling of that beënt impression as not the feeling-ground but as separate from it, negation

of it, and as *there*; in short as Object to a Subject. The various feelings, impressions, states of receptivity (real, phenomenal) may be generalized, I have said, under the Aristotelian predicaments—under a modified statement of these. These predicaments are not *known*, for knowledge is not yet; but our power of knowing has enabled us (here and now) thus to segregate these facts of feeling or receptivity.

The memory of receipts and the association of these belong to the æsthetic or attuent consciousness, and may be seen operative in animals. All activity in the attuent stage is as yet of the nature of re-action: it is reflex action *plus* consciousness, that is to say, through and in Feeling. Accordingly, it follows that the ground of Feeling, the conscious entity which we call subject, is subject not merely in the sense of the here-ground of the there-object, but also subject to the object in the ordinary sense of the term. It is determined by it. It is under the object as a slave is under his master, it is in the hands of the object, it is moved hither and thither by the object with only enough reflex activity to adapt itself fairly well to its environment and so live.

53. Hence the impressions of outer and inner sense, though *felt* in their difference, are not set apart from one another and marked off or distinguished; they are not compared, they cannot be arranged under classes; generals are impossible; causal connexion save as mere succession of impressions cannot arise; reasonings or mediate judgments are beyond its capacity. The world

inner and outer is to this merely feeling or conscious entity incoherent individua.

54. And yet mind has in the higher animals made considerable progress. In its earliest stage it is merely re-action against a singular—a unit of impression, but concurrently with the growth of the central nerve-system there has arisen an ever-extending capacity for impressions and the consequent re-actions. A snail and a dog exhibit conditions of receptivity and re-action far removed from each other. Just as an untrained man at whom a dozen balls are thrown catches only one, while the juggler catches all twelve, so an ever-increasing capacity for the synchronous reception (and reflection as objects) of impressions is manifest as we ascend in the scale of conscious life. The numerous units of impression which together reach the consciousness of a dog from an object, *e.g.* a cart, are received *together* and reflected as they are received as a synopsis, so that an aggregate of such units becomes to the dog the object just as it exists in the world external to it *in so far as it sees and feels it*. A dog does not confound a man, a cow, a fellow-dog and a stone. So with infant-man. There is thus in the subject of a dog a passive-active co-ordination of the units that come to it synchronously which makes it conscious of a *totality* external to it. A synoptic totality or aggregate: and as such, a “*single*” made up of confused particulars—but not yet a One or Unity. All this takes place in the sphere of mere feeling which I have distinguished when it reaches this

advanced stage as *attuition*. A dog or a horse is a conscious attuent organism.

Questions as to the "thing in itself" arise only as the result of the subsequent reflection of mind on its own experiences. They arise because of our impatience of the presentation of mere predicates (called "phenomena," a name which unhappily contains in it a fallacy). This impatience is quite justifiable. We shall, however, see in the end that there is no "thing in itself" outside Being and thought-universal as determined by means of sensible predicates. This anticipatory observation applies in like manner to "substance" and, for that matter, to subject also.

CHAP. II.—GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE RISE OF
REASON IN THE CONSCIOUS SUBJECT.

1. Is man more than an attuent organism? If so, what? And what is the significance of the "more" for him as an individual planted in the centre of the universal system of things?

What we call Reason has not yet appeared in consciousness. The life of an intelligent animal is wholly attuent and non-rational; and indeed, even after Reason appears on the scene, the life of a man is largely attuent and non-rational, if he does not slam the door of Feeling in the face of universal and various being and transform himself into a mummy with the bare form of reason working like clockwork inside him. He is occupied in sleeping and caring for his body, and simply living in an automatic fashion without any conscious exercise of Reason. He is played upon by inner and outer sense, is part of the vast scheme of Nature, with infinite points of contact and community with the universal. Nor is this to be regretted: for it is in this way that man maintains his connection with the actual—with nature through feeling. The pure activity of Reason if too pronounced excludes a man from the genial companionship of universal and infinitely various being. He is apt in such circum-

stances to become starved ; and the soil of mind in its large sense becomes sterile for want of feeding.

2. We seek now the "essence" of the human mind ; and by this we mean its specific differentiation from consciousness, or mind in general. That essence is *thinking*: that is to say, it is (in its elementary form) an innate endeavour after clear and adequate percepts of things. Now this innate endeavour is certainly a *process*. Accordingly, we have as characteristics of thinking that it is an endeavour and a process.

Let us look at this more closely.

3. At the point at which the attuent consciousness completes itself, we become aware of a new phenomenon in the sphere of mind. The conscious subject (or subject-consciousness) exhibits a new function, a fresh power which, without altering its relation to the realm of the Real, gives a new character to that relation and a new meaning to the Real. This new function or power we call REASON—the *human* mind.

4. The psychological (and as will be seen the metaphysical) interest now is to ascertain what precisely this new phenomenon is—what is its essential and differentiated character. If we can watch it in its genesis we shall learn more about its essence than by describing its modes of operation when it is already mixed with the real and has become difficult of extri-

cation. A criticism of knowledge will yield us little as compared with a criticism of knowing.

5. Now the essential character of the new exhibition of mind which we call Reason is, that it is a movement in and from within the conscious subject, the final cause of which movement is the arrestment of the fluent matter or real in the attuent subject for the purpose of converting that material, from being a mere presentation of an object to the subject and dominating it, unto an object possessed *by* the subject and dominated *by* it. This spontaneous movement or endeavour in and by and from within the subject is to be designated Will. Will, then, is the essential character of what we call Reason; Will is the root of Reason, and the total of Reason is simply Will, and the process whereby it fulfils itself,—realizes, that is to say, its own final cause.

The beginning of philosophy, Fichte says, is an act of Freedom: and I merely add that freedom is the beginning of philosophy because it is the beginning of all possible knowing.

6. In the individual organism, man, there are movements from within outwards, to be classified as Desires and Emotions; but they are simply reflex—re-action on the presentation of a stimulus, a stimulus not necessarily external to the body, but external to, and (in a sense) alien to, the organic centre which re-acts. This we have seen to be true of the non-rational intelligence

in becoming aware of that which is not subject—of object as such. *A fortiori* is it true of that specific kind of universal Feeling with which pleasure and pain are bound up. The exhausting of the record of Feeling and Re-action is the exhausting of the record of the conscious subject simply. But now this conscious subject itself initiates. Reflex-action is content with the attuit and this is sufficient for all the purposes of the “intelligent” animal, nor is there any reason in the nature of things why mind in nature should not stop here. But it does not stop. The conscious subject itself initiates from within purely a movement,—in other words it *functions Will*.

7. If we would ascertain the true nature of this new phenomenon, we must watch the movement in its rudimentary form—the rudimentary form of Reason, viz.: Percipience; and if we do so we shall find in this act, the whole of a *priori* Dialectic—a Dialectic, moreover, which is not simply the formal activity of the subject for the reduction of its real content to Knowledge, but also the Dialectic of and in the objective and universal Real itself. Knowing is simply the subsumption of the Real or object to conscious subject through the dialectic of the subject itself.

8. The most remarkable outcome of this new Will-movement is the raising thereby of the conscious subject to self-conscious subject—the transformation of the individual into an Ego—a Personality.

9. The conscious subject as now informed with the self-sprung initiating Will arrests the flux of *felt* phenomena. These are *already* by reflex activity placed outside the feeling subject as objects and as objects-being. The Will-reason *does not constitute* these objects, or realities, or actualities: it finds them so, and it simply proceeds to constitute them for itself as known objects—into knowledge. The being, the reality, the actuality are there prior to the activity of Reason, and are in no way dependent on it.

10. The secret and subtle process whereby the conscious subject becomes a self-conscious personality will engage our attention in the sequel. Meanwhile it suffices to say that conscious subject perceives itself as well as other things, Being becomes conscious of its own Being, and the mere "Is" becomes "I am." Logically speaking, this self-consciousness is the prius of Percipience; but chronologically it is not.

CHAP. III.—THE ACT OF PERCIPIENCE.

1. IN the most advanced stage of sensation which I name "attuition" (the characteristic of the higher forms of the brute-creation) not only has consciousness of the external as a whole, emerged from the condition of confusion in which the stage of sensation between sensibility and attuition (which I have not thought it necessary to speak of) may be supposed to leave it, but total objects, *e.g.*, tree, stone, etc., are received as separate one from the other. A tree-stump, a boy, and a wheelbarrow are all separate and diverse objects to a dog, and further observation will quickly satisfy us that the impressions which are received from these objects by the dog, are probably as numerous as those received by the infant. The aggregate of sensations which constitutes the object *a* for the dog, is clearly demarked on his sensorium and consciousness from the aggregate which constitutes *b*. So with the infant. Now this is a most important advance of mind. For it means in so far as we can venture to interpret it, that attuition (the mental condition of the higher animals) is the instinctive and reflex *co-ordination* of particular sensations, yielding thereby a consciousness of the collective totality of various sensible qualities constituting the object which is,

for the time being, present. It is not yet the consciousness of those various qualities, separately one from another, which in their co-ordinated co-existence constitute the object in sense. The *total* objects are separated *for* Recipience one from the other as totals, but the various qualities of each object are not so separated. These various sensible properties or qualities, however, in so far as they are sensible, may be, and frequently are, *in succession*, attutied one after the other, as characteristic of one total object of attuition, and, as belonging to one and the same object, and not to another. This, however, is wholly dependent in the case of both animals and infants on the *salience* of the said qualities—the prominence of the qualities to the eye or other sense,—the obtrusiveness or the force with which they *imprint themselves on the Receptivity*. But the various properties of the external totality are not seen to be *co-existent yet separate* elements in making up the phenomenal object which for the time is the whole or aggregate in attuition. Attentive observation of the mental condition of dogs and infants bears out this conclusion; while apart from such observation, it is manifest that the consciousness of certain properties as co-existent in any object of attuition, and yet separate one from the other, implies (as we shall shortly see) higher mental forces.

2. In attuition then the objective sense-totalities are separated one from the other, but the co-existent

properties resident in each separate totality (though these may be objects of attuition one after the other or in succession, and thus, by means of association, be dimly connected with the totality) are not attuited as *together and yet separate*. The attuition of an object is in brief a clear, but not a distinct, consciousness. Individual objects are not mixed in confusion; the outline or delineation of each "whole" is clear, or approximately so; the elements which constitute each, however, are yet, in their mutual relations, confused and blurred; and yet a passive-active co-ordination is busy and successful.

3. Note that even in this comparatively advanced region of attuition, the intelligence, or conscious subject, has not yet delivered itself from the dominion of objects, although it is aware of the separation of one object from another. All that it senses, and all that it attuites, occupy the receptive individuality to the suppression of individuality itself. They conceal and overpower, without extinguishing, it. Totalities of attuition separate and define themselves *on* the subject and *for* it; they are not separated or defined from each other *by* the subject, save in the restricted sense of the reflex action of the sensorium or basis of feeling.

Individuality, indeed, is as yet crushed by the weight of the external object, so to speak: the animal is little more than a machine set in motion by the outer or inner sense—a more or less clear mirror, it is true, of phenomenal nature, yet itself also a part, though a

conscious part, of the mechanism of nature. Will or Freewill are, at this stage, notions wholly inapplicable.

Note.—The manifestations of consciousness would seem to grow with the growing physical basis of life and consciousness, and to degenerate and die with it. This physical basis, be it nerve or something of which nerve itself is merely the body or vehicle, would appear to be the condition of the existence of consciousness and limits its quantity and quality. The case of ants and other insects, however, seems to show that the range and character of attitudinal intelligence does not depend on the quantity, but on the quality, complexity, and adaptation of this physical basis.

4. I may now (even at the risk of repetition) define *Attuition* to be the reflex co-ordination of elements or units of sensation as an image or synopsis of a total: it is a synthesis *in* and *for* the conscious subject.

5. When we next in our survey of life take note of consciousness in its onward and upward progress, we find that a fresh movement has carried the recipient subject into the midst of what is, in truth, a very remarkable series of phenomena. The subject-individual has passed out of and beyond itself; it has passed beyond the mere reflex co-ordination of *data*; it has overleapt the stage of passivo-active receptivity; it has disencumbered itself of the load of that which is not itself; it has become freely active. The phenomena, quiescent (quantity, form, colour, solidity, etc.), or movent and sequent, which characterise the out-

ward, are now not merely attuitively received and reflexly co-ordinated, but by a spontaneous inner movement of the conscious subject, they are arrested in their irregular and devious courses, and *actively* distinguished and co-ordinated. A Force advances out of what has been hitherto mere receptive attuitual individuality, and prehends or seizes the presentation, holding it close to itself and contemplating it. This force is WILL. Mind proclaims itself Reason.

6. No new being, no new individuality, has been here created. The subject-individuality exists in the dog as in the man : but in the latter a rebellious movement has taken place against the outer which has ended in victory. No new "substance," let me repeat, now comes within our ken, as is too commonly assumed ; an assumption which vitiates metaphysics-proper, as well as psychology and ethics. However long we hold in contemplation this new fact in the progressive life of Mind, it presents itself to us, at last as at first, as a movement initiated in, and effected by, the subject itself. Less than this it is not ; more than this it is not. In other words, while the receptivity of attuition is rightly denominated passive activity, impressions being co-ordinated by mere reflex action, we have now to deal with active activity. Nay more, it is *pure* activity. For observe, it has in its primordial movement no content. It is, in other words, Will : or, if we choose to indulge in tautology, Free Will.

We thus at once see that the essence or essential

differentiation of Reason from animal consciousness is Spontaneity, Freedom, independence of all else.

7. Further, in so far as this Will has any stimulus, that stimulus is to be found wholly in itself,—in the Form of End which lies concealed in the fact of movement. As kinetic movement it contains and projects *end* as its terminus and proceeds towards it in a specific way.

8. What then is the “end” (the final cause) of this primary and rudimentary kinetic movement? It is a *Percept*. And what I desire to emphasize is, that the particular end is not, and cannot be, in the movement as such in its initiation; otherwise it would begin where it ended, which, besides being contrary to phenomenological fact, is absurd. On this primary fact then, of pure intelligence, not of moral or pathological motive, I rest Will as free and autonomous.

9. There is thus contained in the primary fact of Will, (1) Kinetic energy, and (2) the pure or empty Form of End. The behaviour of this formal Will, when it deals with materials, will shortly appear.

10. In consequence of this sudden advance of the subject from within outward, the phenomenal is then and there sub-ordinated to the subject. The individual intelligence is no longer under the dominion of objects, living only in them, and swayed hither and thither by them. It seizes them one by one at pleasure, and

under the stimulus of its own inborn formal power *affirms* the existence of each. That is to say, the conscious subject not only attuites one object as differing from another, but also as *opposed to itself* (the subject), as negating itself, and thereupon subsumes it under itself—relates it to the unity of its own conscious self in the act of affirmation. Hitherto the subject has beheld objects, *sensing* their outness; now it beholds them *qua* objective, as *not-self*, and proceeds to take possession of them. It sees them in the antithesis of subject and object; and is thus empowered, not merely to affirm (what has as yet been only *felt*) that they are not-self or “object,” but also to affirm what has already been only vaguely attuited, viz.: that they are themselves, and not other things. This isolation of the object and the reduction of it to the subject is, speaking generally, Percipience or Perception—a pure act.

CHAP. IV.—FORM OF PERCIPIENCE.

1. ATTUITION is, observe, already conscious of an “other” or not-self as object, although it cannot possibly affirm it. It is conscious of an outside *a*, be it space generally (a *totum objectivum*) or some particular figured object of attuition such as a tree or stone.

Percipience has this datum of attuition to deal with ready to hand, and its Form of procedure is this:—

(1) Kinetic movement of Will against a presentate (already in attuition as not the subject, *i.e.* as an object). (2) This presentate is either A, B, C, or D, etc. (3) It is not B, C, or D. (4) *Therefore.* (5) *A is A.* This conclusion as to the being and identity of A is the satisfaction of the pure empty Form of End, which is in the bosom of the conscious-subject when it evolves or functions *Will*; and that end is, as we see, a Percept. The object is already in antagonism with the subject, and now in accordance with the above process it is at once prehended and subsumed under it, that is, it is known or perceived; and instantaneously thereafter, and we may say therein, affirmed.

2. Thus, in entering this new sphere of conscious mind, which new sphere is here identified with Perception, I find that I enter it enveloped in the forms of—(1) End; (2) Excluded Middle; (3) Contradiction; (4)

Sufficient Reason; (5) Being or Identity (with its consequent affirmation in the form of a proposition). These Forms (or Laws of Movement) are simply the explicit expression of what is implicit in this new advance of consciousness,—this wholly inexplicable spontaneity, this *actus purus*, this Will which lies at the root of the whole, and makes Reason possible.

3. Let it be carefully noted, however, that prior to the subject-evolved act of perceiving there existed a sub-self-conscious, *i.e.* a conscious attitudinal state in which the object A wrote *itself* on my receptivity,—affirmed *itself*, as it were, on me the subject. Its shape, its being, its thereness, the subject *felt*; but that was all.

4. Simply to catch orprehend the object would not yield perception of it. Having arrested and isolated the individual, a chasm would still exist between the object and knowledge of it, were it not for the final movement of Will, which places the prehended object in the unity of consciousness. In attuition, the object falls *on* the unity of consciousness, and is there, by a co-ordinating reflex action, dealt with and projected outside; in percipience, the Will, prehends the object as there outside, and, bringing it back, relates it to the unity of consciousness, and by this subsumption into itself takes possession, perceives, knows.

5. Thus, beginning with attuition which merely receives the impression of the external with more or

less of reflex co-ordination, the Will moves, after a certain manner, to a completion of that simplest act of intelligence which is Percipience: a vital and all-important act, however; for to perceive is to know. We are by Percipience launched into the sphere of Reason.

6. Nor is this yet all: for, as we have seen, there at once arises in the moment of prehension or completed percipience, the inevitable impulse to externalize the fact of percipience by a vocal or other sign. We are compelled to affirm A (the percept) = A , or A is A . This is vocal affirmation, the sign and seal of the completed perception, the proposition of the prior judgment.

The vocal or other sign of affirmation carries with it (as itself an externalization of the inner of consciousness) not merely the affirmation of the being of A , and of A as equal to itself, but further the being of A as *external* to me: A is *there*, as opposed to me who am *here*. The original consciousness of a "somewhat" opposed to, or set over against, my consciousness at the stage of attuition, forced into relief my own separate hereness as a feeling; and now finally, in the last moment of percipience—subsumption into the unity of consciousness—self affirms (what, however, has been already *sensed* in attuition) the externality and independence of the percept: for the thought-affirmation is not merely " A is A ," but, " A is A " *there*, not *here* (which "*here*" is me).

7. Thus, as the object before the birth of Will stimulates the potential basis of Feeling into Subject, or single homogeneous feeling entity, so now the perception and affirmation of the object, as "itself there," involves the perception and affirmation of the subject here, and as equal to itself: self-identity. I understand Hume to say that there is, in impressions, nothing but impressions sole and single and no consciousness of *being* apart from these. But the record of æsthetic consciousness is not so simple: as I have shown it contains the feeling of being and (reflexly) thereness. And this *feeling* the dialectic process ends by *affirming*. The process of dialectic which so ends contains the following moments:—

8. *Initiation of Reason.*

1. The Kinetic initiating movement which we call pure Will.
 - (a) Formal (empty) End lying implicit in this initiation of movement.

Modus of the Reason—movement: Mediation.

2. The moment or form of the Excluded Middle.
3. The moment or form of Negation or Contradiction.
4. The moment or form of Sufficient Reason.
 - (a) Implicit in this mediating process is (real) End.
The mediating process is in its totality teleological.

Transition.

5. Prehending and relating the content of the issue of the preceding moments to the unity of consciousness: subsumption.

The Issue.

6. The affirmation of the Being of the object as a determined somewhat:—"a determined so and not otherwise."
 - (a) The Law of Identity is in this act yielded.
7. The affirmation of the externality and independence of the object as not only "that," but also "there."

These moments constitute the fabric of Reason : they are all implicit in the prime and primal activity of mind which we call Percipience; impressions are impotent to yield them.

9. Percipience again "Tree=Tree," Tree is Tree, is *judgment*: to be distinguished, however, from Judgments commonly so called, such as "the tree is green," as being an identical and so far forth an analytic, in opposition to a synthetic or ampliative, judgment. All judgments are in the moment of Negation or of Identity.

10. When we say that this free act of intelligence is Perception or Knowledge, we merely employ different words to denote the same thing. For, Perception and Knowledge, when rightly understood, are in their essential nature identical terms.

11. Affirmation is again (as has been already said) merely the last term of the moments of percipience when they take the concrete form of a verbal proposition as externalized thought; and this we call utterance, or Speech. Speech is a prolongation of the free potency of will-perception into externalization. It thus may be regarded as an impulse (quite outside the possibility of explanation) to re-create sensuously, in articulate sounds, the world of sensations after they have passed through, or been reduced to, the unity of consciousness as percepts. The result is really *vox et praeterea nihil*—a sound of which the significance

lies in the prior percept. Speech or the instinct of physical articulation follows in the wake of thought: and we feel that nothing is safe till the perception, conception, and so forth, is externalized in definite and appropriated sounds.

12. It is this act of Will which transforms the animal attitudinal intelligence into human percipient intelligence, which proclaims that the boundary of the non-rational has been overstepped, and that the subject has become, once for all, rational. Will is thus seen to be, in its initiation, the root, and in its form, the essence, of Reason; and Willing in its primal act is ground and possibility of Knowing. Will, I say, in its formal movement is Reason, and in its *real* end is the realization for itself of the idea, as we shall hereafter see.

13. Percipience is of the simple and singular; but, as we have seen it is not itself simple; it is a dialectic process containing various moments. Its issue also contains implicit in it the affirmation of the being and thereness of the percept. The "now" is also implicit, as will appear hereafter. The affirmations are, however, affirmations of *data* of feeling or recipience.

14. The attitudinal (or animal) subject functioning pure Will and so seizing itself as well as other things is the Subject becoming aware of the Subject. Thus, Self-consciousness, Ego, Self or Personality is constituted. What the Subject is, and again what the Self *is*, no man

can explain, any more than he can carry his head in his mouth. All that can be done is to watch the latter in the throes of birth and name what we see.

15. Self, at whose heart lies Will as condition of its possibility, now directs itself with endless activity, upon the infinite field of sensation and attuition presented to it, and through affirmation transforms attuits into percepts, attitudinal consciousness into knowledge or cognition. The activity is endless, because it is pure activity.

16. Further, the emergence of this new potency, Will, gives me possession of a new recept—a recept of a pure activity and of all the forms of that activity. I become conscious of an initiating force and its processes.

Note.—Let me say here that I am not speaking of the breadth of units in attuition which constitute the matter of a simple percept, but with the result and percept itself—a colour or total figure, etc. Of the units I as yet know nothing: in so far as it is possible to know anything, it can only be by means of a subsequent and purposed analysis.

17. Such is the primary synthesis of object with subject. But Reason is not content with this primary synthesis. It resumes its attack on the perceived presentation again and again.

18. This new power—the power of imposing self on and subsuming into self the presentations of sensation

and attuition (inner and outer), enables a man to affirm of each presentation in succession that it is itself, and not merely not another, but also not the others,—which others it has eliminated. The distinctness with which these several properties are discerned depends on the *intensiveness* with which the special force, which is root of Reason, is applied. From the first that force is a free, spontaneous movement, but the intensity and energy of its application vary in accordance with physical and sensuous obstructions and with the gradual subsequent growth of motives to know. Most men take, all their lives, such a semi-passive survey of the properties of successive objects as amounts to little more than attuition. The objective phenomena which to the eye of sense constitute the “thing,” have doubtless in the course of this passive experience made their impression on the conscious subject, but they are not known; that is, the conscious subject as willing has not subsumed them, and they fade from the memory. Nay, so transcendent is the power of Will over Nature, that not merely is the prehension or seizing of the external phenomenon dependent on its activity, but by fixing itself on one or two phenomena it can, for the time, annihilate the consciousness of all else. Self is otherwise engaged, and the whole realm of nature strives in vain for a hearing. Self has chosen to shut it out, and to reduce its whole capacity for impression to a unit.

19. Such are the nature and potency of this wonderful central force, which some regard as a passive sen-

sorium, a reed moved by every wind that blows, a sheet of white paper, one phenomenon in an infinite series of invariable or (it may be) determining sequents!

20. When the subject making itself its object constitutes Ego it manifests its freedom. Its limitation is then itself alone and within itself. But its freedom has already been vindicated. It is only as a *feeling* subject that it is the slave of the other, of that which is *not* it.

Note.—If I sometimes speak of Will as Reason it will be understood that I use the initiatory moment of the whole for the whole. Reason is Will-potency *plus* the form of its process. The issue of the process relatively to the individual subject is Ego. There is no such thing as an abstract entity called Will.

CHAP. V.—THE PRIMARY LAWS OF REASON IN RELATION
TO THE PERCIPIENT ACT.

IN close connection with the preceding chapter I may here, without unduly interfering with the argument of this book, introduce a few remarks on the primary or fundamental laws as treated by logicians generally, which I have presented to the reader as moments in the one act or movement of Perception.

The law of Identity $A=A$ may be deduced from the law of Contradiction, *i.e.* it is implicit in it. If A is not "non- A ," it is A . Again the law of Contradiction may be deduced from the Law of Identity, for that A is not "non- A " is implicit in $A=A$. It is quite clear, however, that neither the one law nor the other is a possible conception except as the issue of an antecedent law, *viz.* " A is *either* A or non- A "—law of Excluded Middle. By following the vital *process* of thinking as I have tried to do above we see clearly; and, by "thinking," I mean here the rudimentary act of Percipience in which, if anywhere, the differentiation of Reason from sensible-attuition is to be detected. The Law of Alternatives or of Excluded Middle being the logical prius of the other four, it is at once evident that the Law of Negation or non-contradiction emerges as prius of the Law of Identity.

For greater clearness it is better to call "non-A" by the symbol B. Then,

Law of Identity, A is A.

Law of Contradiction, A is not B (non-A).

A is A *because* it is not anything else ; it is not anything else or B *because* it is A. Why so ? *Because* again A cannot be at once A and B (non-A), and it *must be* one or the other. That is to say A (anything whatsoever) must be itself or something else. Why must anything whatsoever, A, be itself or something else, B ? To demonstrate this would be manifestly to reason in a circle.

It seems to me that we simplify things very much by declining to speak of these facts of mind as Principles or Laws of all reasoning, thereby suggesting that they are generalisations and giving them a dogmatic air. This I consider is the result of looking at logical and psychological questions from the anatomical or morphological point of view. Let us regard them rather from the physiological standpoint,—that is to say, watch thinking (here Percipience) in the organic or vital process of effecting itself,—as truly being and breathing. These "laws" are then revealed to us as implicit in the organic process and in their true logical order as moments or pulses of one act—each moment implicit in the other.

The conscious subject functioning as Will moves itself for the purpose of separating or determining one (or more) of the mixed multitude of attuits by which it is oppressed ; and moves in a certain way or by a

certain process which is a logical succession of moments, not one of which is intelligible without the other.

A (Anything whatsoever) is either itself (A)
or B (non-A) something else [Exc. Middle].

A is not B (non-A) [Contrad.]

A is A. (Id.)

I must now ask again why is $A=A$, and the answer is because it is not (non-A) B and it *must* be *either* A or B (non-A). The cause or reason then of "A is A" is to be found in the prius of Negation and demands this amended form of concluding statement, viz.—THEREFORE "A is A"; and this is what is called the "principle" of Sufficient Reason.

To which we have further to add that the conscious-subject, thus functioning as Will, seeks an end of its initiated motion—that end being implicit (as a formal moment) in the initiation of motion. This end it formally seeks by the above way or process of movement, mediating the positive issue through Negation as ground.

The sum then of the primal percipience-act is as I have explained it above.

Reason then is a living unity of movement. The empirical ego, one might say, is the conscious subject; the transcendental is pure Ego or personality or self constituted by the functioning of the conscious subject directed on itself. There are not two minds or reasons.

CHAP. VI.—SEPARATING AND NAMING.

1. ADVANCING now with this new weapon, Reason, to the synthesis and conquest of the manifold in sense, the now self-conscious subject quickly finds that the secret of its power consists in the primary act of separating, of determining through negating, as we have exhibited the process above. By separating the phenomena, the totalities in attuition which constitute to the eye of sense this or that *thing*, it carries on the work of separation for Knowledge, which separation has been already visibly completed outside in the constituting of a manifold of things instead of one large all-filling thing. The differentiation of a tree from a stone, and a stone from an animal, has been already effected *for* the eye of passive attuition (as in the case of animals). When the power of actively differentiating nature and of discovering its less prominent differentiations comes on the field, the subject begins a restless, untiring, all-devouring career. It separates and seizes the totalities of mere attuition in a synopsis and so *perceives* them each whole as *one*; it separates and seizes the elements which enter into these totalities, each element as one; it seizes the resultant knowledge as such, and thus, having once succeeded, becomes inflamed with the *desire* to know; it seizes the process

whereby it seizes ; it seizes itself ; it seizes the seizing of itself, and falls back foiled only at the gates of the absolute and undifferentiable.

2. This Will-reason is the power of holding in presence of consciousness, and subsuming under consciousness, that which is not-self. It holds the separate before it as affirmed, "known." It so holds the presentate as separated ; it so holds the presentate, after it has disappeared from vision, as the *representate*. This knowing, this affirming also confirms the impression made on the non-rational attitudinal consciousness, at the same time that it purifies that impression by exalting it to Perception.

3. The separation of the individual presentate always maintains a negative relation to the other presentates from which it is separated ; but these other presentates have the sub-self-conscious character of *attuits* : *e.g.* I separate and perceive the solidity of a horse's hoof, but while I fix myself on this characteristic, the rest of the animal is present to me ; but *only as an attuit*.

4. To complete its act of affirmation, the Will finds itself compelled, as has been already explained, to externalize its act and to seek for a sensible or materialized shape,—words. Unclothed with shapes, be they words or signs, prehensions are scarcely worthy of the name of percepts, having never fairly emerged out of the

non-rational plane of attuition. Until we name, we are, to use a phrase of Montaigne's, "merely licking the formless embryo of our thoughts." As the being of a thing is completed only in its material externalization, so the perception or thought of a thing is completed only in its sensuous externalization or fixation in audible sounds. The force of the Will in knowing does not rest satisfied with the mere act of knowing, but goes on till it contents itself, and completes itself, by projecting its achieved perception into the sphere of sense.

5. *Memory*.—All that we wrest from experience is embodied in language. The man of genius is he who can present us with some new conquest. The percept thus becomes sensualized as an articulate sound, and, as such, returns to consciousness as a recept, and in this way a basis of attitudinal reminiscence (as distinct from recollection) is formed for percepts as such, no less than for sensations and attuits.

6. The fact of Will is also the explanation of Recollection as distinct from mere Reminiscence, which latter is determined wholly by natural association. The Will confirms, by *affirming*, the object in consciousness; and when need arises, it moves itself and goes in search of past consciousnesses. Recollection is animal reminiscence *plus* Will. In so far as it is Will, it is a pure act; Reminiscence belongs to the receptive and attitudinal consciousness of man. In so far as the memory of a

dog differs from that of a man, it does so merely because of the absence of Will.

7 The Will, the conscious subject as willing, has not only the power to recall past percepts, and to give, through its involvement in the physical basis of life, sensible shape in language to its own act, but in its free movement it can even suspend its own activity, and turn back the subject to a state of attuition. Such is day-dreaming and reverie. There is an involuntary production of this state under those physical conditions which we know as sleep. In such day-dreaming, reverie, or sleep, non-self-conscious movements go on with more or less intensity according to the degree of vitality (whatever that may mean) of the subject. The non-rational or animal subject is always in this sub-self-conscious condition into which man only occasionally enters; and the difference between the day-dreaming of a man and the consciousness of a dog would seem to be this, that in the former there is a background of existent, though almost wholly suspended, Will, and that in him the condition of attuition necessarily embraces past *percepts* as well as receipts and attuits. This unregulated play of the non-self-conscious subject may be called a play of representation or imagination in the primary sense of this last word. Hidden affinities among representates may frequently now work themselves out, and large suggestions and broader views of life and of the possibilities of consciousness may sometimes be the fruit of this

suspension of Reason. Its possible abuses are manifest, but its benefits as an enricher of the soil of mind are unquestionable. In this latent action of Reason, we may be even said to share more fully the universal intelligence, and losing that which is individual, we become part of the Whole. The door of the temple of mysticism lies in this direction.

CHAP. VII.—SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

ATTUITION as mere receptivity more or less reflexly co-ordinated is Sensation in the usual philosophical acceptation of that term ; but sensation in its highest form. The current doctrine regarding the origin and process of knowledge, and the primary and secondary kinds of knowledge of the sensible, compels an attempt to distinguish between Perception-proper and Sensation-proper, and to show where the one ends and the other begins.

According to prevalent theories of knowledge there is no *real* distinction possible between these two, if the upholders of these theories are consistent with themselves. At most, sensation ends where the process ends, by which the receptive subject is reached by the object ; and at this very point precisely, perception begins. But this is merely a convenient way of talking, whereby a *felt* difference of some sort or other is indicated without being explained or vindicated. Even to maintain that perception and sensation are in an inverse ratio to each other, is only to enunciate still more emphatically that there is some *felt* difference, and to point to characteristics of the psychological phenomena which are valuable in themselves as observed facts (if true), and may possibly help to reveal the ground of

their relation to each other. Is this so-called "law" of inverseness after all tenable on the ordinary theories of knowledge? If perception be merely a resultant of sensation (that state in which sensation becomes a distinct object to consciousness), it would seem rather to follow that the more intense the degree of sensation the more intense must be the perception; that is to say, if there be *perception* at all.

The true phenomenological relation of sensation and perception, and the distinction between them which that phenomenological relation brings into light, have been already set forth. Sensation-proper differs from Percipience in this, that in the former the Object seizes the Subject (so to speak), stimulates it into a reflex action, which process is the process of the feeling of object and, therethrough, of subject. The subject is, so to speak, in the hands of the object. In the latter, the subject as Will, in other words Ego, itself goes out and seizes the sensed object, subsumes it into itself or relates it to itself, and effects *knowledge* as affirmation. The union of the object (already there in the prior process of sensation) with the subject by the subject is the act of percipience or rudimentary knowing. Also, just as, in the former case, subject comes within the sphere of feeling-experience in the feeling of object; so in the latter, the affirmation of subject by itself emerges in and through the affirmation (perceiving, knowing) of object.

An impression on the senses may be so vivid and intense that the Will can re-act against it only with

difficulty, in which case the act of perceiving or knowing is obstructed. Hence it is that, as Kant says, the most favourable condition for knowing is where the sensation is moderate. This is a common experience; but if, nevertheless, we *choose* to perceive when the impression is intense, then the keener the sensation the more vivid and true will be the perception. It is true, however, that the act of Will in percipience may be overpowered by the mass and intensity of a sensation.

The explanation of the psychological fact lies in this, that perceiving is a subject-evolved free act of Will, proceeding after a certain manner towards the prehension and subsumption of the already sensed object into the unity of consciousness; and without such an explanation, the relation between sensation and perception, although it may be so far correctly described, cannot be disclosed.

CHAP. VIII.—UNITY IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE MANIFOLD.—THE SENSE-SYNTHESIS OR CONCEPT.

1. THUS far we have described in general the action of elementary intelligence as it advances to knowledge. Perception we have found to be, in accordance with the old dictum, separation or determination through negation, and the reduction of the separate to the unity of self-consciousness. It, moreover, involves a *process* which I need not here repeat. Let us now go back to the first dawning of percipience on the world of attuition, and follow still further its formal history in the work of separating, and in the other work which it has to do.

2. The totality of this, that, or the other attuit is received into consciousness as a synopsis. It is an unresolved complex in *sense*: it is a single *totality* in percipience. The term “unity” is to be reserved for a rational act, not for an attitudinal state. The first perception then is the *perception* of the attuited synopsis. A vague, general, and unresolved aggregate of units of sensation which have made a certain impression is marked off by the action and affirmation of Will from other aggregates which make a different impression. It may happen, and constantly does happen, that a prominent quality in the object receives, because of its

salience, special attention, and in this case all the other units of impression are sub-self-consciously felt as associated with that prominent differentia, but they are not separately *perceived*. The subject of the affirmation which follows perception is to begin with little more than x with an indefinite number of possible predicates: if a specific quality has been noted it is then a with an indefinite number of possible predicates.

3. The perception of the synoptic totality is at the same time the starting-point of unwitting, non-self-conscious, crude, and spurious generalization of many individuals under a common name. A plurality of objects passes before consciousness: all these at this stage of intelligence simply as synopsis. Sense-complex a makes an impression as a total, and sense-complex b makes a different impression as a total. It is the complex *total* I perceive and separate from other totals. Having perceived the attuit or synopsis a I name it "Cow": I name the differing b "Tree." A bull, a horse, an ass present themselves and I call them all by the name "Cow," because the impressions they respectively make as complex totals are similar. So different kinds of trees and shrubs come before me, and I name each and all Trees for the same reason. If after the first experiences of perceiving a , b and c I were asked to describe them, I could not do so: I could justify my naming all a 's "cows" only by saying that the general impression each in succession made on me was similar to the first impression. A very slight ad-

vance in my experience of objects would force on me the most prominent mark of the objects called *a*, say, "four-legged." If asked why I called these objects "Cows," the answer would be, "because they are four-legged"; but in so saying I should proclaim that I perceived *a* as a totality and *further* as a four-legged totality. The other elements in the four-legged totality would lie in the sub-self-conscious repository of attuition unresolved.

The first step towards the unity of a sense-concept as distinguished from the mere totality in perception would thus be made.

The elementary perception "Cow" is accordingly a "General" based on similarities, and is so used freely by the nascent intelligence.

This crude generalization is superficial and untrue because, as we shall see, it is the work of the *external* impressing itself on the merely attuent consciousness, and the presentate is as yet unattacked by the Will beyond the mere perception of the totality as an indefinite somewhat different from other objects. To call it a generalization at all in any strict sense is incorrect. But it is important to observe that mind (generally) begins with the universal in this crude form, and then pushes on to the particular, again to reach the universal, but now a *rational* universal as opposed to sense-universal.

4. Will, even in its earliest movements, has made considerable progress, for it has now affirmed the attuited

totality in perception as a one totality ; in other words, it *knows* what has hitherto been only an *attutied* totality. *A* in attuition has, through the process of Percipience, become *not-B* nor any other thing, and is then affirmed or known as *A*. The formula has been already given in the moments of the act of pure Will, which constitute together the texture of reason as distinguished from mere animal attuitional consciousness. It is manifest, however, that I could not proceed to deal with *A* at all with a view to its final affirmation in percipience, unless I first had *A* present to consciousness, and I cannot have it there except as equal to itself—*quasi* self-identical. The judgment of the conclusion, “*A* is *A*,” therefore, seems to be anticipated in mere attuent feeling, inasmuch as this fact is the point of departure for “*A* is not *B*”: and yet again the *affirmation* “*A* is *A*” is impossible, save as the sequel of “*A* is not *B*.” I explain this admitted difficulty (as I explain spurious generalization above) by the introduction into metaphysical psychology of the attuitional consciousness as chronologically prior to the perceptive and having a domain of its own. “*A*” (some presentate or other) is first received into attuition from without and projected as object: the second movement which alone is Perception, and therefore Reason, is the affirmation that this object “*A* is not *B*, nor *C*, nor *D*”; and so I reach the third that “*A* is *A*.” True identity is to be found in the judgment of Reason alone.

5. When an object becomes the subject of predicative

propositions it is an empty sound and is equivalent to little more than the universal "That thing there." Whatever predicates the word may hold concealed, it is no more the "thing" than all the other predicates yet to be discovered.

6. The Will or Self, after exercise of spontaneous energy, feels its own power, and, under the irresistible impulse to separate (for the very nature of Will is restless movement), begins to seize the various qualities or units which enter into the individual totalities; and the knowledge "cow" or "tree" (applied indifferently by a kind of spurious generalization to many animal and vegetable organisms respectively) becomes split up into many differing animals or trees respectively which, while possessed of common characteristics as animals and plants, are now by the force of Will, further differentiated one from the other.

7. This act of Ego or Will we may call, if we choose, Attention; but it is better to reserve that term for the act when sustained for a time. When considered in relation to a unit held in consciousness as opposed to all other objects, the act of Will is called abstraction; and when considered in relation to the totality which is being broken up by the all-shattering force of Will, it is analysis: that is to say, as applied to things. At a later stage, when the consciousness has become overlaid and surcharged with traditionary differentiations fixed in vocables, the Will finds its chief task to be

the dissolving of the various elements which have in the course of history entered into notions, and so led or misled mankind. So important and so great the task that for generations it would sometimes appear that the work of the Philosopher is one solely of definition and division. Nay, if our notions of things contained only true and also exhaustive elements, the Definition of the *Notion* would also be the Definition of the *Thing*.

8. This work of Analysis,—separation with reference to the totality in Perception, advances with quick steps when the fact of the resultant—viz., knowledge, is recognized. Pleasure here enters—not at all into the primary act but into the result. *That there are differences is felt* in attuition ; and the discovery of difference, when once it has made a beginning, then becomes an end in itself to Reason. The more energetic intelligences take the lead in prosecuting the task for the less vigorous, with a view to the satisfaction of the restless avidity of the Ego, which desires to see clearly and distinctly that which really is presented to it, and so to make it its own by subsuming it into self.

9. This partial and provisional knowledge yields to us a *distinct* consciousness so far as it goes ; that is to say, such of the qualities, properties, or component elements as are known, are known in their separation one from the other *at the same time* that they are known as parts of a totality in perception, the remaining parts being sub-consciously *felt*. This totality in perception

becomes gradually more and more broken up by the perception or knowing of its constituent elements or qualities, and is gradually transformed into a unity of qualities perceived,—a *Unity* of perception. This requires further illustration, for it is a great stride and involves much. Let us follow at the risk of repetition the intelligence-process by which the unity is reached.

10. The process, after all, does not in fact, indeed *can not*, differ from that whereby the external totalities, as such, were formerly affirmed, and it is expressed by the formula “A is not B, nor anything else”; therefore, “A is A” (both these being of course preceded by the sub-self-conscious, *i.e.* merely conscious, attuition of A). The sub-self-conscious attuition of A is a quasi-affirmation (or declaration) of itself *by the external object* on, to, and for, the subject. The next step is, as we have just said, “A (the attuited totality) is not B, nor C, nor D, nor anything else;” *therefore*, “A is A,”—an affirmation *by* and for the subject. The third step in the history of Percipience is, C (a quality in A) is not D (nor X Y Z): C is C: C is in A. And so on with all other qualities which are discerned or are discernible: by such a movement it is that we know, and this is continually repeated.

11. Every step in differencing which we thus make encroaches on the vague totality in perception. This total percept¹ continues to be affirmed as a totality, but it gradually yields to the ever-growing discrimination of

¹ I am quite well aware that in calling the totality in presentation a *percept*, I expose myself to criticism. But note that a dog has

the qualities in it. Every fresh percept breaks up still further the totality of the percept, until the latter is supplanted altogether by a colligation of qualifying and quantifying percepts. The thing—the mere *totality* in perception (vague and unsatisfying) now becomes the *Unity* in perception or knowledge. The Thing at this stage, and thus far, is to empirical consciousness, what its perceived qualities are in their unity, as all returning into themselves, *plus* the affirmation that *it is*. This isness will be afterwards shewn (as has been already indicated in the Table of the Form of Percipience) to be the affirmation of the Identity of the thing with itself, which identity has been in the attuent stage a vague *feeling* of sameness.

12. The end of all this energizing of the Ego is Perception and therefore the single and simple. By analysis Will seeks to break up the totality in attuition, and to find the true qualities of a thing and the last differentiation or “essence” (so called), so that round this ultimate differentiate it may synthetically reconstruct the totality in the unity of knowledge. For the end of the analysis of the primary synthesis, *i.e.* the synopsis, is again synthesis.

13. This unity in perception, achieved by the spon-
the totality in presentation. Reason distinguishes totality from other totalities simply *as a totality* (to begin with) and affirms it as such. Why, it may be asked, do I occupy my reader with what is little more than elementary Logic? Because I have a thesis to establish—viz., that the whole fabric of Reason is concealed in Percipience.

taneous movement of Will directed against attuits, and gradually won from the totality or aggregate in attuition, is to be called a *Sense-Concept* (or sense-synthesis as opposed to a sense-synopsis). The movement whereby the matter of the concept is gathered or subsumed into a unity lies in the spontaneity of Reason, which is the conscious subject freely functioning Will after a process.

14. It is only after Will comes on the field that we can be said to perceive or know; but the object present to sense, prior to the exertion of the spontaneity which is the root of the act of percipience, is not a vague, undefined and chaotic *series* of feelings, or of sense-stimulations, but already an aggregate of sense affections which have been printed on consciousness *together* as an external and independent "somewhat," and constitute a totality in sense—*i.e.* an attuit. *Unity* is not yet there, but aggregated synoptic *totality* of this, that, or the other sense-object is unquestionably there.

15. The distinction between the totality in attuition which, when perceived, is at best merely an attuit (or synopsis) perceived, and the unity in perception or true synthesis which constitutes a sense-concept, is obvious enough. This concept is further to be distinguished from the Concept which is the fruit of subsequent generalization, and which presents itself to our consideration in the next movement of Intelligence in its attempt to arrange and understand the manifold outer. The distinction which is here laid down between sense-concept, which is an individual

thing, and generalized concept, which contains things under it, is frequently forgotten.

16. The sense-concept is attained by a succession of perceptions, which perceptions are judgments. It is a synthesis of analytic judgments. That the primary perception of the total complex is judgment will be denied by some, but this because of their inadequate understanding of the act of perception. In the primary judgment of percipience the subject of the proposition is the demonstrative pronoun "*That*" (a mere abstract and universal) which is applied to the vague totality in attuition, and the predicate is the name we give to the confused congeries of qualities in attuition, *e.g.* "*That (there) is tree.*" All we try to express is the difference of this total from other totals.

17. Let us note here that, so far as we have yet gone in the evolution of Intelligence, we have reached the sense-concept and have as yet met with nothing save Percipience: for Concipience is merely the binding together of a series of percepts or perceived predicates as constituting the total object before us; and this by the sheer force of Will. As yet the "thing" is only the empirical thing and is on its way to its true birth in Reason; and it is not to be hastily concluded from the fact that the concipient act seems to be (in so far as it is to be distinguished from the percipient) mechanical in its nature, that the "thing" is simply "being" with a bundle of predicates cohering in an external and mechanical fashion.

SECOND PART.

DUALISM.¹

1. *Extension and Externality.*

1. THERE are here two questions—that of Externality and that of Extension or Space.

2. Hume's fundamental position may be thus briefly stated: Every idea—that is to say, every experience, thought and conviction of the human mind—arises primarily from some *impression* conveyed to the mind through inner or outer sense; in other words, arises from Sensation. Sensation means *felt* impression. Further, every impression is found, when closely looked at, to be simple and single, and proclaims *itself* to consciousness as *nothing else than* itself. Ultimately then our knowledge—that which we call reality and truth—is nothing save our outer and inner sensations and their sense relations.

3. Hume does not deny that we have convictions of the externality of other men in the world, and of every object in it, also of substantiality, being,

¹ The following argument is from a pre-Fichtian standpoint.

necessary cause, and so forth; nor does he deny that such convictions are to be assumed as true in the ordinary work of life. His object is to show in what circumstances and by what process these practical beliefs are evolved out of the aforesaid impressions and ideas, and to demonstrate that they are all to be explained as (fundamentally) impressions cohering; that thus they ever remain within the sphere of individual mind, and beyond this have no validity.

4. *Externality*.—All is within me. Of course, where else could it be, if I am to be conscious of it and know it? Hence it is that I may doubt the externality of what I feel and know.

5. If an object—nature, or let us say that part of nature which I call my body—be truly external to consciousness, we do not need to demonstrate its non-dependence on human intelligence, and its separate continuity as a more or less explainable aggregate of mutually interpenetrating qualities and relations. [Quality corresponds in the *object* to *impression* or sensation in the mind.] Such externality would give us that duality of mind (or consciousness) and nature which is the assumption of common sense, and, could it be demonstrated, would critically vindicate the crude belief of the vulgar. And, after all, every philosophy must ultimately sist itself at the bar of ‘common sense’ in the ordinary meaning of this expression.

6. Hume points out that we are not directly con-

scious of the *externality* of Space or Extension, but merely of extension as an impression, and as a quality of objects. To the argument that extension is presented to our consciousness along with other qualities of objects *as being outside* us or external, Hume would reply that this is to make an impression, which is by its nature single, double, because the impression would then convey to our minds Space *plus* Externality.

7. Hamilton in formulating the fundamental position of the Scottish School, says that the external and the internal exist as opposites by the very same evidence, and in the same act. *So far* he gives a critical basis to "Common Sense." But, it might be objected to him, where do you find this outerness and innerness as independent primary facts of consciousness? In the most rudimentary acts of sensation and perception you see only space or extension, and you choose to add on the *further* fact of outerness to that extension, when all the while you are conscious only of extension, and hasten illegitimately to the *inference* of outerness or externality: objectivity is one thing, externality another. If it be not an *inference*, then, you are bound to show that the sensation of externality is given *plus* the sensation of a spaced object in the same act; in short, you have to maintain, what Hume denies, that impressions are, or may be, in their ultimate analysis, double. If the double impression which thus gives rise (in Hume's language) to two ideas, is contrary to fact, then the *inference* has to be justified. To

say that it is a "necessary and universal" inference, is merely to re-affirm the old Scottish position in its crude uncritical form. And, even if we grant his argument, Hamilton's primary duality only gives us, at best, a non-ego of some kind or other.

8. If, however, we were to identify Extension with Externality, we should have so far an answer to Hume. Where is the "impression," Hume would say, which yields to you the "idea" of externality? Answer, the impression of extension (which you yourself admit), for this *is* externality. This would give us a true duality; for externality, as Hume himself admits, involves independence. But, as in this case externality itself would be still a subjective impression, fresh difficulties would arise.

9. Before Reason appears on the scene at all, and while we are yet regarding mind as limited to purely æsthetic or sense-relations (Attuition), the state of the case seems to be this:—Extension as a *totum objectivum*, and extended and figured things are received by the subject-sense as impressions. These impressions act as a stimulus or irritant to the sensational or attitudinal subject and so give rise to a reflex action of consciousness whereby the impressions, viz., extension generally and all impressed objects, are placed outside the subject, and in that act constituted an external object. Extension is thus a *datum* to consciousness; the externality of extension is given *reflexly*

by consciousness. By a reflex action of consciousness things are constituted objects and external. This movement, moreover, lies in the very heart of consciousness; and through it alone is consciousness possible. Externality is thus an universal and necessary in all sense-impressions and is, in this acceptation, an *à priori* offspring of the æsthetic consciousness merely. Dualism of subject and object is thus constituted within the sense or attitudinal sphere (the sphere of Feeling) *before* Reason in the elementary form of Percipience appears on the field. When it does appear, it at once posits or affirms the issue of that necessary reflex movement of sense which constitutes the externality of an object; and it does so in the form "A, *i.e.* That (*there*) tree, is." Thus the externality of the "thing" is in no way dependent on Reason.

10. We must hold with Hume, I think, that the *independence* of things is constituted by and in their externality. Extension or Space accordingly, as now shown to be external to the subject, is independent of the subject.

11. It does not, however, seem to follow from the universality of Space as given in universal *impression*, nor from the externality of Space as given through the above necessary reflex movement, that Space is a necessary, *i.e.* an inevitable condition of all possible thought of the external. In other words, that extension is the universal *modus existendi* of the sensible non-ego, which non-ego is external, does not explain the neces-

sariness of extension. This presents a difficulty; but may it not be met thus?—In what sense is space necessary? In this, that I cannot think the external otherwise than as extended. But this is simply to say that, as wherever I *receive* the external I receive it as extended, so whenever I *image* the external I *must* image it as extended. All that is presented to sense is extended, and therefore all that is or can be *represented* is also extended. Sense is sense, and not anything else, and all possible imagination (*i.e.* re-productive or productive imaging) of the external operates in the field of sense. It seems to me, accordingly, that we may say: Necessity for Extension, *i.e.* Extension as necessary predicate of all possible externality, is simply an Analytic Necessary. In fact all æsthetic universals are analytic necessities.¹

II. *Knowledge of the external object:—Relativity.*

1. To sum up—Consciousness whether in the stage of rudimentary sensation or in that more advanced stage of co-ordinated sensations which is called attuition, has *a prius* in the object, that is to say, it is by a movement outside itself and independent of itself that the potentiality of consciousness becomes actual. This irritation is, from the side of the subject, called Receptivity. The feeling of the externality of the source of that irritation is simply a result of a reflex

¹ The question of the infiniteness of Extension will be afterwards considered.

action in consciousness; and what is external *to* the subject is independent *of* the subject. Thereafter, when the strata of mere Receptivity have been burst through, as it were, by the volcanic action of the newly-evolved energy which arises in and springs out of the subject (which dynamic energy we call Will), the externality of the impression (extension) is therein and thereby affirmed. Thus the fact and predication of externality are implicit in the constitution of the æsthetic, attitudinal and non-rational consciousness, and thereafter explicit and affirmed in rational consciousness. And here, but exclusively within the sphere of percipience or affirmation, externality rests on the same basis as the fact of internality. The affirmation of internality, as a sole, is an impossibility to Reason.

2. The whole question of externality becomes a question at all only when men begin to analyse the nature of knowledge and the sources of knowledge. Hence it is that in connexion with this question the further but cognate question occurs, "Given an object truly external to the subject, can the subject truly know it, precisely as it *there* is?"

3. Certainly, if I do not know the external object as it is, but simply use it as a fulcrum x for my own attitudinal and rational activities, it becomes a mere determinable of my Reason in respect not merely of its formal grounds (which aspect of the question may be for the

present set aside) but also as regards what we call its sensible qualities—its phenomena, its matter. This is the question of the Relativity of Knowledge. If we do not know the object *an sich*, then it is either for consciousness or consciousness is for it. No other kind of relativity is possible.

4. If the object be not external, *cadit quaestio*, because if it is not external it must be internal; in other words, it must be the creation of consciousness in some way or other, and what is created by consciousness must be true, *as it is*, for consciousness.

5. So far, however, we may regard ourselves as having gone:—There is an object impressed on me which is external to me, viz., extension; but that which I see and name “extension” may only after all be an external “somewhat” which sets up by a law of nature the image and scheme of extension in me. The truly external x may be transformed into y as it enters my subject-consciousness. I am dependent for all I call knowledge of the sensible on an infinite number of transcendental x es which I convert into y s. These transcendental x es are merely a series of dynamical shoves. If relativity of knowledge does not mean this, it has no meaning. It matters not in the least whether relativity takes the shape of a physiological, psychological, or ontological relativity. They are all the same at bottom as regards the verity and validity of my knowledge of phenomena. Those who think

they get rid of difficulties about Matter by transforming all the sensible into forms of Motion, merely substitute one kind of external cosmos (or chaos) for another: the philosophical question is not even touched thereby.

Fallacy in Terms.

6. The terms most commonly used in the discussion are Relative, Sensation, Idea, Form, Substance, Phenomenon. These words are too often used in such a way as to beg a theory or veil a fallacy. If, however, we can expose the fallacies in the use of the terms Relativity and Phenomenon, it will suffice.

7. "*Relative*" is used sometimes in the sense of the locally or personally relative, as when an object, whose constitution meanwhile remains unaltered, is bitter to one and sweet to another, or it may be to the same person in altered circumstances. There is the relative among things, as when we say that things are large or small, as measured by some common standard. And further, there is the relative involved in all knowledge, inasmuch as any one thing can be known only in relation of community or opposition to other things, or both. In none of these senses can the term be admitted into the discussion of the Relativity of Human Knowledge.

8. But even in philosophical discussion there is a sense in which "relative" is used, which is beside the question, and that is the sense of the limited or re-

stricted.¹ Knowledge is of course limited and restricted. This does not affect the *philosophical* question as to the validity—the truth—of what we *do* know.

9. The question, in fact, lies wholly between relativity proper and relativity in the sense of adaptation or transformation of the unknown x , in accordance with certain conditionings of the percipient subject. These two distinct uses of the term are, I hold, constantly confounded.

10. Nobody, I suppose, denies that knowledge is a relation, nor again that a knowledge of an object is a knowledge of a system of relations. Wherever there is Subject and Object, there is of necessity a *relation*, and the object, too, *is* itself a system of relations of² quantity, quality, etc. This strict and accurate use of the term is to be called *Relatedness*. Everybody recognizes Relatedness, and so it comes to be assumed that relatedness involves relativity; whereas, into the word “relativity” a new thought has been insinuated. Relativity, as that term is commonly used, is in truth relatedness *plus* adaptation of one of the terms of the relation to the other. And in this lies the fallacy.

11. A man may quite rationally maintain that there is an actually and independently existing scheme of

¹ Hamilton's “authorities” almost all refer to this sense of “Relative.”

² *Of* not *in*; otherwise there would be nothing to relate.

things, but that his knowledge of that scheme of things is merely a bringing of a certain object,—nature,—unknown *as it exists*, within the range of a certain kind of intelligence called human: which intelligence sees the object according to its own *kind*, and so constitutes it. In other words, we may hold that the subject creates for itself a coherent world, relatively valid for the purposes of the individual's existence, out of a world, really subsisting, it is true, but in its independent reality different (it may be) from the world of human intelligence, and for ever unknowable by it. This is substantially the doctrine of hypothetical realism: and, it is at once apparent that those who imagine that they save the external truth of percepts by affirming the non-mediateness of sensible perceptions, are in error and delude themselves, so long as they also maintain the relativity of human knowledge. This requires only to be stated, to be at once apparent. Relativity in their mouths must mean, if it means anything, the modification of an unknown external object, which is employed merely as a fulcrum, in or by the percipient subject: and, that being so, it throws no light on the validity of knowledge, to say that my sensible perceptions are the fruit of a direct or immediate communication between me and the external world. Indeed, the position is unintelligible. I cannot concern myself about the directness or indirectness of a knowledge which, after all, is not absolutely true and valid.

12. Neither a sensible nor an attitudinal subject, nor

an intelligent rational subject is possible, except as one of two factors. Neither sensation nor perception (to put it otherwise) is possible, except as a member of a duality—the one member being the Subject, the other member being the non-Subject or object. In other words, subject and object, in the sense of *inner and outer*, are necessarily terms of a relation: the one term involves the other. Now, if we look at this fact from the point of view of an assumed objective Creative Power—an absolute *ens realissimum*, of which all intelligences are mere passing forms, it is *prima facie* absurd to suppose that the scheme of creation involves at the very summit of its energising, which is the finite Reason, a suicidal act: that it creates in its highest effort an intelligent subject, while overturning in the very act of creation the *raison d'être* of that act, viz. percipience, or knowing. This consideration, while leading us to expect efficacy and validity in perception, disposes of the objections founded on the supposition of the total change which would be wrought on the object of perception by a modification of our senses. We are entitled to start with the *assumption* of a harmony between the conscious and the non-conscious, perfect equivalence between the idea and the ideatum. In sensation and percipience there is, as in everything else, a process of “Becoming.” Given an external object, that object *becomes* to my consciousness. Why should this process vitiate itself? The *onus probandi* lies on him who supposes it does. Whatever may be the range of a subject’s sensation or perception, the

sensible presentates as such, and so far as they go, are *truly* given to the subject. That is to say, it is possible for the subject, if it be a normal organism of its kind, to sense and perceive the sensible and perceptible as they exist, within its proper range of action.

13. Further, Relativity, in the sense of relatedness of subject to object, cannot involve invalidity. For if relatedness involves *invalidity*, and if relatedness is present, as it *must* be, wherever subject and object are present, knowledge is for ever impossible to all intelligences whatsoever. Nay, it becomes doubtful if even the Creator could know the objects of His own creation, after they have been placed out of Himself.

14. Again, the act whereby self thinks self would be subverted, inasmuch as self is here related to self through the act of diremption. The doctrine of relativity is, moreover, like scepticism, self-destructive, for the knowledge that knowledge is relative is itself a relative knowledge.

15. Relativity of knowledge, in the strict signification of the term relativity—*i.e.* relatedness, merely means, that in all knowledge there is a subject and object, and *therefore* necessarily a relation between them. If *such* relativity introduces an element of uncertainty, knowledge is for ever impossible (I repeat) for all intelligences whatsoever, whether in the body or out of the body. Herein lies the fundamental fallacy: because subject

and object—the condition of all possible knowing by intelligences, divine or human—are limbs of a relation, that is to say, because they involve each the other, *therefore* the relation in which the former necessarily stands to the latter is a “relative” relation, the term being now used surreptitiously in the *secondary* sense of modified or adapted. In other words, the very condition of all possible knowing is itself a destruction of the validity of the act of knowing, nay of the possibility of knowing, and converts knowledge itself into an illusion. The absurdity of this position is evident. The result of the doctrine is simply this, It is impossible to know, and this *by the very nature of the act of knowing*.

16. There is not only the relatedness between the subject conscious and the object in consciousness: there is the universal relatedness of things, the inter-reciprocity and community of all the parts of the whole. Such an experience in sense as a Thing *per se* is not given to us or (probably) to any possible mind. Indeed it never can be *per se* except in so far as it is *per aliud* and *in alio*: but the “how” of the “per se” *per alia* and *in aliis* seems to me outside the possibility of explanation. Yet the thing “for us” is the thing in itself (*an sich*): in other words, the thing we know as being so-determined is the thing as it is in its actuality. Why should it not be?

17. Our mere attitudinal consciousness, I conclude, is a true mirror of the external as it *there* exists. It is

not to be supposed that Nature, in the slow process of evolution, finally breaks down at the critical point of reflecting itself.

Naïf natural realism holds its ground.

III. "*The Phenomenal is ipso facto Relative*"—*Not so.*

18. As regards the word "*phenomenon*," there exists a fallacy as great as that which we find in relativity. Those who make play with this word, regard (if consistent) all data of sense as forms constituted by the subject, while they posit, as underlying these, "being" of some sort or another as the sole reality. This sole reality may be a merely limitative noumenal *x*. I admit that there seems to be a contradiction in terms in speaking of the reality of phenomenon, but is this not due to our first wilfully importing into the word phenomenon the notion of *semblance* in opposition to true being? We have no right to do this. The external presentate is the phenomenon, that is to say, it is the *modus existendi* of Being—Being *thus* or *thus*. But Being is not one "thing," and phenomenon another. The thing before us is Being *plus* its *modus existendi*, *i.e.* phenomenon. These are two sides of one and the same actuality. This will appear more clearly when we consider further the consciousness of "Being." All abstraction of one side of the actual fact from the other is merely logical—a necessary process in the search for truth. Each moment in the actuality bears home to us a truth. Phenomenon, or

the "sensible," is not, however, to be interpreted as crass matter. Here, too, we have to ascertain *what* it is we are really conscious of as external, and leave it there. It is certainly not crass matter that we are conscious of.

19. As to the speculative ontological difficulty which leads us to affirm only one possible Substance, the question should be put thus: Not, are sensible things as externalities possible, but are individual finite Egos possible? For from a strictly logical ontological position, it is quite as legitimate to understand the subsistence of a stone as the subsistence of a finite Ego. Are we to accept such finite individualities (even if their subsistence presents insoluble difficulties), or rest in the inevitable alternative that we ourselves are phantom shadows of shadows with an illusory freedom involving an inexplicable (and ridiculous) sense of moral responsibility? Phantom shadows truly, but with this further peculiarity, that we can detect the mockery of which we are the victims, and so, as it were, defeat the Creator on His own ground? The vast one, Fate, which overwhelms us, yet finds us defiant and supreme!

20. No one denies the fundamental unity of subject and object, inner and outer; to do so would be to set up two Gods. As a matter of fact, however, the movement of creation exists in a diremption, and our business is done when we have exhausted our analysis of experience. Better to leave irreconcilables standing than

involve ourselves in absurdities. Phenomenological metaphysic has simply to look and to record. Let us beware of confounding the constituting of a "thing" for conscious knowledge with constituting a "thing" for itself.

IV. *Recapitulation.*

1. The attuent consciousness receives external things, as already co-ordinated, in their co-ordination; and the capacity of the conscious Subject at this stage of mind-development is the capacity to receive as a *whole* (out there) parts in relation—in other words co-ordinated qualities in a whole or synopsis of Sense. The datum is not atomic or relationless, but an aggregate of relations mirrored and reflected as an aggregate, and undiscriminated as to its parts.

2. The attuent consciousness at the moment of receiving the "impression" of Extension (and all sense-impressions), locates them as outside itself, and as external, independent of itself, by a reflex action which is of the essence of consciousness. The idea "here" (to use Locke's expression) is also the thing "there." The conscious Subject is herein negated by the "other."

3. The Feeling of Being which we have with the phenomenon is placed outside in and with the phenomenal Object. (*Vid.* Chap. I.)

4. When further, Consciousness rises into Reason through the emergence in itself of Will, its primal predication is the aforesaid externality and independence of extension and all objects of sense; the formula being "That (there) is A, B, or C," etc. Externality is thus given as primary fact of attuition, and primary act of reason.

5. The negation of the conscious subject by the "other" is cancelled or negated by the act of subsumption which brings the other or "object" into a relation of unity with the subject. But immediately thereupon this negation of the first negation is again negated by the affirmation that the "thing" is *there*.

6. There is, therefore, a veritable dualism of finite subject and finite object.

7. Extension, being a universal of things, is consequently a universal of impression; but Extension as a *necessary* is not thus accounted for. (*Vid.* 9.)

8. Potential consciousness being stimulated by something not itself, externalizes that something as "object" by the necessity of its own nature (which I call reflex action) and thereby and therein becomes actual consciousness.

9. Further, the universal in recipience is also the

necessary in all thought involving outer sense. For all imagination of the sensible or the possible-sensible is itself in and through sense. How else can it be? The necessariness of Space is, therefore, an analytic necessary. If outerness is *as* Space, how can I image or think the outer save *as* Space, in other words how can I image or think Space save *as* Space? This illustrates what I mean by saying that Space is an *analytic* necessary.

10. When I am conscious of external Space, I am conscious of an indefinite entity or thing extended, or rather, a thing indefinitely extended in a series of mutually exclusive points—not of an empty space in which extended bodies are placed. I am also conscious of separate bodies extended, of figure, colour, and so forth; and this long before the new activity called Reason appears on the field to perceive what has been receptively sensed. The side-by-sideness and mutual externality of bodies does not presuppose a prior Space in which they are located here and there.¹ These bodies are themselves parts of all-pervading space—determinations of the universal externality of which they are a

¹ It is difficult to see how, on the assumption of the Kantian *a priori* Space-form, we can get localization,—*a* here, and *b* there, etc. It is easy to see how by means of a Space-form we (and *we* includes dogs and horses) invest the suggestions of sense with Extension as the condition of their being perceived. But how do we *dispose* these things? The same difficulty appears as regards sequences in Time.

part.¹ By which I do not mean that Space is a thing, but that I am conscious only of Spaced things, not of Space-abstract; *i.e.* Space is a predicate.

11. The *a* here of recipient consciousness is precisely similar to the *a* there of externality. The harmony of the Cosmos is to be assumed to hold here as it does elsewhere, unless potent reasons can be alleged for doubting it. It is only necessary to redargue objections in order to make the primary assumption safe. These objections (I have endeavoured to show) all turn on a fallacious use of the terms Relativity and Phenomenon. The condition of consciousness, which is relatedness, cannot *ipso facto* invalidate consciousness. The final movement of the cosmic evolution of Being, which movement is knowing, cannot be suicidal.

12. To the objection that certain (so-called secondary) qualities of the external, *e.g.* colour, sound, heat, etc., are wholly subjective, the answer is that qualities are, *quâ* subjective, mere *Schein* or illusion, not *Erscheinung* or true phenomenon. Certain impressions involve the sensory in pleasure and pain more than others, and thus it is that they are conceived and named in terms of the feeling, not in terms of the object. No competent observer will receive a first impression as the truth of the external. The external phenomenon is seen, as

¹ This primary consciousness of Space implies doubtless *units* of sensation, but it is only when these units have reached a certain quantity that I become aware of any impression whatsoever.

soon as I get rid of local excitement, to be a motion of some sort, and this phenomenon actually and externally subsists and exists as the physicist (not the ploughman) knows it.

13. The true sense-presentate in consciousness then is there outside me *so as* it is here inside me.

14. Yet all is phenomenon, *i.e.* the appearing side of existence, from which the being side cannot be dissociated without involving us in self-created gratuitous and wilful contradictions. The phenomenon *is*, the phenomena *are*. Nor do these phenomena present themselves to consciousness (save perhaps the vulgar consciousness) as substantive crass matter. We feel and we perceive *only qualities*—qualities quiescent and movent, statical and dynamical—all as in relation. The “thing” is, in brief, a system of predicates and relations *plus* Being (and dialectic as this will be more fully exhibited in the sequel). As to the inscrutable noumenon, it is simply thought there and thought here in me. Such seems to be the actual fact yielded by a critical psychology, and it has to be accepted and made the best of. For all I know, there *may* be a material entity in the vulgar sense, but I can neither see it nor imagine it, nor in any way think it. The philosopher, like the physical investigator, must honestly accept and report what he actually finds. Even if his doing so should involve thought in insoluble contradictions, that is not his fault. I am well aware that by the

naïve acceptance of the "other" of Feeling inner and outer, I evade some difficulties rather than solve them, and I plunge into others. But I submit that while the *datum* may be described and defined in its ultimate terms and relations, it is impossible to get beyond the simple acceptance of it; and as to contradictions, it must suffice if we can show that they must arise in a finite intelligence simply because it is finite.

Note.—Egoistic idealism, in the mere affirmation of Ego as sole reality, *eo ipso* posits the other as Fichte said and Hegel confirmed. The Hegelian thought is directed to the reduction of this "other" to a moment in the universal dialectic—a result which to philosophic faith is an irresistible conclusion, but which it is impossible scientifically to demonstrate.

THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.—THE COMMON OR GENERAL.

The Process Generally.

LET us now resume our tracking of the march of intelligence or Will-Reason.

Were all objects isolated from one another and wholly different, were not all things parts of one system, were there not a universal community or *commercium*, our knowledge would consist simply of an arithmetical enumeration of unconnected facts—unmeaning atoms. There could be no mediation, no abstraction, no generalization, no reduction to cause, no systematic view of nature, at all possible. This community is not merely a community of Being, one, simple and universal in all and each, but a community of predication. Through the like in the different, and the different in the like, it is that our knowledge of the particular in feeling passes into the universal and is capable of rationalization. This community and reciprocity is a fact of external nature: we approach, and finding it *there*, endeavour to interpret it by the organon—Reason.

1. The prehensive movement of Will (as we have seen) seizes the totality of attuition, and, by prehending it and subsuming it into the unity of consciousness, raises the attuit to a percept. But while the totalities or aggregates as such are perceived, the ground of the difference of each from the other is as yet, though existing and *felt*, lying in vague attuition alone. Will then breaks up the totalities by a series of separations of their constituent parts, thus perceiving each; and gathering these parts or elements together transforms the percept of the synoptic totality to the percept of a unity—a unity in perception which is an individual or sense-concept—a true and rational synthesis.

2. But all the while, and prior to the action of reason, the datum which we thus raise to a unity in perception is *there* as a unity, and exists by virtue of all that is in it and its relations, positive and negative. The function of Reason is simply knowing and interpreting what is already there. But so far as the Subject is concerned, the external unity exists, at first, only for the *attuent* consciousness and consequently as an aggregate or total, and not yet as a unity. In all our subsequent percipient separation of the various elements which enter into this attuit or synopsis, there is a constant sub-reference to the said *whole* in attuition; and this sub-reference to a *whole* goes on while we are making play (so to speak) with analysis, with a view to the transformation of the whole into a unity. If a final and true synthesis be not possible, this is due to the

fact that a final analysis (diathesis) is not possible, for the elements in an object have infinite relations. None the less, however, have the objects definite characters; a horse is a horse, and not a man, and I can render a fairly good account of both. [The discussion of the question of the possibility of the identity of a concrete in sense is here postponed.]

3. While we are yet in the stage of perceiving a complex attuit as a whole, a total, and a single, the characteristics of that attuit which chiefly impress themselves on sensation are those which are the most salient and prominent; and those salient characteristics, though only as yet in feeling, constitute the ground of our consciousness of difference. The distinctness of the percept of the total attuit is, to a large extent, as yet numerical, the prominent characters of the object being only confusedly sensed. The total as perceived is not a sense-concept at all, but the perception of an attuit, a conglomeration of sense-impressions felt to be different from other conglomerations which press on us. It is, *quâ* percept, clear.

4. The most prominent character of the attuit is thereafter the first to be truly perceived, and this apparently without effort; and it is precisely that which is most largely shared by other objects than the one which is at any one time present to us. Thus, "leafy-branchedness" may be the first complex percept of an oak; naturally so, for this is the salient character

or quality by which it first impresses the merely attitudinal consciousness (like that of a dog or the nascent intelligence of a child) before the spontaneous movement which completes itself in perception, comes into play. As all other trees and even shrubs share this prominent quality, they will all fall into a common class and be designated by the same *name*. We thus start on the long journey which leads to knowledge with a Common or General—a pseudo-general, it is true, but still a general. A barren result as yet.

5. This name—the name of the most assertive differentiate—now becomes the leading element in the sense-concept of this or that tree or shrub; and the said name becomes the “subject” of future ampliative judgments. It symbolizes the thing as phenomenon and also the thing as being.

6. The very fact and act of separating the most assertive differentiate and fixing it by a name as of plural or general application to a series of objects, throws into relief in consciousness the specific characters of each of that series; and thus the Will whose essence it is to move, energize, and separate (and when separating to affirm) gains bit by bit on the totality before it.

7. The first “name” is *used* as a general or common (a spurious common) but it is not perceived or known as a *Common* until specific differentiates in the individuals of the series are perceived or known.

The commonness of character was in fact up to this time only *attituted as commonness*: it is now perceived, known, and affirmed as Common, and becomes a true and rational (though it may be wholly inadequate) General.

8. The restless Will is thus continually striving by the necessity of its nature after the separate, the single, the simple, which it can never reach. It is the individual it seeks in order that it may know. It is in this search after singulars that it has now found the General as such. The fact that there is "commonness" among things is now recognized as well as the fact (already recognized) that there is difference: and thus the General becomes an object of conscious and *purposed* search, just as search for difference had already become a conscious and purposed end.

CHAP. II.—THE NATURE OF THE ACT OF PERCEIVING THE
COMMON OR GENERAL¹ MORE FULLY CONSIDERED.

1. THE Ego (*i.e.* the attuent subject generating the spontaneity called Will, or, let us say, functioning Will, and thereby transforming itself into Ego) in its desire toprehend or know, now goes on with conscious purpose seeking for and seizing the characteristic which is *common* to many external objects, just as it consciously seeks for and seizes the different and the specific in the individual. The acts are really of the same kind. The latter is merely the affirmation or knowing of one quality *plus* the affirmation that it is predicable of a single external totality; the former is the same affirmation *plus* the affirmation that it is predicable of more than a single totality. The mere dynamic power of Will is such that it can affirm a quality, and at the same time affirm or sub-affirm plurality of reference for that quality, by a rapid repetition in thought of the objects in which that quality has been perceived as common.

2. This infinitely rapid repetition in thought of numerous objects becomes, however, very soon un-

¹ The terms "Generals" or "Commons" seem to be better than "Universals" or "Predicaments." The last word is better reserved for *à posteriori* Categories; and "Universals" for those predicables which apply to all objects whatsoever, *e.g.* Quantity, Quality, etc.

necessary ; because the fact of commonness as such—as a thing to be sought for and found—has been already affirmed. It is enough accordingly to think the percept, as an entity of thought, *e.g.* “greenness,” or “hardness” or “roughness,” to call up to consciousness all that is indicated by these terms as commons, whether we call them common qualities (with silent reference to the objects), common percepts (with silent reference to the subject perceiving), or common terms (with silent reference to the vocable by which these qualities or percepts are denoted). The Will, in short, affirms the quality and *also* the fact that it has already been affirmed to be common (*e.g.* “ruminantness” is a quality of all cows) without again entering into the detail of its common character as that was originally discerned through the perception of the like quality in successive objects. The Will is *supported* in doing this (not enabled to do it) by the device of language which furnishes quantitative words (“many” or “all”) that symbolize the affirmed *fact* of community. These give a visible or audible (sensuous) explicit utterance in a proposition to what otherwise would be a silent affirmation. The entitative name itself, by colligating a series of prior and particular silent affirmations, largely facilitates the progress of the will in knowing, names (as has been well said) being the fortresses of thought.

3. A Generalization accordingly is a simple act of Will concentrated on a single separated percept *and*

also a second or synchronous act of Will affirming that this percept has been found in many objects. This second act is symbolized by the word "many" or "all" when the observations have been completed with reference to some group such as "man" or "cow," and is expressed in the form of a proposition; *e.g.* "all cows are ruminant" (*i.e.* ruminantness is in all cows). This verbal device consolidates, by vocalizing, the numerous separate and prior acts of Will. The Will affirms the percept, and then or at the same time affirms the generality of the percept, *i.e.* its predicability of a fixed or indefinite number of individuals. If predicable of many individuals, it may be called a plural common (or partial generalization); if predicable of *all* of a class, then it will be called a general common (a generalization proper).

4. Thus we have, first, the act of Will in fixing a particular quality apart from the other qualities in consociation with which it first enters consciousness; secondly, the act of Will in keeping this quality present to consciousness while discerning and affirming its presence in another object than that in which it was first discerned, and in various successive objects. For example, the affirmation of the quality "green" in grass is a separating or differentiating act. All separating is affirming, in other words constitutes the separate a notional entity, and thus makes it possible to think and speak of the separate as an entity (*e.g.* *greenness*) apart, as it would seem, from any or all of the objects in which it is originally perceived. I say

"as it would seem," for it is manifest that when we hold "*greenness*" in consciousness, we hold it there as we originally found it, namely, as *greenness* of some particular object, or as greenness of many objects. The separation is a mere logical step on the way to synthesis. In short, a *particular separate* is merely the affirmation of a quality held apart in consciousness by the force of Will *plus* the affirmation, that it is in one object: the *same* notional entity of separation held in consciousness along with the sub-affirmation that it has been perceived in more than one object or external totality is a *common* or *general separate*.

All this is due to the energy of the new potency, Will. Animals cannot do what man does, for want of Will.

5. Before leaving this part of our analysis let us not omit to notice the necessary condition of the affirmation that a quality in A is like a quality in B (or rather that $A=B$ in respect of C); namely this, that I cannot affirm likeness in B to A without holding present to perception two objects at one and the same moment of experience. I must be conscious either of both together as presentates (immediate objects), or representates (mediate objects), or of one as a presentate and the other as a representate, in order to make it possible that I should affirm the similarity of one to the other. Both acts of perception must be in consciousness at the same moment, the one as a memory, the other either as a present, immediate percept or

as a memory. There is in this fact a new exhibition of the potency of Will: it prehends not merely A, but also, *at the same time* and by the same act B. Were A and B not coexistent in consciousness the comparison and identification of the consciousnesses would manifestly be impossible. So also, when I hold "greenness" or any other percept in consciousness as a "Common," I affirm "greenness," and I also affirm *at the same time* that it is a common. There are two synchronous acts of Will. All this seems to me to be simply the result of the sheer dynamic force of Will as prime and primary moment in the dialectic of Reason; though at each step, of course, Will moves within its own dialectic.

CHAP. III.—ABSTRACT-PERCEPT.—ABSTRACT-CONCEPT.

(a) Abstract-Percepts.

1. THE result of differentiation, so far as the object is concerned, I have generally spoken of as a *separate*,¹ avoiding, for sufficient reasons, the more common word *abstraction*, which word, moreover, generally presumes that we hold apart in contemplation the abstracted quality.

2. The process whereby the Will, working according to the movement of dialectic (see "*Form of Percipience*"), reaches a common or general proposition has been traced; and I think it has appeared that what is called a General proposition—that is, a proposition in which something is affirmed of all of a class of individuals, such as the "Cow class" or "Tree class" or "Man class"—differs from what we have called a plural Common (or partial generalizate) in respect to quantity alone. Further, that this general proposition is simply an explicit enunciation of what is already implicit in the general term. If this be so, we get rid of much confusion which attends the subject of

¹ It is desirable to distinguish an act from its result, and when the language itself furnishes us with past as well as present participles, we should use them. Abstraction is used in the ordinary, not the Kantian, sense.

Generals and General propositions, and at the same time confirm the history of the intellectual process which has been given in the preceding chapters. The provisional statement "two, or twenty, cows are horned" differs in no respect save quantity from the proposition "all cows are horned." Both are simply colligations of particular observations effected by the bare force of Will.

And if we emphasize the qualitative percept in consciousness and conversely say "hornedness is to twenty cows," there is in the percept "hornedness" in this connection nothing more than when we say "hornedness is to two cows," or "hornedness is to one cow." This may seem obvious; and yet it will well repay the labour of tracing the movements of intelligence which result in general propositions, and in common or general terms, if we have shown that there is nothing in the whole process save a more intense energy of the potency of Will exercised for the purpose of consolidating, abbreviating, and facilitating the act of Knowing.

3. For we thereby show that the abstract-percept "greenness," "hornedness," or any other, which we endeavour to affirm and entertain apart from the object which these percepts qualify, is in truth only a separated quality or percept *plus* the sub-affirmation that it is common to many objects. We have justified this power of double affirmation by showing that the potency of the Will is competent to two or more synchronous perceptions, knowings and affirmations. We have still further elucidated our position by our detec-

tion of the true nature of the perceiving or knowing act, which is simply an act of Will arresting, affirming, and subsuming the existence of that which is present for the moment to consciousness. It matters not whether the object present be a tree, a man, or simply a *quality* of an object: it is by the Will subsumed and affirmed as *existing*. Thus it happens that the separated percept is affirmed as existing, and its separate entity becomes more prominent to thought (through opposition) as the number of objects of which it is predicable increases. The consciousness becomes confused with the multitude of individuals, and thus, by very contrast, the one separated percept which is being affirmed as a common or general is more distinctly thrown into relief and stands forth as if truly itself an entity. The Will, exhausted by the mass of sub-affirmations, is driven, for the very safety of knowledge itself which is in danger of overwhelmment, to affirm the entity of the separate common with a kind of affected emphasis; to know "hard" as it were.

Such, it seems to me, is the natural history of Generals in so far as they are separated or abstracted *Percepts*.

(b) *Abstract-Concepts.*

1. We have not yet however exhausted this subject when we have shown that a separate percept does not alter its character (save quantitatively) when it becomes a Common and may be styled an abstract-general. There is another and more delusive form of "Generals"

or "Universals," as they are often without distinction called. I mean, "Abstract-general *things* or concepts." We do well to bring to light and keep apart the different kinds of abstract-generals: otherwise we shall wander in mazes from which extrication is impossible. It may be that a few clear adequate distinctions, in the elements of knowing, are of more service both as a discipline and as a fruitful source of further knowing, than an elaborate system of thought through which some secret error pursues its devious and vicious way.

2. Let us then look at the natural history of the Abstract General Concept. The preceding movements of the Will towards the formation of general propositions (which is simply the forcible and mechanical colligating of many single observations), and the subsequent step of isolating or abstracting percepts and entertaining them as entitative commons or generals, presuppose an elementary and prior, though spurious and attitudinal, generalization or arranging in classes, according to some prominent character of the objects for the time within range. When the totality in attuition "Cow" falls within the range of Will and is perceived, affirmed and named, this is the act of differentiation from all other totalities of the animal kind; and the salient quality thus named in the word "Cow" [let us call it "milk-giving"] is in fact the specific *difference* of this animal which has been by Will discerned. The object "Cow" is now known by this difference from all other animal objects hitherto

observed. Doubtless in the early stages of percipient life, "Cows," "Deer," and even "Horses," are all confounded, as they constantly are by infants. The totality in perception, which is a "Cow," would doubtless in the course of time separate *itself* from the totality "Deer" by the frequent impression on the senses of some salient quality in the one animal which was not found in the other, even if we were not endowed with Will and its consequent perception. But since we are so endowed, the Will does not wait for any such slow external operation of mere impression, but itself goes forth in an untiring search for difference. "Cow," "Deer," "Horse," continue to be sensed as *similar* totalities, but the active discerning Will has discovered that they in one or more respects so markedly differ that they must be differently *named*; *named*, because I cannot reach difference without, by the impulse of my nature, seeking to give sensuous form (articulated and audible or script) to all that is distinctly seized as a Percept. These differencings or perceptions break up the chaotic totality in perception, as we have before shown, and find something else and other there than that first quality which constituted the difference affirmed and named, as "Cow" (viz., milk-giving). The new difference may be for example the relative swiftness of the two objects; and the new act of Will in discriminating a Deer from a Cow may be expressed simply by the differences "slow-cow-animal," "fleet-cow-animal."

3. The two similar totalities are now broken up into

these two differentiated totalities, each representing its own class of individuals. The first step is in truth now taken towards transforming the perceived totality "Cow" into a "perceived unity" or concept, for there is now a conscious binding together of two percepts into *one* whole—viz., the percept Cow or "milk-giving," and the percept "slow."

4. Thus the process of differentiating (which is knowing), goes on until the unity in perception, the crude sense-concept or primary synopsis, becomes the rich and full object which in these days it is to all, but especially to him who applies his Will specially to the animal class of totalities and *knows* it as a professional naturalist. In the presumed case, "slow, milk-giving animal" is all that is, as yet, discerned in the sensible presentate *Cow*, and constitutes (not the totality in perception, which is in reality much more, though as yet unknown, but) the *unity* in perception, which is what we mean by a rational sense-concept—a first synthesis.

5. There are, however, as we soon find, an indefinite number of individuals answering to this unity in perception, and these vary in size, colour, and even, somewhat, in shape. And, accordingly, when, in the absence of the object, I am called on in the course of thought or conversation to reproduce in consciousness the thing "Cow," I do not image to myself this or that particular cow, but a cow generally—an abstract cow. What I hold in thought is something different from any par-

ticular cow known to me, and if it were not so, it would often happen that I could not talk of the "thing" without involving myself in contradictions. What now of this Cow-general? It would seem as if there were some new element or material introduced into the sphere of knowledge. Consciousness is brought into the presence of a strange and seemingly inexplicable phenomenon: a cow which is no cow, and yet every cow—a notional or ideal cow—the idea of a cow.

6. Berkeley's opinion and Hume's on this question seem to be approximately correct; but they have this defect, that they are statements of the view on one side of the argument which, though persuasive by their clearness, are not convincing, inasmuch as they fail to reveal the genetic growth, and therefore the true character, of this novel fact of consciousness, and may therefore be met with apparently equal force by a counter-statement of the opposite view. Now, we can find the true state of this case, as of every other, only by attending to the birth and growth of knowledge.

7. And so distinctly does this historical or phenomenological mental attitude bring to view the truth, that we may take the very case which now perplexes us, and whose growth as a concept we have traced, and we shall see that the difficulty attending a General or Abstract-concept is explained by referring the phenomenon to the potency of Will in concipience, in like

manner as we have already explained an Abstract-percept, singular and general, and its illusory independent entity.

8. When the Will prehends the various qualities which are present in the unity of perception, and finds that the multitude of objects already classed as "slow and milk-giving animals," or "cows," vary in colour, size, and shape, although still "cows," it takes the liberty (already exemplified by the manner in which it constitutes a single percept into an intellectual entity) to construct for itself a unity in conception from which unity it deliberately excludes whatever quality *it pleases*.

9. When, therefore, "cow" is entertained in consciousness without reference to any particular cow, it is not at all the "unity in perception" of a particular cow which is kept present by the Will and held to represent all other cows, but *that unity in perception alone* which the Will has *chosen* to constitute a "cow" *for thought*. It is no cow at all; but simply a certain number of qualities abstracted from individuals which the Will has tied together in the unity of concipience, and on which it confers a provisional or *quasi* entity. When we speak of a "cow" in the generic sense we speak of a knowledge, not of a thing—an ideal (intellectually constituted image), not a real.

10. True it is that we cannot hold in consciousness the unity in conception—this abstract concept—this *ens rationis*—this factitious thing of knowledge, without

its forcing before us some particular thing of sense—some image; for the Will, in its struggle to overpower nature and to emerge above the sensible, does not ever wholly succeed, and the forms of sense are, consequently, always pressing forward and claiming a place where they have none of right. But the sense-suggestion obtrudes itself (like sense-suggestions in the moral sphere) only to be denied and to be excluded from the sphere of the knowledge at present in question—which is a knowledge based on an act of Will—*i.e.* on the power which the Will has to subsume and affirm one set of percepts while excluding another set, permanently or provisionally, from alliance with them. Precisely in the same manner we saw its power to affirm a quality (percept) and synchronously to affirm its residence in many objects.

11. The whole difficulty is removed (to my mind) by the distinction which a watchful tracing of the workings of intelligence brings into prominence—the distinction between the totality in perception and the abstract unity in conception. It is not at all alleged that the generic thing “Cow” *necessarily* excludes from itself, as a unity in knowledge, the totality as it is in perception. The two *may* correspond simply because each cow as yet seen by us may be in all respects like every other cow. The sense-concept as a reality and the abstract rational unity (the abstract-general) in such a case *happen* to coincide and are merely numerically different. All that is insisted on is that the rational unity, which is the

“Cow-general,” has nothing of sense about it (save its origin in respect of its matter), and is simply a bundle of affirmations (which may or may not correspond to any individual cow of sense) colligated by the force of Will and rolled into a quasi-entity capable of being predicated of every possible cow. Will, in brief, which is the source of all reason and all knowledge, has created a rational unity (call it if you please a generic cow), by affirming and colligating certain qualities as constitutive of that unity and negating certain other qualities, although they may have entered sense in company with those which are selected for the first constituting of the unity in knowledge. And this unity can be entertained in consciousness and held together as a ghostly entity by the marvellous potency of Will, which resolutely denies and extrudes any affirmation or intrusion of the original totalities in sense-attuition.

12. Such entity, however, as this rational unity or concept has, is neither more nor less than the independent entity possessed by *percepts*, such as “blackness” or “warmth,” when these qualities, being separated from objects, are affirmed by themselves. An “ideal” cow is a cow in idea; a cow *in* idea is a cow *of* idea—a cow of Will. So much for that remarkable Kantian invention—an *à priori* monogram.

13. It is sufficiently clear that the abstract-percept and the abstract-concept alike are accompanied by the sub-affirmation that they exist in certain things. An

actual and objective existence is assigned to them as in the things from which they have been taken ; but more than this they do not convey. And from this we learn that abstracts, whether percepts or concepts or "laws," should never be dealt with by thought save as actualized in things apart from which they have significance, but no reality of existence.

14. Thus we find, when we cast a retrospect over the past analysis, that all the phenomena of Reason-intelligence (as distinguished from the attuition-intelligence of animals) which successively present themselves to our expanding consciousness are merely the successive efforts of the restless Will to prehend by separation and entitative affirmation more than it has yet prehendend. Not content with aggressively advancing on sensible phenomena and seizing the totalities in attuition and so transforming them into totalities in perception, it seizes the parts of these totalities and constitutes unities in perception, *i.e.* individual concepts ; it seizes the parts of these parts ; it seizes, moreover, two or more parts in different unities of perception and holds them in conjunction ; it affirms likeness and unlikeness of these ; it affirms the singular percept as such (abstract) ; it seizes and affirms this percept as a common or general ; it holds together as an abstract unity whatever it pleases ; it again lets that unity dissolve itself ; and it also dissolves what comes before it as a unity and so detects the delusive tendency of its own forceful habit of constructing entities.

15. Not only does the Will thus seize and differentiate, particularize and generalize, combine and dissolve; it seizes (as we have here been doing) in its grip, its own energizing, its own acts of prehension, and constitutes prehension, in all the above shapes, an object of contemplation. It thus constitutes *Knowing* as such and *per se* an object of pursuit; for it not only seizes and thus knows, but it *desires* to seize *that it may* know this or that: nay more, it seizes the act of knowing, as we have been endeavouring to do, and separates and disentangles the secret processes of its own working; and much more than this (although of the same kind), as we shall, in the sequel, see. Knowing, simply as knowing, becomes a delight and may become a passion, because in it lies the victory of Reason and the joy of truth. To know the true and the good and to make these actual is the final cause of man.

16. But even a power so great as this at last breaks down. The manifold in sense threatens to overpower it in its search after likeness and unlikeness; and besides, these are often difficult to discover. Knowledge in its various forms is struggling painfully with its own multiplex vastness, when it happily finds made to its hands a new tool—a new instrument whereby to subdue nature and the phenomenal; a tool, however, which it has been already unwittingly using in its rudimentary form; for it lies latent in

the *form* of the initial act of Percipience itself—in other words, in Dialectic.

We are still, in truth, in the merely rudimentary stages of intelligence-movement: we must now advance.

Remark.—It is usual in psychological and logical treatises to introduce “abstraction” in connection with generalization as if only in connection with the latter did the former make its appearance as an act of mind. Our analysis, however, shows that the act of percipience—the rudimentary act of all intelligence—is as an act of separation an act of abstraction. I isolate or abstract this or that as it already exists in attuition, and, proceeding mediately, I subsume and affirm it.

The generalized percept is simply this act and the concurrent sub-affirmation that the percept exists in many. (It is, I think, a misuse of language to call this a concept.) The generalized concept, again, is simply a synthesis of percepts and the concurrent affirmation that this synthesis exists in many.

Also I may here say that in current books on psychology, sense-perception is constantly confounded with sense-conception. Perception is always *de singulis*. I need scarcely add that with sensational psychologists Sensation and Perception are hopelessly mixed.

CHAP. IV.—FORM OF MEDIATION AS THE FORM OF PERCEPTION, COMPARISON, ABSTRACTION, GENERALIZATION, REASONING, AND CAUSAL INDUCTION.

1. IN seeking through likeness and unlikeness for generals, the potency of Will is early exhausted. It could not, without snapping the too tense string of thought, hold distinctly present to itself innumerable and ever-growing percepts, and the fact of their likenesses and differences. It must either find an expedient for abbreviating and simplifying its heavy task, or give up its pursuit of the general altogether.

2. Nay, it has already, unwittingly as it were, found that expedient and has been secretly putting it in operation in a rudimentary form. For when we spoke of the synchronous existence in consciousness of B and C (either as presentates or representates) as being the necessary condition of comparison between them (that is to say, their synchronous existence, either as immediate or imaged objects of perception), there was already indicated in this statement the new and marvellous machinery of intelligence which we are in search of.

If I say that the sea and grass are alike in respect of the quality "greenness," the sea alone being present

to my immediate contemplation as a presentate, while grass is present only as a memory or representate, the procedure is as follows:—Greenness (A) is a quality of the sea (B); A is also a quality of the *representate* of grass (C^1); $C^1=C$; A is a quality of grass C. The representate is affirmed to hand down to me a true record of the presentate; but in the case in question (a very usual one), I know the presentate through its remembered image only. I desire to connect B and C, and I do so through C^1 . There is thus, in a rudimentary form, an act of mediate perception. Two extremes—B and C—are brought together, through a middle C^1 .

3. Thus the range of Knowing is extended, not merely by one step, but indefinitely: immediate perception has a wide field of observation, doubtless, but not so wide or so important in its results as *mediate* perception. There is the memory of two separate judgments, but this memory would suffice only for these separate judgments, and no further, were it not for this entirely new phenomenon of intelligence, whereby the two are seen to fructify into a third.

4. This same mediating power is meanwhile also facilitating the progress of the acquisitive intelligence in its search after commons or generals; and Will would, as we have said above, become exhausted were it not supplied with this new machinery (for it is manifestly of the nature of machinery, and not itself a new potency). I affirm that “greenness” is

common to A B C and D, or even a larger number of distinct sense-concepts, all held present to consciousness as presentates or representates (as the case may be). Successive perceptions and affirmations, however, multiply beyond the power of the Will to retain them together in knowledge for purposes of comparison; and this impotence necessitates a resort to some expedient, such as that just brought into view. For example, in affirming the likeness of the twentieth observation of "greenness" to the nineteenth, we not only affirm *this*, but we also affirm the similarity of the twentieth to all that the nineteenth has been previously ascertained to be (or to contain) in respect of that particular similarity; and as the nineteenth has been affirmed to be like eighteen prior observations, the twentieth is also like these *by being like the nineteenth*.¹

¹ That the above statements are open to question in some respects I see, but that the *process* is as I have described will be admitted, if we consider the only other possible supposition. It might be said, for example, that there are only two judgments involved in the affirmation that the twentieth object is like the nineteen preceding in respect of "greenness," viz., first, the judgment that the twentieth is green, and secondly, that it is like the nineteen preceding percepts in respect of greenness. But what we have already established regarding Generals, shows that in every General there is the affirmation of a particular *plus* a second affirmation that this particular is like, or represents, as the case may be, many particulars. Accordingly when I say that the twentieth is like nineteen preceding percepts *all of which are green* (it being impossible for me to hold nineteen distinct percepts in consciousness at once), I, in truth, affirm the likeness of the twentieth to the nineteenth, and in addition to this I sub-affirm a certain quality—greenness—as in the twentieth; this quality is like that observed in nineteen preceding objects. But I am not

5. It appears then that when, in the work of comparison, the objects exceed that number which can be readily held in presentative or representative perception as separate observations and be immediately seen to be alike, we find ourselves competent to add a new fact of likeness by the device of indirect or *mediate perceiving*; e.g. as above, $20=19$, and $19=1+2+3$, etc. to 18: therefore, $20=1+2+3$, etc. to 18. Thus, twenty successive A's are found to be like, and we get the general able to affirm greenness as in all the nineteen, and as the nineteenth has already been affirmed to be like the eighteen preceding it, the twentieth is also and therethrough like those eighteen. The observation of the nineteenth was not merely the judgment "nineteenth is green"; for I did not leave it until it also contained the judgment, this "nineteenth is like the preceding eighteen," and therefore, so far as future comparison might go, contained in it those eighteen.

Again: to say that the object twenty is in respect of greenness like nineteen preceding objects, is in fact to say that twenty is like the general affirmation: "all these nineteen objects are green"; that is to say, that a quality or percept in a certain object is like the general affirmation of a quality or percept. That a quality should be like an affirmation is manifestly absurd. It might also be said that there are only to be found these two propositions, "the twentieth is green," and "the twentieth is like nineteen or any one of nineteen in respect of greenness." If so, the knowledge attained would be only of one or two resemblances and stop there; unless we repeated the whole process twenty times, concluding with the colligative affirmation, "All these twenty which we have surveyed are alike." But this is *not* the mental history of the growth of a knowledge of resemblance, as we shall at once see, if we imagine a larger number than twenty and say two hundred. The Will as it adds to its stock of resembling percepts, becomes afflicted with imbecility, and finds ready to its hand the abbreviating process of mediation just as in an earlier stage it found in itself the power to generalize or colligate many under one affirmation, and thereby to signalize its advancing and victorious march by the erection of fortresses to hold the country overrun.

proposition, "All these twenty A's are green," as a matter of fact, not as an induction.

Thus, here, as in the connection of the presentate with its representate (*par.* 2), we have a very early introduction to mediation in the search after likenesses and generals. In the primary act of perceiving, then, in comparing, and in generalizing, we see Will as a self-sprung potency, operating on sensuous data; and further, as essential to its operation, nay, as constituting the *very form* of its movement, we find Mediation—the perception of the truth of one thing through the perception of the truth of another. The process is formulated in the axiom, "Things that are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another."

7. The sole object which, at this stage of intelligence, the new machinery subserves, is the attainment of predications of likeness and unlikeness and of generals. It is a way or method of getting at what would otherwise escape us as being beyond the direct potency of Will. It is mediate or indirect perception as opposed to immediate or direct perception.

8. It is also the skeleton Form of the Syllogism: *e.g.* Socrates is mortal through the mediate concept "Man," since the general concept "Man" comprehends mortality.

9. Again, it is the Form of the inductive Syllogism of inference which concludes a universal, *e.g.* $A^1 A^2 A^3$,

etc. have x: these *represent* all A's; therefore, all A's have x. The mediate here is the proposition, "These represent all A's." [A pseudo-induction or colligation is merely the force of Will, holding together particulars in a bundle.]

10. The Induction of Cause, again, is also a mediated conclusion (which conclusion is merely a synthesis of necessary sequence following on an analysis of facts); but in this case the process of mediation is through negation and exclusion. To ascertain the cause of any effect we merely isolate the former and perceive it; but this will be considered more fully in the sequel.

11. Thus, the Mediating Form appears *first* in the primary act of simple Percipience, in which the mediate is Negation (Law of Contradiction); then, in Comparison, in which the mediate is some other percept; then, in Abstraction and Generalization, in which the mediate is the Negation of other percepts than *that* selected as an Abstract-percept, and of *those* selected to constitute an Abstract or General-concept; then, in Deductive Syllogizing, in which the mediate is a General-concept; then, in Inductive Syllogism, in which the mediate is a Proposition. At the basis of the whole is the pure power of Will, separating what it pleases to separate, and binding together, by sheer force, what it pleases to bind together. But the same fundamental *Form* of Will-movement is always at work, appearing in more and more complex shapes.

Thus, all action of Reason is but a repetition of the primal act of Percipience, and in this rudimentary dialectic movement the whole of Formal Logic is contained. This dialectic is the mechanism whereby we know. [And, if I may here anticipate, this Dialectic is the form or ratio of existence.]

12. To those who seem to bear a grudge at the very existence of the syllogism, as containing nothing in its conclusion, which is not already in its major and minor, and who condemn it because of this alleged unfruitfulness, we may here say: *First*, that they condemn the process by which intelligence intellects (inference through mediation); *Secondly*, that since all they know is due to this syllogistic process, as the primary interwoven law of knowing, it is *all*-fruitful. *Thirdly*, that the self-conscious evolution of the law, in its various applications, and the tracing of it through its subordinate modes and figures, must be always a disciplinal study (though its importance in this respect may be much exaggerated); and that, in the application of formal rules to particular and general concepts, it quickens the action of intelligence and opens up the whole realm of fallacies of matter, no less than of form. In studying Logic, a youth is studying all the sciences at once, and it ought to be the universal propaedeutic for every special application of intellect.

CHAP. V.—MEDIATION AS GENERAL FORM OF
PERCIPIENCE OR KNOWING.

(*Repetition.*)

1. WE have found that even in the simple act of Percipience the Will energizes by means of the Laws of Excluded Middle, Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity, which so-called Laws are merely the explicit enunciation of the actual process of the Will-movement. It seems desirable at this stage to look more closely into those mental operations which have forced themselves before us in the growth of knowledge, regarding them however merely in their modal or formal aspect.

2. The law of Excluded Middle is sometimes spoken of as if it were a Derivative Law. It is in point of fact the prius of all movements of the Will in perceiving. Its form is, "A is either A or B or C; A is not B or C; (therefore) A is A." The law of Identity, $A = A$ (which appears even in mere attuition as the *feeling of sameness*), exists, and can exist, in *rational* consciousness only as the posterius of the law of Contradiction "A is not B."

3. In so far as identity is the *prius* (which it must be) of the law of Contradiction, it exists, I repeat, only as feeling in attitudinal (non-rational)

consciousness. In *rational* consciousness the Will moves in the net of the Law, thus: "the thing before me, *i.e.* A or the vague sense-totality already in attitudinal consciousness, is *not B—nor C—nor other things*: THEREFORE, it is A; or $A=A$." The Will-reason is utterly unable to affirm anything about the object present to it, either that it is A or anything else, except as the sequent of the negating of B, C, etc. Nor does the rational movement confine itself to negating B, but it negatives also *omnia alia*, unless we chose to take B as containing *omnia alia* in its implication.

4. Now compare this process with the formal statement of the law of Excluded Middle as given above, and it will appear that this law contains a movement which is, in truth, sub-positd in the laws of Identity and Contradiction in their relation to perception. For when I perform the operation which results in the *affirmation* of $A=A$ under the laws of Identity and Contradiction, I implicitly affirm (and this affirmation determines the result) that "the thing before me is *either A or B*, or something else: it is not B or something else, *therefore*, it is A: or, $A=A$."

5. This implicit negation *determines* the result—the conclusion. And this also is demonstrable; for I cannot escape a "therefore" as the herald of the conclusion. In other words the simple perception "A is A" is mediated, and so necessitated, *through* the negative affirmations that it is not B nor anything

else, on the presumption that it is either A or something else.

6. Thus the process of Reason in Percipience may receive the general name of the "Form or Law of Mediation" inasmuch as we attain to the act of simple apprehension, $A=A$, only by means of a middle. It does not affect this fact that the middle is a negation.

7. In the mediating process there is contained Causal Necessity. The third moment is necessitated by the first two. And it is of much significance, in the history of Will in knowing, that the Form of Mediation whereby the simple act of perception [which is the "end" of the will-movement] is reached, contains in it a "necessary" in the strict sense of that term. The conclusion or accomplishment of the perception is attainable only as an irresistible and necessary conclusion—in other words, as contained in its *prius*, and so rationally *caused*.

8. The complete formal fabric of Reason I need not repeat; it suffices to refer to it as tabulated in the chapter on the Form of Percipience, but I would emphasise here the Dialectic process as Form of Mediation containing the moments, (*a*) Law of Excluded Middle; (*b*) Law of Contradiction; (*c*) Sufficient Reason; (*d*) Law of Identity, finally expressed in verbal affirmation. Form of Mediation is Form of Cause.

9. Those manifestations of Reason which have already

passed before us under the names of Attention, Comparison involving Judgment, Abstraction, Generalization, are (as appears from our past analysis) neither forms nor faculties of the subject-self in any proper sense, but merely names which we give to the *attitude* which the Will or reason-*potency* assumes towards the objects of inner or outer presentation. Reason consists of only one faculty—viz., all potent Will and the Form through which it effects itself.

10. Thus then, Will constituting Self or Ego, appears as free Potency in the heart of attitudinal consciousness, freely functioned by the conscious subject and transcending phenomena inner and outer, *existing, in fact, only in so far as it transcends phenomena*. It renders knowledge possible. It seizes on the natural and phenomenal by means of this engine which we have just signalized—the engine of Mediation. The end, Knowing, is reached, not at all by a direct prehension, but by this process which, as “Form of Mediation,” lies at the basis of the fabric of knowledge as the primary form of all intelligizing.

11. Of the two factors, Will (active ego) and Phenomenon, the Will¹ is, I repeat, in its nature, and in

¹ Some may object to the expression frequently employed in these pages, “The Will knows”; and I shall endeavour to avoid it, it being understood that when we talk of “Self” we mean subject transformed into ego by this Will. The mere subject, it is scarcely necessary to repeat, is characteristic of animals as well as man, and cannot *know*, but only feels and reflexly attuites. This conscious

any possible definition, the transcendental relatively to phenomena, and is *ipso facto* removed from the co-existent and sequential series of inner and outer presentations which it surveys and disposes into order. It is not given in sense, and, by the mere fact of its existence, it renders a system of pure Sensationalism impossible.

12. Nor is this all. The primary and perpetual Form in which it moves, involves a "must" in its conclusion. *It cannot but be* that A, since it is not B, nor anything else, is A. There is here the same movement and the same formal necessity which rises into the complete and explicit syllogism. So that not only the first factor or moment, Will or pure Potency, but also the second factor, Mediation, rebuts Sensationalism—the former by its mere existence, the second by its character of necessity.

13. The fundamental Form of Reason, then (let me again say) is to be sought for neither in the inductive nor the deductive process, but further down, in the very initial act of Percipience itself. What is the syllogistic logic of the Schools save this very form—the mediation of generals through a sum of particulars, or of particulars through generals?

attuition precedes as we have seen the act of will, and it is the act of will which is the new element whereby the attitudinal consciousness becomes a knowing consciousness. By *Will* as Reason, I of course mean not merely the pure potency, but also the form under and in which that potency works, as that has been exhibited.

FOURTH PART.

THE MATTER AND SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE GENERALLY.

1. *Phenomena of Inner and Outer Sense.*

IN following the growth of consciousness and of reason, we have been dwelling on the formal. We have seen the potency called Will raising itself out of, and rising above, attitudinal consciousness, and assuming certain lordly attitudes towards attuits. These attitudes are all merely exhibitions, under relation, of the primordial and spontaneous act of prehension as a movement of will, whether we denominate them differencing, separating, perceiving, knowing, judging, comparing, abstracting, generalizing, or syllogizing acts.

By uncovering the ground-nature of these Will-potency determinations, we are able to furnish definitions in accordance with our conception of the true character of rational life as Free Willing. Judging is seen to be only the explicit enunciation of the simple act of perception or Knowing, perception being itself an implicit identical judgment, viz., $A=A$. Comparison, again, we have seen to be merely the Will holding present to itself two or more percepts or judgments

(implicit or explicit), and making a further affirmation of likeness or unlikeness respecting them. Concipience or synthesis is the act of Will holding several percepts together in the unity of an individual whole. Generalization (of which commons or generals are the result) is an act of Will holding through a twofold affirmation various individuals together within the colligating band of a percept or a concept, as the case may be. As we proceeded with the act of comparison, we found a limit of grasp imposed on the Will-potency, which would have resulted in an impotency, had it not been averted by a machinery, the existence of which might well till then have escaped us, though it had in truth been in constant and active operation, as we had already shown, in the very act of simple percipience itself, *i.e.* the machinery of Mediation.

Thus, by means of the Will-potency and its mediating Form, largely aided by the distinction we have made between the respective characters and spheres of attitudinal and percipient consciousness, there seems to come into view a scheme of Intelligence reduced to order, precision, unity, and simplicity.

1. It is manifest, however, that since we left behind our preliminary analysis, we have been dealing only with the formal, although the fact of a matter or content for these formal activities has been maintained as a *prius* of consciousness and exhibited in the "First Part."

2. We have now to ask what this matter is?—what

it is that the Will-Reason aims at reducing by analysis to the synthesis of a systematic unity in knowledge? The first affirmation is that the presentate to my consciousness—its content—is, and is *there*. But this is only the starting-point. Advancing in the work of analysis and differentiation, in subjection to the laws and forms of the Reason-process, as these have been exhibited, I am aware of an ampliative process in which I add fact to fact, until I finally sum up and unite in the synthesis of conception the totality of distinguishable marks which constitute the sensible presentate before me, as opposed to all other presented or presentable things. What are these marks of the object? They are its extension, size, figure, solidity, and colour; its roughness, hardness, heaviness, sapidity, toughness, or their opposites; its place, its time, its movement (*ab extra* or *ab intra*), or its quiescence; its order or relation in a sequence, its inner inter-dependence of parts, its odorousness, sonorousness, etc., etc.; and its relation to other things (positively or negatively). We have in the Categories of Aristotle an attempt to generalize all that we can predicate of any object of sense (*see* Categories).

3. For our present purposes it is sufficient curtly to say that weprehend and affirm all sensibles as either quiescent or movent, statical or dynamical—both in relation to each other, and as to their own constituent parts.

4. The word dynamical is used simply in the sense of movent. To import into this word a connotation of productive and efficient movement is illegitimate procedure. Hume was unquestionably right when he pointed out that the intimations of sense cannot yield Cause.

5. All that we receive through sense is thus phenomenon. This does not mean (*vide* Chap. I. Part I.) that sense-data are *by themselves* the reality, but only the appearing or *modus existendi* of reality, both sides of the reality being actually *there*, constituting actuality. Phenomenon of sense is known only as so many qualities. Matter in so far as we know it is simply an organisation of predicates which constitute the vehicle of Being. In knowing matter we know Being as brought within the sphere of sense.

6. The same remarks apply to the *data* of inner feeling.

7. So much seems to be yielded to us by the outer sense. But note that these things are all impressed on consciousness *prior* to the appearance of Will or Reason in consciousness: existing there as receipts or attuits, side by side with certain attuits of inner sense, such as hunger and thirst, sense of fatigue, love of repose, sexual desire, love of offspring, feeling of benevolence, affections, emotions, and so forth.

8. The whole orb of the matter of knowledge is thus in *Feeling*.

9. When magisterial Will entered on the stage, this whole matter of attuition (which is merely Feeling with reflex action) as yielded by outer and inner sense, became elevated or elevatable into matter of perception or *knowledge*. This Will again, operating on the raw material, gives rise to fresh products. And yet all matter or content of consciousness is ultimately a receipt in Feeling. By which we mean that all matter of knowledge, *however it may be initiated*, is, in so far as it is known, first offered to consciousness as a *datum*—offered to the receptivity. A differentiate, abstract, or generalizate of things of sense is not, however, furnished by sense, *in so far as it is* a differentiate, abstract, or generalizate. But these also are yet *recepts* in so far as we are conscious of them, although they are the product of two factors—viz., Sense *plus* Will and the process of Will. They are presented to consciousness for its acceptance as *data*, after they have been formed. This resultant of the action of Reason or receptivity may be called a complex receipt.

10. Accordingly, the matter or content of mind includes all that we receive; and there is no matter which we do not receive—which is not presented to *Feeling*. To be conscious is to feel. Consciousness of Ego and its activities is through the *feeling* of them as being.

Matter, in the more restricted sense, is that matter of knowledge which we refer to the external, such as the consciousness of our own bodies and of the world of outer sense.

11. Of the reality of the feeling of "matter" or of any other feeling nobody doubts: but in so far as the feeling reflexly projects the impression into the external and constitutes it an object, there may arise doubts as to the reality of the object; but the only question worth considering in this connection (after what has been said in the remarks under "Dualism") is whether the object is illusion or reality—Schein or Erscheinung.

12. In considering this question we must again direct attention to the experience of the merely attuent or conscious subject and of the self-conscious or knowing subject.

As to the reality of the object in the sphere of attuition, there can be nothing said save this, that, under normal and adequate conditions, the object is and exists as we feel it, to the extent to which we feel it. So far as we *truly* feel it, in short, it is not Schein but always Erscheinung. There is no other criterion possible, and to discuss the subject further is mere triviality.

So also the object is known by a knowing subject, acting under normal and adequate conditions, so far as it is truly known. To know it truly is to know it clearly, distinctly, and as satisfying the categories *à posteriori* and *à priori*. Of these in the sequel. Knowledge of this kind furnishes its own criterion and its own criticism. All knowledge that is knowledge is so far true, and is a step towards the final synthesis.

13. Is this all? Can the whole realm of knowledge,

the whole fabric of thought and emotion, the world of fancy, imagination, and aspiration be constructed out of these elements—the primary data of feeling and the complex products effected through a cunning Reason-process, which is at bottom the mere force and form of empty Will? Is Reason, in other words, merely formal? No. Being or Substance, Cause, the Absoluto-infinite, Moral Law, Duty, God lie outside the possible product of a merely formal movement *plus* Sense. These things have to be explained. It is unscientific to take these unquestionable possessions of human consciousness in the lump, and dub them “innate ideas.” This is suggestive of a certain impotence of thought. Until the *modus* of the generation of these facts of consciousness be unfolded there can be only subjective conviction, not objective knowledge. Emphasized opinion is not science.

But, postponing this, let me interpose a few paragraphs on the *datum* Extension, although they involve some repetition.

2. *Natural History of the Consciousness of Space.*

Attitudinal consciousness, as we have seen, contains in its notion an inner and outer, which outer is the historical *prius* of the emergence of the inner—given to the inner, not created by it. Duality thus constitutes the primal or elementary form of all consciousness. We have shown how externality, as distinguished from objectivity, is gained.

It may be said of course, that outerness is, after all,

only projected innerness. Again, it may be said that the inner is merely the outer—a reflex of the movement of Nature, or a moment or function in that movement, innerness being merely outerness turned back on itself by itself. Both idealistic schemes are speculatively full of interest (and there is a sense, as will appear in the sequel, in which the latter is true); but they fail to overturn the actual dualism of consciousness. There is, as a matter of fact, a diremption in the cosmic scheme.

Further, that outerness and innerness, extension and consciousness, are only branches of the same trunk—different faces, rather, of the primal unity whose twin and necessary attributes are Thought and Extension (the abstract Begriff and its externalization), is highly probable; but in a criticism of knowledge we do not touch such questions of pure ontological speculation, so long as we limit ourselves to analytic.

True, the acceptance of consciousness and extension, subject and object, as two primary and antithetic facts, involves us in contradictions which demand solution. But we are bound to reject solutions which annihilate the innerness of the inner and the outerness of the outer. It is no true solution which confounds knowledge by forcibly absorbing or ignoring contradictions. Our possible range is limited: we must accept restriction and consequent nescience. To resume:—

1. It would seem that the infant consciousness is aware only of an all-embracing extension, from which

it has not yet separated itself, and in which there is neither nearness nor distance, nor relative position, nor three dimensions, nor any determinate object. To it, space is surrounding diffusiveness merely—a *totum objectivum*.

2. As so given it is unique, boundless, simple. The *feeling* of space, in which feeling duality of subject and object is only implicit, quickly gives place in the growing consciousness to the sensation of space—that is to say, to the consciousness of space as opposed to consciousness, as “other” than it. At this stage—the stage at which duality dimly emerges (which may be called Sensibility)—Space is a universal, unbroken, diffusiveness; it might be called a sense-universal, and it is *not* a series of impressions of this, that, and the other object as being spaced. At the same time it is an impression of a *thing* spaced, of extended being. Particular objects, bodies, quanta, are not yet discerned. This confused sensation of outer extension gradually gives way, at the stage of attuition, to the limitation or delineation of certain extended objects on the receptivity, and this is attained, apparently, by the help of colour, through the constant repetition of impressions. Attuition in this relation is the sensation of outer objects in parcels or lots of extension, so to speak. Spaced and figured objects are now *for* consciousness, and space is now tridimensional.

3. By the law of antithesis which prevails in a

rudimentary form even in sub-rational intelligent movements, this attuition of external, mutually-limiting phenomena, gives greater clearness to the *sensation* of extension as being diffused outside and beyond the bodies specially attuited. I say the *sensation* of extension; for while all movements of Intelligence bring in their wake a consciousness of their own antithesis, the latter always exists in a feebler and lower form than the consciousness of the thesis.

Thus far animals and men accompany each other in the growth of their Intelligence. The co-ordinated sensations are *for* consciousness—being co-ordinated by a kind of reflex action.

4. The next movement of intelligence—which is the rational or Will-movement—prehends extended objects, already attuited as quanta “*there*” and mutually exclusive, and by subsuming them into the unity of consciousness and affirming their existence, gives an intense and vivid delineation in consciousness to the objects themselves. This process is largely aided by the sense of touch, including resistance. Already in the previous or attuitional stage of consciousness, we possessed attuited quantal (limited) bodies, and *ipso facto* our sensation of the antithesis—*non-quantified* space—was intensified and itself raised into an attuit: that is to say, we sensed unquantified space as different from and opposed to, quantified figure or body; but we did not then *perceive* extension or space as such, although it was *felt* in the very first breath which consciousness

drew, and was afterwards *sensed*. The *perception* of Space is a higher act. The mind is as yet only at the stage of perceiving and affirming *quantified* space or body, and through this it has attained to the clear attuition (but not the perception) of non-quantified, boundless or indefinite space outside the objects perceived.

5. It is against this sense of universal non-quantified extension that the subject-self may be said to be from the first directing itself: its function, as we have seen, being restlessly to seek for new limitations and quantifications, which it may add to its stock of things known. Every act of limitation and quantification necessarily brings into clearer relief the antithesis, and this antithesis is finally *Extension non-quantified, non-limited, non-defined*; in other words, Indefinite Extension held (as yet, as I have said in the last paragraph) only as an attuit. Thus we find that the sensation of Space is followed by the attuition of Space, and that the attuition of *Space as such* is not attained by consciousness as an aggregate of countless limited spaces, but as a primal and simple unity in antithesis to this, that, or the other limited space: and we not only find this, but we have genetically explained it. Space is the *prius*; quantity, motion, position and relation in Space are the *posteriora* of Space itself in consciousness.

6. Let me emphasize this; that the quantality of Space, *i.e.* consciousness of parts or quanta of Space, is

effected *by* the outer on consciousness, and that with every such *datum* of quantity the *indefiniteness* of space outside the quantal presentate is felt or sensed. All this takes place in the sphere of the attitudinal, and is shared with us by the higher animals.

When masterful Reason appears on the scene as Percipience, the affirmation of the quantum which is quantification (as distinguished from quantality), causes the indefiniteness of space to stand out more clearly in consciousness. I then am in a position toprehend or *perceive* indefinite extension through antithesis with the definite. This is not an indefinite perception (which is no perception at all), but a perception of indefiniteness. Beyond this perception few men ever go. Infiniteness (of which hereafter) has not yet come within our ken.

3. *On the Locus of à priori Percepts.*

To return, after the above excursus into natural history:—

If we are to lay hands on any matter or content of knowledge which is not ultimately of the inner or outer sense, we must look for it in the pure activity of Reason. By Reason it is scarcely necessary again to say we mean the pure will-potency of the conscious subject and the process whereby it effectuates itself in the rudimentary act of percipience. Here synthetic predicates *à priori* have to be sought for; if they exist. And here we shall find them: for this Reason-movement holds implicitly in its bosom several subject-born or *à priori*

contributions to knowledge which further are universal and necessary predicates of all other content of knowledge and make their appearance as being this.

The new cognitions, which have their source in the dialectic process whereby we know, are Reason-born and are fitly to be called Dialectic percepts and to be so distinguished from cognitions which have their matter in inner and outer sense.

If these Percepts are to be found, they will necessarily be found in the initiating movement itself—Will, in the modus or form of its movement, or, in the issue of its movement.¹

1. Will as functioned by the subject-consciousness presents a new fact to consciousness, but as such, does not enter into the content of consciousness as a synthetic predicate.

2. In the issue of the movement—the affirmation, we find the fact of Being and Identity, *A is A*.

3. The Being of the presentate before me through which that presentate is an actual and is affirmed (and affirmable) is, when held as a percept apart from the phenomenal presentate, contentless, non-determinate, non-finite—therefore absolute and infinite just as it is in Feeling. Being-universal, as ground of the universal of actual or possible presentation to sense, is the Absoluto-infinite. In relation to the particular, it is

¹ What follows anticipates the more reasoned statement, and may be provisionally accepted.

the absoluto-infinite ground of the finite. It gives the reality without which all would be phantasmagoria.

4. This issue of Identity, and of the revelation of Absoluto-infinite being as a *determined there*, is not attained by immediate looking, but mediately. And in this form of mediation (already exhibited in the chapter on the "Form of Percipience"), we have Cause as ground of the affirmation. And as this Form is the necessary *modus* of all knowing, it follows that all phenomenal content of knowledge *can be to consciousness only as caused*; nay, further, it is only in and through things that Cause is for us at all. Cause is a dialectic percept, and it is also the objective fact in the total of things.

5. The mediating or causal contains implicit in it issue or End. Thus things are known by us as teleologically constituted—the end of each being itself.

Accordingly, Being, the Absoluto-infinite, Cause, End, are all thrown into consciousness by the Reason-process as pure percepts: and, further, so thrown in as to constitute them ampliative or synthetic *à priori* predicates of all possible content furnished to Reason as *data*.

These products of pure activity we call Dialectic Percepts, or *à priori* categories, and, in their phenomenal relation, synthetic predicates *à priori*, not in a merely formal but in a *real* sense. It remains after this preliminary statement, to consider them more fully.

F I F T H P A R T .

DIALECTIC PERCEPTS OR SYNTHETIC PREDICATIONS
À PRIORI [*Intellectual Intuitions*].

Preliminary.

It is true that Concepts to be true must conform to actual intuitions (perceptions); but there are intellectual intuitions no less than intuitions of the sensible and phenomenal.

Consciousness evolves the new potency—Will, and we have thereupon Self-consciousness, *i.e.* the subsumption of the subject by itself into itself. This Will is not itself Reason, but it is the possibility and initiation of Reason; and in its form of movement towards its end (which end is perception) it is Reason. It is an inner, pure, self-determining process.

There is no possibility of defining a pure originating act and fact like Will, but it may be described as initiating movement. An initiating movement tends somewhere consciously or unconsciously. This *terminus ad quem* we call end—*formal* end, because it has not, but only seeks for, content. In the primal movement no particular end can by possibility be present as motive; and yet, implicit in the movement, and lying

in the bosom of the pure act, there is end. Formal end implicit in Will is the stimulus of Will to effect itself, and hence it is in its essence (in the sphere of pure intelligence) a free movement. Will is free-will in opposition to sense, appetite and volition, which are stimulated into their various and peculiar activities by particular and concrete pathological ends—which stimuli we call motives. This last is the animal condition, and the condition of man in so far as he is animal; that is to say, in so far as he is not Will.

The particular filling or “end” which the Will in its primary movement finds for itself is a percept. It reaches this terminus through the Form of Mediation, and the reaching of it is signalled by the affirmation of “being” (already, however, in feeling), which is externalized into the articulate and verbal affirmation that the object perceived *is*. The further end which Will under its formal stimulus seeks, is the affirmation not merely *that A is*, but *what A is*; and the ultimate end is the affirmation of what A truly is, *i.e.* its essence, its idea objectively. As pure activity, Will restlessly and unceasingly strives after this final resting-place—the idea.

The content of consciousness due to outer sense or feeling is, as has been said, summed up in the *a posteriori* predicaments—the reason-affirmations of the generalities of Sense.

The moments of the dialectic of percipience throw themselves into consciousness simply as facts of activity,

just as the rest of the content of the subject are facts of feeling.

The moments of the dialectic are a wholly independent contribution to the record in the subject. I do not at all wish to shirk the fact that these dialectic percepts are previously in feeling, as *felt*. This would be to depart from the method of procedure in accordance with which Mind in the world has been exhibited as a growth from the mollusc to man; and a growth of such kind, that each stage contains in it a premonition or anticipation of that which follows it in the ascending scale.

In feeling there is reflected the *ratio naturæ*, but no being could see this or affirm it except through and by the activity of reason in him. And this reason has its root in the spontaneity of the subject, and has its own law of procedure—an inner self-determination. Were there no consciousness of the being of things as given in sense, the dialectic process would yield it.

In the sequel, when speaking of the Categories, I shall show that each moment of the categories has its anticipation in feeling. But it is through the spontaneity of the will-movement, and its form of movement (which is reason), that it is able to render an account of the content of feeling, and in and through its own *ratio cogitandi* to become aware of the *ratio existendi*. This formal dialectic, which is the real of the Ego as a reason, is not merely machinery for the interpretation of nature to mind, but as always operating *in rebus* it reveals the ratio of *res*, and is constitutive

of them. It is the "real" of finite reason and the reason in the finite whole.

The contributions of dialectic to the content of the conscious subject, of which I shall now speak, are Being, the Absoluto-infinite, Cause and End. In speaking of these we speak of pure *à priori* categories.

CHAP. I.—BEING OR SUBSTANCE IN FEELING AND
IN THE DIALECTIC OF PERCIPIENCE.

WE rightly say *Being or Substance*, because the matter of knowledge yields nothing save phenomenon statical or dynamical, and there is no substance save Being.

The term substance (*οὐσία*) is used in various significations: (1) Popularly and also by Aristotle (in one of his uses of the term) to denote a *thing*, *e.g.* a dog or a stone with all its qualities as they present themselves to the senses: in brief, a unity or synthesis in sense-perception; (2) It is used to denote the various sensible elements taken singly which enter into a perceived synthesised unity; (3) It is used to denote the (so called) essence of the unity—that is to say, that “somewhat” by virtue of which the unity is what it is, and what it would continue to be, notwithstanding the extinction or change of many of its sensible qualities. In this signification, “substance” corresponds to the *formal principle* of Aristotle; (4) It is used to denote the *sensible* “somewhat” called Matter, which is not the sensible qualities separately nor yet as a colligated whole, but which is the underlying substrate in which these sensible qualities are supposed to reside as manifestations, forms (in the sense of shapes), appearances, phenomena; (5) It is used to denote that *non-sensible*

“somewhat” which, underlying the substrate crude matter or the bundle of sensible qualities, supports them and lives in them; which is in fact the *being* of the sensible object; and, as the being of it, is also the cause of it, relatively to its qualities or phenomenal existence.

These, I think, are the various significations of the term which a review of the modes of philosophical speech suggests.

It will be generally admitted that in the first and second denotations the term “substance” is used in a physical signification only, and is consequently, so far, outside metaphysic.

The third use of the word is an abuse of it: there is such a thing as essence of a totality in opposition to the sum of its properties (at least logically); and there also is such a thing as substance; but it is a loose way of talking to confound them. Substance or being, as commonly understood, underlies the material essence itself; and this, whether we interpret substance as a material substrate or as a non-sensible unknowable support and cause—a transcendental *x*.

The fourth use of the word is that which is probably, since Locke, the customary sense of British philosophy. Of this we here say that it *seems* to be given in sense. The true state of the case is that there is, as we have shown, prior to the emergence of Reason, a *feeling* of “being” particular and universal, and that Reason emerges for the purpose, *inter alia*, of *affirming* or knowing this.

Outer sense yields us outer shapes alone, that is to say, sensible qualities and their relations in feeling, and along with this a *feeling* of Being in them. There is no evidence for the external subsistence of crude matter except the vulgar belief in it. This common belief is raised to the dignity of an axiom of "Common Sense," on the assumption that it is given in universal consciousness. It is, as a matter of fact, not so given. Philosophy must, certainly, accept the verdict of consciousness, but only after it has interpreted it and ascertained what it really says. Now, what it says as to substance we are about to show. It does *not*, however, say that *crude matter* exists outside us, as the basis of qualities or in any other way.

The fifth use of the word "substance" at bottom identifies it with cause—the unseen yet efficient sustainer of the thing in its material "essence" and "accidents."

Prosecuting our inner phenomenological search on the same lines as hitherto, let us consider further this question of Being.

In the first part of this treatise, and elsewhere, it has been shown that the feeling of the being of impressions is an ultimate and immediate fact of the æsthetic consciousness. Perception, as we now know, is a free movement of the subject for the purpose of seizing or prehending a sense-presentate. In other words, it is the conscious subject willing with respect to some particular recept which it arrests, limits, detains, and subsumes into

the unity of apperception. This arrestment and limitation is completed in the act of affirmation which finds material or verbal expression in the verb "to be"; it is, in logical language, a predication of Being as a determinate and particular, and, further, inasmuch as the object is affirmed to be equal to itself, it is a Judgment of Identity. The thought-affirmation is made whether words be found to give it sensible expression or not; and, *à fortiori*, is implicit in the *mere naming* of the object in presentation.

The objective or phenomenal (that is to say, presentation to sense), we are told, can never by itself tell us more than the phenomenal fact. Doubtless, it may be argued that the phenomenal, simply as such, does *not* convey to our consciousness the fact of being or substance in the noumenal or any sense whatsoever: it may be said that phenomenal modes, statical or dynamical, co-existent or successive, pass before the human subject as an æsthetic or attuent subject, and that is all. This is the Humian position; but what has been here maintained is that when the conscious entity becomes aware of, that is to say, feels, the phenomenal impression, it feels the *being* of it, and the being of a thing is the reality of the thing—the thinghood of the thing. The being and the phenomenon constitute the actuality.

When we rise to the next platform of consciousness, we are introduced to the affirmation by percipient reason of the fact of being or substantiality. At the moment of knowing or perceiving the phenomenal we

know it as *being*. To perceive or know is in other words to affirm "isness." Being, accordingly, as a fact of consciousness, is given as the issue of the activity of Reason. And not only as the result, but in every successive moment, of the dialectic. The feeling of being has now become a percept or knowledge.

It is a delusion—a delusion arising out of the non-distinguishing of the various gradations of consciousness (as we have endeavoured in our earlier chapters to trace these)—to suppose that we get our *knowledge* of being, noumenon, or substance *along with* the object in sensation or attuition; we get only our feeling of it, just as we get the feeling, not the knowledge, of the object itself.

Has, now, the fact of "being" an objective reality? To this question we can only answer that (as we have seen in our first chapter) the conscious subject feels it immediately as there, opens itself to receive it as a universal "here" and "there"; and further, the subject-self, in the very act of introducing itself to knowledge, *ipso facto* and necessarily affirms it. The very condition of the knowledge of phenomena is that *we know them as being*, and not otherwise. Accordingly, we feel, and we perceive and know, the phenomenal *only in so far* as we are conscious of it as *being*.

I say the *fact* of being is thus revealed to knowledge as *in* things, just as, in the earlier stage of æsthetic consciousness, it was revealed in immediate feeling along with the object. To strive to know more of being *qua* being than the bare fact, is for the consciousness to pass

out of the region of being as such altogether. It is manifest that being cannot possibly be anything *qua* differentiation, *qua* phenomenon. By endeavouring to speak of "being" further than as a naked fact, given in or revealed to consciousness through feeling and through the act of affirmation, we *ipso facto* endeavour to contemplate it phenomenally, to finitize the infinite:—a dialectic suicide. In other words, we commit the error of endeavouring to quantify and qualify being, thereby constituting it phenomenon. In the very act of striving to reach a closer knowledge of "being" we cause it to pass into the phenomenal, thereby annihilating it *qua* being. We feel it and we know it, and that apparently must suffice.

"Being" then is truly *in* phenomena; phenomena *are*, or, all intelligence is an illusion and we had better leave off thinking. There arise *immediately* in attuent consciousness phenomena and groups of phenomena, with the being of these, as receipts; and the very first mediating act of reason is to affirm this reality.

By thus tracing our consciousness of "being" to its source, we detect and explain its reality at the same moment that we discern its nothingness *qua* phenomenon.

The feeling and the percept "being" is accordingly a universal and necessary of the consciousness, attuent and percipient, of the particular. When, then, we are competent to rise to a conception of a presumed totality and thereafter of a presumed unity of phenomena (*i.e.* Nature), we are, of course, still under the necessity

of affirming Being of this totality and unity. The totality or unity *is*.

This necessary Being in the Total is not to be set aside as nothing because it is without form, and void; for it is, in truth, everything. It vanishes if we endeavour to construe it in quality or quantity, either as a thing or the attribute of a thing. None the less is it, simply as fact, supreme, and patent to the intellectual vision.

Being, in short, is not a predicate in quantity or quality. If we endeavour to construe it as predicate it vanishes, and in its place we have phenomenal existence, and have to go a step further back to recover the percept we have thereby lost. The sensuous mind of man does not readily accept such realities: it would fain see them with the eye of sense or imagination that it may believe, not knowing that any presentation to sense or imagination of such truths is a contradiction in terms, and would, if it were possible to thought, cut man off from communion with that which *is*.

The term and abstract thought "Being," considered as the starting-point of an ontological excursion, in which subject and object vanish, is not here matter of speculation. It is true that if we abstract Being and hold it present to consciousness, it is then possible only as the antithesis of not-Being, and a new fact seems to be thus revealed to consciousness. But this is illusory; for non-Being can be present to conscious-

ness only if we have first illegitimately posited Being as in some sense a "thing"; and this is, however we may conceal the process, to phenomenalize it, and is a spurious act. With equal validity we might go on to abstract non-Being and say that it is possible to consciousness only as the antithesis of non-non-Being, which again is Being: also that the Percept (*see sequel*) Cause is possible only through the negation of Cause, and the Absoluto-infinite through negation of the Absoluto-infinite: all which is, in a sense, true, if we first transmute what is given to us as positives, and as dialectic percepts, universals *in things* (*in rerum natura*), into "things." Being (as we shall in the sequel see), Being as absoluto-infinite and Cause are (to use a Chinese phrase) "the Great Extreme" of legitimate thought.

We must then take non-sensuous attuits and percepts as we find them. The sensuous mind will always go wrong in this sphere, for in these attuits and percepts there is nothing of sense.

Let it be noted that the issue or terminus of the Dialectic movement is to affirm Being, not as abstract being, but being *in things*, being particularized or determined. I know nothing and can know nothing *about* being save as manifested in things. The issue of the dialectic is the taking up into the unity of apperception of things as being, of being in and through things.

But this is not all: the æsthetic attuit, let us recall, yielded the being and the "thereness" of the impression.

Thereby the impression became an object to a subject before the activity of reason appeared on the scene. The first business of this reason-activity is to hasten to affirm of the said object that it *is*, that it is equal to itself, and that it is *there*. As immediate *feelings*, all these affirmations are implicit in the attuent or æsthetic consciousness: what has next to be noted is that they are now all mediately affirmed by Reason in percipience and are implicit in that rudimentary act. And further, as I have stated above, that *all* dialectic of the individual mind is not *in vacuo*, but in and through things, and possible for consciousness only so.

CHAP. II.—BEING, UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY.

THE substantia of things is merely the “being” of them as given in Feeling, as at once reality and the guarantee of the reality of whatever is presented to us. I have sometimes used the word “real” as equivalent to phenomenal, but it is a misapplication of words, though justified by philosophical history, to speak of a real, a *res* which does not *be*. The real as being, however, is to be called the actual by way of distinction; although more strictly speaking the actual is the phenomenal *plus* Being and the whole Dialectic of Being. Being is a universal of Feeling.

Again, the issue of Percipience—a simple Percept—is not itself simple, but an implicate of judgments already existing in the crude and non-rational shape of Feeling. Of these judgments being or isness is the central pivot of the affirmation.

Being is also in every moment of the Dialectic. *A is* either A or B; *A is* not B; \therefore *A is* A. Being is thus the sole true universal. But further, inasmuch as it is a dialectic percept (in the affirmation of percipience) it is a necessary as well as a universal: a necessary, because the process of reason cannot escape itself: what is in it and constitutes it is necessary to its being and activity; just as the other moments of the dialectic are necessary because they constitute the reason-act.

There is a natural reluctance to break up the concrete of any consciousness and to contemplate its moments apart. There is considerable justification for this reluctance. We, however, know what we do know of objects precisely in this way: we reduce them to the units which constitute them as existent, and by a subsequent synthesis re-constitute them for true knowledge. The process is analytico-synthetic. But if I abstract Being—the sole universal and necessary—I can ascertain nothing (I have already said) save the said *fact* of “being” as universal ground. Being-universal is the Being of the universal of things,—constituent of that universal. This seems to be all we can say; and yet by virtue of the laws of Identity and Contradiction, we may make certain affirmations, as we have been now doing, and shall do further in the next chapter.

CHAP. III.—BEING : POTENTIALITY : THE
ABSOLUTO-INFINITE.

It has been pointed out that the complex datum or object in recipience, when by means of the new movement of percipience I have affirmed it, is, as affirmed, a complex totality of impressions of which I have affirmed nothing save separate or particular being as opposed to other beings. The said object, *e.g.* horse, having been affirmed as being, becomes *ipso facto* a subject ; and all future ampliative predications are in the usual form of the judgment. The filling of the empty subject is a slow process, and the very first predication—the most salient character of the object—usually becomes the name. As yet, however, in the earliest stages, the subject of the judgment is no more than “being,” which, after a series of perceived determinations, becomes “being ^{1+2+3+4,}” etc., etc., until the analytico-synthetic movement is presumed to be complete.

These successive predications may be positive or negative. The negative again may be positive, though in the *form* of negation, as when I say “man is not mortal,” wherein I affirm positive continuance of life : or they may be only preliminary steps in negation whereby I assist the process of positive determination by excluding this, that, and the other from the notion of

the object before me ;—preliminary steps always taken, but not always explicitly enunciated. We are speaking of the concrete.

But when we have present to us the abstract non-sensible percept Being, we are not entitled to affix to it ampliative predications, for this would be to determine it, and, so far, to destroy it as “being.” Of being we can know nothing save in and through its finite determination in the world. We can predicate nothing of it save itself, Being = Being.

And yet everything that is given to consciousness is given as itself and not anything else : and as itself and not anything else “being” has its *notion*. If it has not, how can it differ from anything else? We are entitled then, *at least*, to a series of negative predications, in order to preserve the purity of the notion of “being” as given. These negative predications are not ampliative; they simply protect the primary experience, and have only the external form of predicative propositions.

But further, *although we can predicate nothing of “being” relatively to itself*, we can predicate not only its negative characters in relation to other facts, but also its positive relations to other facts as we find these *given*. Thus, we have already said Being is the “sole universal” as a matter of fact. It “is” in all that “is” and can “be”—in the actual and the possible.

Then, negatively, in relation to the “many” we say it is one : in relation to the complex, it is simple; in relation to the innumerable diverse experiences in

our feeling-consciousness, it is always the same and unique.

Again negatively, that is to say as opposed to the finite, Being is non-finite or infinite. Being, as such, is the absoluto-infinite. In truth, to speak of Being as absoluto-infinite is a tautology. This non-finite *prius* of all determination is the true Infinite. It is only because the finite first arrests us and occupies consciousness that the term "infinite" assumes a negative form—*non-finite*. It is the positive of which the finite is the negation, the universal thesis of which finite phenomena are the antithesis.

We are quite within our legitimate intellectual rights in speaking of Being as abstracted from the concrete in which we always find it. For (as I have said) it is only by separation, abstraction, analytico-synthetically that we do or can know any complex whatsoever. At the same time we must take facts as we find them, and we find Being and affirm Being only as one moment in the concrete. We may deal with it as an abstract, but only on condition that we do not illegitimately divorce it from the concrete.

What has been said of Being above, as sole-universal, as one, as simple, as absoluto-infinite, is said of it as a moment in the determined or finite concrete. And, still restricting ourselves to this, we further say Being is the implicit of the explicit manifold, because One is *prius* of the many, the Absoluto-infinite *prius* of the finite, Being *prius* of its phenomenon. Being, still regarding it as a moment in the concrete, is therefore the Potential

of the actual—ground and source of the determination which with it constitutes the actual. Being-universal is the potentiality of existence-universal.

I am quite aware that I raise in these statements the whole question of philosophical method. I am not, however, speaking of Being as a “thing” outside and apart from phenomenon, determination, and finitude, but only as a moment in the total concrete. As *such* I am as much entitled to define Being (in the etymological, not logical, sense of definition) as I am entitled to define the finite and phenomenal presentate of sense by resolving the sense-synthesis into its predicates. With this difference, however, that in dealing with the simple and one, I can so define or demark it only by reference to that which is *not* it. Hence I would say, these seeming predicates of Being are strictly speaking to be called *implicates* of the notion of Being. They are no more predicates of Being than it is a predicate of Being to say that it is a universal datum in feeling, and a universal and necessary datum in the inner determination of the dialectic process. The true predicates of Being are there in sense—the totality of the universe. Being is at once noun and verb of a universe of finite predications.

There is, of course, a further question—Can we separate Being from its finite determinations—its predicates in externality, and so withdraw it from the world, of which it is the implicit potential? I pass this question. I am here engaged with Analytic only.

Infinite Being, not *an* infinite Being, is as yet all I have found. But this Being, as it has been put in these pages, is none the less because of this unsolved difficulty, *ens realissimum*, *ens entium*, *ens originarium*—first and fundamental factor in the complex notion, God, always with us here, there, and everywhere. The fact of Being is not a product of the Dialectic only: it is given *à posteriori*, and is borne *into* me, myself a beënt subject, bringing with it the ground of all things, the possibility of all actuality.

The result, to my thinking, is that Being is as a possession of my consciousness *à posteriori*, and also in *à priori* dialectic. I both feel and know absoluto-infinite universal-Being, *prius*, ground, and potentiality of all that exists, more closely and intimately than I know that leaf outside there. The “thing in itself” is nothing save this very Being determined-so through the dialectic of Being in its movement of finite determination.

Being and the Infinite.

On this question I may be allowed a few more words even at the risk of repetition.

“Being,” as a dweller in man’s consciousness, is, both in feeling and *à posteriori*, and in the dialectic and *à priori*.

The finite is there outside me in numberless shapes; but the finite, the determined, the determinate is also in every moment of the *à priori* dialectic as an inner self-determining process.

It thus lies in the very heart of the Percipience movement that in one and the same act it should affirm Being and Finitude as the issue of its movement, viz. "*A is.*" To determine, and to affirm the Being of the determined, is its primary function. Finitude, accordingly, in so far as it is a "necessary," is a dialectic necessity and a dialectic percept as well as Being. But neither the one nor the other owes its existence in consciousness as a universal to the dialectic movement: they were there in the conscious subject prior to the emergence of the dialectic percipient activity.

Being is not only in and of the affirmed determinate, but is the ground and possibility of the affirming. In the sphere of attuition, being and the determined are both *felt*, but they are not distinguished. The moment of their distinction is the moment of the dialectic affirmation, "*A is.*" And the mere looking at this act shows us that the affirmation lies in the *is*, and that without the "*is*," as logical *prius* and ground, there could be no determinate.

Being then is the ground of the Determinate. I take up the determinate into consciousness as grounded in Being.

Taking now this universal and necessary percept Being, I have found that as such and by itself it is qualityless; that it is in all actual or possible affirmations the same and one. Again, I find that it is non-finite, non-determined. Were it not so it would be "*A*," not "*is*": it would be itself a determined somewhat with nothing to affirm it or sustain it as

a determined. Consequently, it is non-finite; and as being in itself and by itself it is absoluto-non-finite.

This experience of Feeling and percept of the dialectic process then, viz., Being, we have found to be one, universal, necessary, homogeneous, absoluto-infinite. These characteristics may be called predicates, but not correctly so called, for they are not synthetic attributions, but implicit in the fact and thought or "notion" of Being itself, and they all arise out of the negation of the finite—one as opposed to the manifold—non-finite as opposed to the finite—same as opposed to the different.

There is no absoluto-infinite save Being.

The definition of the true Infinite then is simply that it is Being as non-finite ground of the finite—the not-as-yet-finitized, the determining not-determined, the conditioning not-conditioned—the potential not-yet.

The sensuous infinite, again, is the non-limitability of that which is prehended as finite, determined, conditioned. The true infinite is the prius of the universal finite; the sensuous infinite, on the contrary, arises in thought only when the finite and determined is already there; and arises, moreover, only as a characteristic of my thinking of the finite, and may or may not have objective truth. It is not itself any moment of the dialectic, but only the inevitable result of the dialectic intromitting with Space and Time.

Being absoluto-infinite, however, is a very different matter. It is the very ground and possibility of de-

terminates; and I cannot by possibility take up any determined or the totality of the determined, save as grounded in absoluto-infinite being. It is not a consequential result of the dialectic, but permeates the very activity itself. Having first felt determination and being as a dual complex *in rebus*, I next, as a percipient activity, affirm Being *in rebus*, take up *res* so and not otherwise, and affirm it moreover as infinite, undetermined prius, and ground of the finite and determined.

The above I hold to be the true analysis of the primary percept "*A is*" in its universal characters.

We know nothing of the "Absolute," and we are here in the region of phrase and vagary (it is said). True, we can know nothing *of* the Absolute (*i.e.* absoluto-infinite), but we can and certainly do know the Absoluto-infinite. Even the Hamiltonian will admit that the term Absoluto-infinite represents some thing or other; else how do we get the word, and why does he talk about it? Manifestly there is a mental phenomenon to be explained. Of knowledge and what knowing is, it is unnecessary to do more than to repeat that to know is toprehend and hold present to consciousness by an act of Will (to subsume into the unity of the conscious subject); in other words to perceive. There is a phenomenological fact in my consciousness so subsumed, for which I find the name Absoluto-infinite. Inasmuch as I hold that fact present to my consciousness I *know* it. Being is the Infinite.

Within the sphere of this Absoluto-infinite, *as such*,

however, my finite thinking cannot move save in the form of finite thinking, and it is therefore shut out from that sphere. The mere fact of Absoluto-infinite-Being, however, is as certain as the fact of finite phenomenal existence. Neither the one nor the other can be thought separately, though the latter *seems* to be so thought. If it be not so, then dogmatic atheism is the only rational outcome of philosophy instead of being (as it is) the most non-rational of all possible results.

It is a proclamation of our sensuous enslavement to proclaim the nothingness of Being. It is precisely because Being is nothing determinate and explicit that it is everything, including that which is not yet disclosed. Thought is deeper than words; but, deeper far than any thought that gives shape and distinctness to the daily aims of finite reason, is feeling—the feeling of Being,—the greatest gift of God to man. In and through this we find the Infinite, and repose from the clashing claims of intellectual contradictions. Poet and sage alike find here a refuge from strife.

CHAP. IV.—THE SENSUOUS-INFINITE—SPACE.

LET us consider now the sensuous-infinite as opposed to the true infinite—the non-finite.

Were Infiniteness in respect of Space to be explained by the fact that Space itself is an *à priori* of the æsthetic consciousness, animals would then have a sense of infiniteness, whereas in the natural history of the consciousness of space it has been shown that, on the attitudinal or æsthetic plane of mind, a sense of indefiniteness is alone possible. Infiniteness, as a percept, is Reason-born and its genesis may be thus unfolded :—

Animal intelligence, in the attuition of a determined totality in space, determined *for* it, not *by* it, must have a *feeling* of indefiniteness of space outside the given totality. Reason, will-born, comes on the field and there is then possible the *perception* of this totality, which gives rise, by antithesis, to a clear consciousness of indefiniteness of space. When this consciousness is itself prehended, it is transformed into a *perception* of indefiniteness.

This perception of indefiniteness in respect of space is not a perception of infiniteness, though it is generally so regarded. The act of determination (which is quantification) of a spatial totality in perception or

of a portion of space, yields necessarily, I have said, by antithesis, the consciousness of indefiniteness or the indeterminate, and this, again, may become a percept. The perception of infiniteness on the other hand, is the perception of illimitability—the not-to-be-determined; and this as the necessary antithesis of limitability. We see this the moment we see that perception is possible only in so far as it is determination, or quantification, or negation. In the necessary act and fact of limit or finitude, the illimitable or sense-infinitude is affirmed.

The questions of the *minimum divisibile* and the *maximum extensibile* are, it seems to me, futile questions. We may *affirm* a *minimum divisibile*—be it atom or (real) point—but to *image* a minimum of extension which cannot be still further divided would be to imagine an extension that is not extended. However reduced, the presumed minimum is still extension, and it is of the very nature of extension to be divisible: this *is* extension. We shall be able to conceive and prove a minimum of extension when A ceases to be equal to A. So with the maximum—the possible circumscription of space. By the very conditions of the act of perception, which is determination or quantification, space *must* be always outside any possible image or determined portion of space whether as a maximum or a minimum. The sense-infinite is in fact contained *in* the act of percipience as a determining act. A man cannot jump out of his own skin.

Consider it for a moment and you will see that the perception of anything spaced is limitation, and involves in its very nature non-limit. Accordingly, the moment I think limit *as such*, I *must* think the illimitable; or, rather, the act of thinking limit is thinking illimitability.

But *not illimitability* of Space, but an illimitable or infinite *series of Spaces*.

CHAP. V.—DURATION AND TIME—NECESSARINESS AND
INFINITENESS OF THESE.

AT the stage of attuition, the conscious subject is recipient of external impressions and by reflex activity co-ordinates these, and so attains to synopsis. It is aware, further, of a succession of objects, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, etc., and the intervals between these are filled by a *feeling* of the continuity of the recipient subject. The interruption of the continuity of the subject by *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, etc., marks off that continuity of being into parts or periods. These periods or lapses of duration constitute what is strictly to be called *Time*. There is in this animal and pre-rational condition a *vague* consciousness of “before-and-afterness,” but only in so far as association links, or may link, *a* to *b*, etc., and so forth. Animals accordingly have a sense of Time; vague, it is true, because it rises out of merely attitudinal states, but sufficient to attract our notice, especially in those animals that have a vivid temperament.

The above, we presume, would be a fair, if brief, account of Time as an experiential fact from the Lockian point of view, modified and adapted to the terminology and point of view of this treatise.

Men have all that animals have; but they have more. The difference is not one merely of intensity or

vividness of feeling, but is one of kind. This specific difference is due to the characteristic attribute of the human animal, viz., Will, which is the basis and kinetic ground of percipience. What the animal attuites of successive changes or of interrupted continuity of duration the man prehends, fixes, and subsumes into the unity of consciousness,—in brief, perceives. Time, as periods (or spaces) of continuity or duration, is thus sharply defined; and with this sharpness of definition the power of taking note of lapses, and of measuring Time, arises. The vague feeling of a before-and-after also is thereby raised into a clear perception of a before-and-after.

Let us consider this question more closely:

From one point of finite determination to the next there is a lapse. The finite is not merely a series of co-existent atomic points of Space, but it is a series of atomic “nows.”

“Time” is not visible as space is. I cannot get it through sense. All I can get through sense is motions of parts of space in space. Atomic spaces are intelligible as parts of one Space.

I cannot see Time: I cannot feel Time. I am entirely in the hands of successive motions as presented to my consciousness. Now no number of a succession of motions of or in space could yield the consciousness Time. Nay, if I will think purely and simply what actually occurs in sense alone, I shall find no succession. Motions I should be aware of—these I

should receive:—but they would be anarchic. Not to speak of order, there could not be even succession; and consequently there could be no series. It is essential to denude ourselves of associations, and of the contribution of reason to sensation in order to see this clearly.

a b c, as mere phenomena, I say, will not give even succession or series. To get this I must have *a—b—c*. To say by way of explanation that *a* is given *now* and *b* *then* is a patent assumption of a series in Time; and this is the very question at issue.

There must be a continuity between *a b c* if I am to be aware of them as a series. There is no sensible continuity between phenomena as such; this is certain.

In short, *a b c* are, and can be, a succession, a series, at all, only in so far as they are in or of a Continuum:—a continuum which is in itself unbroken: it is *a b c* which break it.

Where is this Continuum? As regards the sentient individual we say there is the unbroken continuity of the beënt subject or recipient basis. This continuum is not made up of a series of *as* and *bs* and *cs*—an infinite number of finite experiences. It is these very experiences, in so far as they are a series or succession, that we have to explain.

But if the continuum is not an infinite number of finites, it has no determinations.

What then is it? It is simply Being—the one sole continuum and bond of atomic motions [as, perhaps, of atomic spaces].

The “one-after-the-otherness” then of sense-experi-

ences is made possible by the fact of a permanent continuum in which they as objective arise (Being), or, for which they as subjective experience become (the beënt consciousness).

But here we have introduced a new word—the word “permanent”—compelled to do so by the play of finite determinates on my consciousness, which play has revealed through antithesis the one and “permanent” continuum as necessary ground of the series. “Permanent” is that which persistently remains during all changes; in other words, it is in its relation to changes and the question of Time, *During*. During and Duration are to be used as opposed to finite changes and determinations.

What is it that “dures”? Being and Being alone—the sole connective of universal existence.

Subjective Time.—It is evident, then, that if there were no sense of continuity filling up the space between the successive presentations *a* and *b*, there manifestly could be no consciousness of Time. There would be nothing of which Time, *i.e.* lapses of duration, could be a portion. There would be the successive percepts *a* and *b*, but as the interval would be a blank, nothing could come of this experience save the said isolated percepts *a* and *b*. It is the succession of *a b c*, moving, so to speak, over the surface of, or in, the permanent being-subject, which brings into consciousness two phenomenological facts, *viz.* (a) Continuity of being, or *Duration*; (b) Successive spaces or parts of continuous being, or *Time*.

Time, then, as a subjective experience, has its roots in a twofold consciousness—the consciousness of the continuity of the being of the subject (*i.e.* duration), and motion or change. Thus far, Time is as yet seen to be merely a succession of portions or spaces of Duration; *i.e.* determinations in the form of succession.

Objective Time.—If there be a veritable externality (which there is), then the observed succession of portions or periods of duration is a real external succession of motions. There is a before-and-after external to the subject. Objective Time is, or might be described as, pulses of infinite duration.

In other words, universal Being externalizes itself as motion in a protensive series of determinations, as well as in Extension. Time, then, is an actually subsisting *series* of determinations *following* one upon another outside there, and independently of a finite percipient, just as space is a co-existent outside-one-another series.

Duration or during is simply (as now appears) *continued-Being*—and we now here encounter another implicate of Being, an implicate yielded by its relation to change or a series. Were there no change or series, the notion “continued” could not arise, and During would be simply a synonym for Being; but because of the fact of change there is yielded a fresh contribution to the notion of Being. During is a stream on which there is no ripple, an eternal now.

Time is in sense; and Duration, the thesis of Time,

is also in sense or feeling, just as Being is; for it is Being-*during*.

We cannot go on to speak of During and Time in their own language any more than we can think them in their own true lineaments. During assumes the spatial form of a protensive quantity—a line; and Time assumes the form of finite parts of that line. What follows, therefore, is in the language of Space, and so far, therefore, metaphorical.

Necessariness of Time in Sense.—Duration is a universal and necessary *condition* of Feeling. Is Time, *i.e.* portions of Duration, a *necessary* within the sphere of the æsthetic, or sense, consciousness? Even if there were no space, there would yet be a consciousness of inner changes—of a succession of determinations in the beënt continuum. Time is thus not only a universal, but a universal *condition*, of consciousness, and, as such, a “necessary,” just as space is.

But, further, it is a necessary of sense in so far as it is involved in Space. I cannot feel Space, and I cannot image Space, save as a series of parts. The infinite parts of extensive quantity involve protensive quantities or times.

Infiniteness of Time in Sense.—Time is not infinite in Sense because it is itself a finite-determination.

DURATION AND TIME UNDER CONDITIONS OF REASON.
—Reason in its elementary form of Percipience now enters to deal with the above data.

It vivifies attitudinal experience. But not only so.

Necessariness and Infiniteness of Duration.—Duration, since it is Being, is *à posteriori* as well as *à priori*. *Duration* is accordingly a necessary and infinite—the prime and ultimate necessary of both subject and object. All that Reason effects is that the perception of Being-universal as During is brought into relief through the perception of a determinate series. But the consciousness of the necessity and infiniteness is not due to Reason: it is, prior to the emergence of reason, felt; and now, it is perceived and affirmed.

Necessariness of Time.—The feeling of *Time* as lapses of duration—as determinations of during-Being, *e.g.* $a-b$ and $b-c$, is now, through the activity of percipience, vivified, discriminated, subsumed and affirmed.

Percipience is not only a determination of quantity—a quantifying as regards space-universal, but in the same act it is an arrestment of flux of duration. *a* (the object) is *now*.

But this *timing now* is the issue of a dialectic movement. The necessariness of Time, or Timing, is thus contained in the Dialectic. So we found the necessity of a determination of a finite or quantified object in space was a necessary issue of the Dialectic.

Infiniteness of Time.—We are now dealing with finites, and the sense-infinite in respect of Time emerges. The arrestment of the determinate is the arrestment of the determinate as “*now*.” That is to say, the limitation of duration to a “*now*.” Given the line or flux of duration, it is manifestly impossible to limit it to the point

of "now" without affirming therein a "before" and "after." This, viz., non-limitation, or rather, not-yet-limited, or indefiniteness, is contained in the *fact* of limitation.

But at whatever point I put my "now," I also posit a before and after: and there is thus forced on me (just as in the case of Space) that the illimitable is contained in the *act* of limiting by the very nature of that act: the infinite in respect of Time arises out of the finitizing act. Limit posits with itself, as condition of the possibility of positing, the illimitable. But not the illimitable of Time, for Time is everywhere a determined or finite; but an illimitable *series of Times*.

This is the Sense-Infinite in respect of Time. The true Infinite is given in Duration as Being-During.

Questions accordingly as to the *minimum* and the *maximum* are unavoidable, but the discussion of them is vain. Whether there be an atomic *punctum* of Time or not, we are compelled to speak of Time in terms of space, and it is as impossible to conceive an atom of time as it is to conceive an atom of space. Also, a maximum of the series of Times, past or future, is an impossibility. There is an infinite *series*. The very conditions of knowing necessitate the infiniteness, *i.e.* the illimitability of the *series*: the infiniteness is *in* the finite act; and as the fact is so, it must simply be accepted. To beat our heads against such questions is a waste of energy.¹ When we have found a fact and

¹ The question, "Had the world a beginning in Time?" seems in the light of the above wrongly put. It should be, "Had Time a beginning?" *i.e.* Had the Finite a beginning?

the genesis of that fact, our work is at an end. Like the Buddhist priest, we must just spread our carpet and sit down before the ultimate.

*Further Remarks on the Sensuous Infinite
(Space and Time).*

In addition to the true infinite—the absoluto-infinite as that has been explained, there is, as we have seen, an experience of reason which yields to consciousness the infiniteness of Space and Time—the two æsthetic universals—as a series of Spaces and Times. The finitization of Absoluto-Infinite Being, however,—its determination into the finite and phenomenal, has taken place before the infiniteness of these universals of sense becomes an object of perception at all. There is a perception of *indefiniteness* of Space and Time in the very first act of percipience. This is inevitable, for how can I affirm a circumscribed portion of Space and Time without positing at the same moment the indefinite and uncircumscribed, the not-yet circumscribed, as outside and beyond the circumscribed? This is a perception of Indefiniteness of the universals Space and Duration; and beyond this nothing. This, manifestly, is not infiniteness.

The restless activity of Will in its desire to compass the whole of things—the synthesis of all experience—finds as a matter of fact, that it cannot do it. Why? Because percipience is itself an act of determination of Space and of arrestment or determination

of Duration. Thus it may go on determining these universals for ever, and yet precisely because the act is an act of determination, a continuous and endless series of determinations, the act of percipience is finally exactly where it was after its primary determination. The result is that the determination of the total of Space and Time is by the *very nature* of reason as percipience for ever impossible. That is to say Space and Time already *given* as universals are found to be necessarily illimitable by human reason because of the nature of that reason. Were it otherwise, percipience *would not be* determination; percipience as act would vanish and there could be no percipience. But reason is not on this account justified in saying that Space and Time are infinite factually—on the side of either the maximum or the minimum; but only this, that the finitizing of these æsthetic universals is impossible to human reason as reason, and this because of the very nature of finite reason. The perception of the Sensuous Infinite is the perception of illimitability as necessarily contained in the consciousness of limit.

To call even this non-limitability of sense-universals “the Infinite” is misleading. The true Infinite is the absolute or non-finite as already explained.

The absoluto-infinite is *as such* out of relation and prior to relation; the infinite of Space and Time, on the contrary, arises out of the finite and is possible only through the finite. This sense-infinite which is through the finite, this finite which involves the infinite, is, as we shall afterwards see, of ethical importance;

and also of intellectual importance, for it stimulates the activity of reason in the direction of atomic diathesis (search for essence) on the one side, and to a completion of the synthesis of all experience on the other.

The true Infinite, I repeat, is the non-finite: the sensuous infinite (of which I have been speaking) arises out of the impossibility inherent in human reason (by its very essential nature) to finitize the finite into which the true Infinite has already passed as the manifestation of its Being—its *modus existendi*. The play of finite and infinite into and out of each other, in the matter of Space and Time, early forces on the mind of man the consciousness that the finitizing of the totality Space and Time are impossible to him. He then says Space is infinite, Time is infinite; but all he is entitled to do is to inquire how it is that an object which is itself a finite determination of the true Infinite should not be finitizable by his reason. When he can detect the explanation of this as lying concealed in the very nature of reason-percipi-ence itself, he then finds that he is not entitled to make any dogmatic assertion at all about the factual infiniteness of objective Space and Time, but only that *he* cannot finitize their series—nay, could not do so without a suicide of such reason as he has.

The true Infinite, on the other hand, he both feels and perceives as an implicate of Being: it is objective both in the sense of being non-ego and in the sense of being both ego and non-ego—the sole universal and necessary

in all actual or possible existence. As such it is ground and, as ground, constitutive of the Finite.

It is this question of the infinite in the finite of a sense-series that complicates all questions of the identity of a concrete thing. All is in flux and there is no point at which a thing can be said to be purely itself as a mathematical point is. In Space and Time all change of state is infinitely divisible. There is no *leap* across a chasm however minimized it may be. There is infinite graduation and gradation. A thing *is* now what it was not *then*, but even in its "now" it is already in its future as in its past. The old sophistical and sceptical difficulties arising out of this have never been solved and never will be. The supposed answers have been either *tu quoques* or delusive. The task of philosophy is not solely to explain, but quite as much to place its finger on the unexplainable, show *how* it must be unexplainable, and there leave it.

CHAP. VI.—CAUSE AS A DIALECTIC PERCEPT OR
SYNTHETIC *à priori* PREDICATE.

IN addition to Being or Substance is there any other necessary Universal—the offspring of the subject-self—which we affirm of the phenomenal as constitutive of it? If there be, we cannot find it in the attuent consciousness, for we have exhausted its record: we must look for it in the form of Percipience, for there we find Reason in its elements.

That we universally and necessarily affirm Cause is admitted. Metaphysical debate, like most ethical debates, is a debate not as to matters of fact, but as to origins. The genesis, and consequently the nature of the Causal notion is variously explained, and the notion itself is often explained away. But no spasm of logical effort will ever satisfy men that the synthesis of Cause and Effect is resolvable into invariable succession, combined with a habit of expectation of the recurrence of what has often before occurred. There is a residuum of necessity which is by such an explanation left unaccounted for.

1. *The Causal Predicate.*

Two questions, viz., the necessity of the Causal Predicate as a Universal, and the necessity of the Causal

nexus, are (I think) frequently mixed. Hume certainly distinguished, though he almost immediately proceeded to confound, them.

Attuent consciousness is aware of external phenomena as statical and dynamical and as related to each other as units of a series. There is nothing in the attuition of motion to suggest anything save the fact itself of motion. This fact is accepted just as statical and quiescent phenomena are accepted; and it is in attuiting these simply as phenomenal facts that the function of mere attitudinal consciousness exhausts itself. In the attuition of a dynamic series, however, there lies the expectation of recurrence. If a series has *once* occurred in sense, why should it not *always* recur? This is true of dogs as well as of men; and Hume's conclusion on the whole subject must be accepted as beyond question if we confine ourselves within the attitudinal pre-rational sphere of the conscious subject.

Again, suppose the necessariness of the Causal Nexus—the “productive power” of the antecedent in a time-sequence of two or more—could be established, it would not follow from this that the Causal Predicate is a necessary of human intelligence. If this were all, we could, it seems to me, conceive a given quantity of matter and energy to be the eternal *status quo*, and the sphere of things to be maintained by a complex and unceasing causal reciprocity of an efficient as well as universal character, without therefore concluding that the primary *status quo* is itself an effect of a prior cause. We cannot, however, as a matter of fact, so conceive

the primary *status quo*; and the question is, how does the universal and necessary predicate of Cause arise? Given the perception of necessary sequences within the range of the existent and phenomenal, we should, it is true, be driven by the impulse of mind to continue the operation of sequent and antecedent regressively *ad infinitum*. But this inevitable impulse of mind could not establish the necessity of Cause as a universal predicate. It might be regarded indeed simply as a *cacoethes cogitandi*. Our business is then first to ascertain whether the causal predicate, as a universal and necessary, be a fact of intelligence. And this question cannot be settled on the "common sense" ground that we have an inevitable necessity imposed on us to affirm Cause, but only by the critical exhibition of the nature and genesis of the necessity, if that be possible.

In the simple, initial, and rudimentary act of intelligence which is called Percipience, we have found the process whereby we reach a percept. That process is (stated generally) the Form of Mediation which, when broken up, yields us the laws of Reason-movement, viz., Excluded Middle, Negation, Sufficient Reason, and Identity. This identity is the conclusion of the process and is the form of the subsumption of the object by my will into the unity of consciousness, and its consequent affirmation as determined being equal to itself. But this determined being has been manifestly mediated: the thing is, *because* it is not any other thing. It is mediated, in brief, through negation as ground.

So it is with every determination and discrimination ; and we thus have a mediating or causal process as *prius* of the issue in percipience—the determined somewhat or percept. Here, then, is Cause, as “Sufficient reason,” woven into the very form of the primal process of Reason, accompanying it in every act, and making its acts possible.

Sufficient Reason is the summing up of two antecedent movements, viz. : A is either A or B or something else (excluded middle) : it is not B or anything else (contradiction or negation) ; *Therefore* ; it is A (identity). The cause, the formal cause or ground of the existent external, is contained in the *therefore* of Sufficient Reason which lies in the bosom of the mediating process of all possible Percipience.

The universality and necessity of the Causal predicate as synthesis of the external and interpreter of the matter of sensation, is thus exhibited as implicit in the act of Percipience, and so Reason-born.

As in the case of “Being,” the Causal Predicate is necessarily affirmed of the totality and unity of things, as of each individual thing. It is not a “general” nor an “abstract,” but a percept—a dialectic percept—a synthetic *à priori* predicate, and involved in the very nature of Reason.

The importance of the distinction I here make between the Causal Predicate and the causal nexus is great. If it be not recognised, then the Causal notion is applicable to nothing save empirical *changes* of state going on *within* the sphere of finite phenomena.

We find ourselves under the necessity, it is said, of carrying the Causal predicate regressively back *ad infinitum*. But this is an illusion: Cause, kinetic and formal, is the real ground which Reason posits as in things, and it is the *prius* of things *qua* phenomena. It is the condition of the possibility of our thinking things. When I imagine myself under the necessity of affirming a cause of this ground-cause and so on, I have created my own difficulty by first sensualizing the dialectic percept, Cause (as we said also in the case of Being). I have either transformed Cause into an *ens* of imagination, or into an *ens* of abstraction—both of which proceedings are equally illegitimate. Given that I *so* think Cause, it follows, of course, that I must think the said cause as again caused, and so forth. But if I hold Cause before me as dialectic of Reason beyond which I cannot by the very nature of the case go (at least along the ordinary beaten path of thinking), any predication of a cause of the cause is a contradiction and an absurdity. This intellectual perception of the act and fact of pure reason is characteristic of our cognition of all the Dialectic percepts.

I have said Cause is predicated as necessary ground of things *qua* phenomena. After what has been said elsewhere I need scarcely protect myself against being supposed to use the word “phenomena” in the Kantian sense. Phenomena are not shows of things constituted by the mind, but the system of predicates existing *there for* the mind: and beyond these and their Being and Reason-ground or *ratio* there is nothing.

Further, we would point out that discussion about the infinite regression of causes is futile; because if the Form of our percipience—of all thought, be causal, how is it possible to imagine the uncaused in things? We should first have to unship reason. Thought cannot get behind the primary and necessary conditions of thought.

An interesting question arises as to the relation of cause and effect to Time. Cause is always necessarily conceived as the time-prius of the effect. Why so? Because all thinking is in Time, and the fundamental form of Reason yields the mediating moments as *priora* of, as the *prius*, the completion of the dialectic act—the percept.

In fine, the Causal predicate is outside the series of phenomena as phenomena, and is constitutive of them as ground.

We may now pass from the Causal Predicate to the Causal Nexus.

2. *The Causal Nexus.*

Let us look at this question historically and genetically. It is really a question of empirical causation demanding an explanation which the empirical by itself cannot yield.

The attuent consciousness, which precedes the emergence of the rational in and through Will, we can imagine as being, in its first experiences, aware only of the quiescent qualities of the external. It then suddenly receives the impression of motion, *e.g.* the

motion of a leaf up to that moment attituded as stable. This experience suggests nothing save the isolated new phenomenon—motion or change of state. The fact of change, however, is thereby introduced into attitudinal consciousness and so added to receptive experience.

If the *rational* consciousness becomes aware for the first time of this new phenomenon of motion, there is, of course, a place here, as everywhere, for the universal Causal Predicate; but there is as yet no place for the Causal Nexus. Matter is not yet furnished for this.

The attituded intelligence is, as yet, aware of nothing save the fact of motion and change. If, however, the alighting of a crow on the branch had preceded the motion, these two motions would then be attituded through association as before and after—*a b*. Nay, even the attituded consciousness might after a certain frequency of *impression* associate two or three antecedents with a sequent. The association in memory of an antecedent and sequent *a b* leads to the expectation of *b* when *a* is again attituded, as when a dog expects the descent of a whip on seeing the raised arm: nay, the memorial association may suggest *a* when *b* is seen.

In short, the order or series of attitudes in time leads an attituded intelligence (as endowed with memory) to expect a repetition of the same order when any unit of the series re-appears. This habit is engendered on phenomenal experience.

The primary fact given to us, and which we *receive* and have to explain, is the sequence *a b*.

The non-rational attuition of sequents is undoubtedly, at best, an association as passive and receptive in its character as is the attuition of a single and simple phenomenal shape. But this does not prevent the education of experience or custom taking effect in non-rational intelligences. But the series of sequent movements which in a dog ends with the sensation of pain may some day change its character. The up-lifted arm, which, up to a certain date in his experience, has been an antecedent of the descending whip, is found also to be sometimes followed by a friendly pat. The second limb of the associated series of movements is thus destroyed and another limb takes its place; and this new sequence, *if repeated more frequently* than the first sequence which was bound together in attuition, will ere long supersede it. Inasmuch as a dog cannot, because of his want of Will-potency, fix attuits in consciousness and discriminate their true characters, he cannot compare, though he can feel likenesses and differences: thus the *more frequent* becomes to it *the invariable*, and there are fixed, in his associative memory, certain sequences as always occurring.

Further, the dog not only, through mere association, attuites invariableness of succession as characteristic of a series of phenomena, but it has a further capacity: for, if any pleasure or pain affecting its own organism is one term of the invariable series, its movements show that it expects one term of the series to be followed by another. It *expects* *b* when it is attuent of *a*. The certainty of expectation is not, of course, a knowledge

in any proper signification of the word, because the Reason-movement whereby we perceive or know is not yet there; but it is fore-*felt*.

Accordingly, a dog (if we might venture to interpret its intelligence) is, by means of associative memory, attuent of a series of movements consisting of two or more terms; further, of the fact that the one *invariably* follows the other in the order of time: and not only so; for the attuition of the invariableness of the occurrence of the terms of the series becomes in the canine consciousness the *feeling of expectation* that a specific sequent will follow a specific antecedent.

It would almost seem, then, that the animal consciousness may claim to possess, in common with that of man, an experience of the causal relation. And such is the fact in every essential respect, *if* the perception of cause and effect as existing outside, and consequently the notion of the causal nexus, built on the foundation of that perception, be only a perception of an invariable and certain (that is, "always to be expected") series of phenomena. I say there would be no *essential* difference; the sole difference would lie in the greater vividness and intensity of the attuitions of the higher organism (man).

The causal nexus as analysed by Hume is, in point of fact, the causal nexus of the dog as it has just been exhibited. It is, to use a Kantian phrase, the synthesis of imagination in the sensibility only.

The term attuition, it is scarcely necessary to repeat, has been used to denote that state of consciousness

which is neither perception on the one hand, nor mere elementary sensation on the other : as it rises above the latter in its reflex power of co-ordinating many synchronous impressions as a single totality, so it falls below the former as a specifically lower grade of intelligence. In *attuition*, the subject is conscious of the object:—the object occupies and fills the subject without regard to the spontaneity or movement of the latter, which is in a condition of receptivity, or, at best, of passive or reflex activity. The subject is the slave of the objective phenomenon. In *perception* or knowing, on the other hand, the subject, as Will, applies itself to the object, arrests the flux of phenomena, fixes some one phenomenal object, and, by subsumption into the unity of consciousness, makes it more or less permanent as an object of consciousness. Now the delivery of the rational man from the tyranny of the object enables him, in the first place, to contemplate steadily the mere *synthesis* in the sensibility given by impressions, and to discriminate, in a sequent series, those terms which are the *true* antecedents of a perceived consequent from those which either do, or may, vary. Forcible impact, and not the raising of the arm, he discriminates as the true, invariable, and certain antecedent of the dog's pain when he is beaten : the human agent, the uplifted arm, the whip, are all detected to be variables and therefore not true causal antecedents. The *attuition* of the dog is, no less than the perception of the man (it is true), a consciousness of sequences : but the perception of a man (by virtue of the sustaining Will) is a consciousness which

can disentangle and discriminate those veritable terms of the series which alone *must* issue in the consequent. Thus we rise to the *conditioning invariable antecedent*, and have taken a step in advance of Hume, and are alongside of Mill.

Perception thus discriminates, from among its phenomenal experiences, that which is truly the invariable and certain antecedent of a given consequent. Thus far it simply reads correctly, from the book of experience, that which has happened, does happen, and certainly *will* happen. The merely attitudinal brute reads from the same book incorrectly and confusedly, because it cannot bring Will to bear on the phenomena. Sequence is not consequence.

Let us now take another step forward. The expectation of the future recurrence of the same sequence in the same order reached by the perception of the man is simply a projection of the invariableness of the past into the future; it resolves itself into a confident and reasonable anticipation; and the (so-called) certainty of the recurrence of *b* after *a* can never be more than *this confident anticipation, unless we silently and surreptitiously import more into it from some other source than the mere experience of sequence as such.* In Hume it is and can be nothing else than the reasonable anticipation based on custom or habit, and so it must be with all Sensationalists. At this stage of phenomenal experience it is usual to stop; and, if we here stop, the (so-called) causal is truly resolvable, it seems to me, into merely uniform conditioning sequence: and the

outcome of this is, "*b* will always follow *a*"; not "*b must* always follow *a*." What is the true force here of the word "conditioning"? Merely this, that the true antecedent has been discriminated and not the apparent merely. This uniform and apparently inevitable sequence is really all that we yet find. The uniformity of nature is, thus far, not necessary, but merely "to be expected." For the *necessity* of the sequence is not at all yet explained: it is rather cast out from consciousness as an illusion, and interpreted as a mere *cacoethes intelligendi*.

Now without this *something more*, it will hardly be maintained that the above explication of the relation of antecedents and sequents is an exhaustive record of the causal synthesis which we call the nexus of cause and effect. Forcible impact on a sentient body is not only invariably followed by pain in such a body,—a sequent *always to be expected*; but over and above this, it *cannot but be followed by pain*. There is a *must* in the case. Forcible impact on flesh and nerve and the consequent pain, are related, not only as certain and invariable terms of a series, but as *necessary* terms of a series. Given the one, the other *must* follow. This is what rational intelligence really means by Cause and Effect—by the causal nexus, or necessary relation, of the sequent series *a b*.

Again, if a given antecedent invariably and necessarily involves a certain sequent, and if that specific sequent *cannot* take place without the prior occurrence of that specific antecedent, what is this but to

say that the antecedent *causes* the sequent or effects it? Cause then means in the rational consciousness *Efficient* cause. There is no cause which is not efficient; any non-efficient antecedent in a series is *ipso facto* misnamed *cause*, and must be forthwith eliminated. Nay more, the efficient cause is also formal cause, because *a* is the ground of the qualitative *difference* that takes place, and which we call *b*.

Cause then, it appears, is efficient and formal,¹ cause and effect are related by a *must*, by a necessary nexus—nor merely by invariableness of sequence. All that has yet been said is a mere matter of phenomenological fact in the history of intelligence, which we may try to explain, but which finally declines to be explained away. Can it truly be explained or justified? Must we content ourselves merely with loud assertion of the existence and reality of the necessary nexus, or must we accept it as after all an illusory habit of mind?

Consider: Is this necessity given in the experience of sequent phenomena, or is it imported into consciousness from some other source as a *concomitant* of the relations of sequence? The answer is, that while all the phenomenal materials are given in experience the *must* is a subject-evolved product—the form in which the particular time-sequence is taken up by Reason. No assertion that this is so, however,—no emphasizing of mere assertion—can establish its truth. We must show *how* it is a Reason-necessity. If we do not

¹ In the Aristotelian use of the term.

do this, we stop short at the critical point of the whole analysis, and our loud affirmation is mere vulgar opinion dressed up in the borrowed clothes of philosophical terminology.

The case stands thus in accordance with the preceding investigation.

The universal *à priori* synthetic predicate *Cause*, implicit in the Form of Percipience, takes up all presentates as caused—statical as well as dynamical presentates. The presentate before me, *e.g.* a bird, is perceived and affirmed as a caused determinate somewhat which is the issue of a causal process: when the said bird flies, the new phenomenon, motion, is perceived and affirmed as also caused; and that is all.

But if I see that two motions follow each other, *e.g.* the approach of a cat, *a*, and the flight of the bird, *b*, I have a case of time-sequence. The *à priori* universal predicate thereupon operates thus: *b* was caused: *what* was the cause? Answer, *a* the time-antecedent. Thus I synthesize *ab* as causally, that is necessarily, connected, and I thus establish the causal nexus in this particular case. Among all the possible time-priora of *b*, *a* alone seems to account for *b* as productive or effectuating cause. The necessity is thus engendered on this particular time-sequence by means of the *à priori* causal synthetic predicate which compels us to think things as *caused somehow*. But the causal nexus is within the series of the phenomenally conditioned.

But all this, it may be admitted, gives us the fact of Cause, the necessity of Cause as ground of *b*, and the affirmation of *a* as being that ground in the particular case; but we have not yet so bridged over the relation of *a* to *b* as to yield a *nexus* which is, as a matter of experiential fact, *necessary* as between those *two particular phenomena*. True; but the explanation of that necessary nexus in the particular case is to be found in a simple operation of intelligence. For, our concept of *a* (the cat) is by the new experience extended so as to comprehend the quality of "bird-alarming," and our concept of *b* (bird) is extended so as to comprehend the quality of "cat-fearing"; and so long as these concepts respectively contain these elements *a must be* followed by *b*. Two concepts are so related in thought as to cross each other and are thus so tied together that to think and affirm the one is to think and affirm the other. In brief, the law of Identity comes on the scene in the completed cognition of a particular sequence-relation and the necessary nexus in thought is thereby constituted. It is a case of identity. So, *e.g.* "Fire burns wood," *i.e.* Fire is *comburent*, Wood is *combustible*: the two concepts cross and are mutually involved.

We say the necessary connection *in thought*. For my constitution of the nexus in the particular case before me may be no nexus at all *in rerum natura*. And yet for a thousand years men may so have regarded it. It is a question of observation: *b* may not have been caused by *a* but by *x*, or *y*, or *z*. This, I say, is a question of accuracy in the observation of the

phenomenal sequential series. But having, however erroneously, constituted the two concepts, *a*, *b*, as I have constituted them, they must remain in a necessary nexus, till I have, in the further progress of knowledge, taken them to pieces and reconstructed them. The *vera causa*—the true synthesis of *ab* we reach, as we reach other knowledge, only by passing beyond crude percipience and concipience, and, through analytico-synthetic processes, finding the actual fact. This is Science. The nexus in *rerum natura* is seen only when we finally see that it is a case of transmutation of Energy—a case of *physical* identity. To say, however, that an effect is simply the sum of its conditions is one of the many attempts to solve difficult questions by easy phrases. The pavement is dry, and it rains: result a “wet pavement.” The coincidence of two sets of conditions produces a *tertium quid*—something that did not before exist.

The perception of the fact of physical identity is said to explain the causal nexus. But it cannot do so, for the nexus is a thing of thought. For ages before the identity was seen which revealed that *b* as effect of *a* was simply *b^a*, the nexus of *ab* was to thought a necessary and efficient nexus. It does not matter whether the causal synthesis was wrong or right. Opinion is always on its way to science; but at every step of the way it is *subjectively* assured of its causal affirmations, and the synthesis is disconnected finally only by showing that the concepts in the synthesis are not what we thought they were. The nexus is thus

broken. The causal nexus rests on identity, but it is an identity in thought.

Let it be noted in this connection that the so-called induction of Cause of which Logicians treat, if it is to be called induction at all, is induction of a peculiar and analytic character. I have *f* an effect; and preceding it and somehow effectuating it, there are the possibilities *a, b, c, d, e*, mixed up. My search for cause is an analysis of this complex series in order to isolate the true specific causal element in the series, that results in the specific effect, *f*, and which I find to be *e*. We thus have the causal synthesis *e-f*. We are aided, doubtless, in searching for this by the so-called methods laid down by Logicians. But these do not constitute methods at all: they are simply the experimentalist's expedients and are subsidiary to true Method. The Method is analytico-synthetic.

In conclusion, let me make two remarks. Causality does not determine the time-sequence of *ab*. Causality merely finds *itself* involved in the universal time-sequence. The Form of Percipience necessitates the causal moment as *prius* of the effect—the percept; and the attempt to construe a logical *prius* in thought is to place it as an antecedent in Time. The dialectic of finite reason is in Time.

The Sensationalist, departing from his only logical and tenable doctrine—invariability of sequence in time engendering a quasi-necessity—now calls the cause a *conditioning* invariable antecedent. If by this he means merely to signalize the true antecedent as

opposed to many possible antecedents or the crude antecedents of the vulgar, he manifestly gains nothing as regards the question of causality. If, on the other hand, he means by the word "conditioning" that there is something *more* than true time-sequence, he is endeavouring illegitimately to foist in causality in the sense of effectuating power and necessary effect; and thus, he either gives up the sensationalist position altogether, or confesses his failure to explain causality.

3. *The Law of Uniformity in Nature.*

This does not mean that what has happened once will happen again. Nothing more than the possibility of its happening again is established by its happening *once*.

If any sequence, *ab*, happens *frequently*, the probability of its happening again is then established, and a consequent expectation arises in the mind of the observer; and the more frequently it happens, the greater is the felt probability of its recurrence.

When, next, the sequence, *ab*, has been invariable in *all* the instances *yet* observed, as in the case of day following night, the probability rises to a firm belief that *b* will always follow *a*. But this, at most, is only conviction (subjective).

When, further, *a* is affirmed as the invariable (so-called) "conditioning" antecedent of *b*, we have a conviction of the continued recurrence so strong as to amount almost to certainty; and this is sufficient for all practical purposes.

But there is, as yet, no necessity in the uniformity of sequence. To-morrow's sun might rise a charred mass. Until we recognise the necessity of the synthesis *ab*, there is no objective *law* of uniformity in nature. This necessity rests, as I have shown, on the Law of Identity. If *b* did not follow *a*, *b* would not be *b* nor would *a* be *a*.

All uniformity of sequence in phenomena, accordingly, is only possible and, in varying degrees, probable until we have definitely discriminated and affirmed a true causal sequence. And the uniformity of nature is merely the uniformity of the causal relation; the necessity is the necessity of the causal nexus, which is analytic.

Reciprocity is not a separate category but merely the causal intercommunity of parts whereby a complex unity is constituted—the unity of a thing or of a Science of things.¹

The question of the causal nexus, it now appears, lies entirely within the finite phenomenal series. The Causal Predicate again, which is the *à priori* ground of our searching for cause at all, is the ground of the possibility of any finite phenomenal series whatsoever, and as ground and efficient, constitutive of the world.

¹ It is scarcely necessary to point out that in a doctrine of natural realism, the perception of the co-existence of phenomena is in no way dependent on the notion of Reciprocity as a form of the Causal notion.

CHAP. VII.—END.

WILL under the stimulus of formal (empty) end seeks a “real” filling. This it finds in the perceived presentate. Having achieved this, it then continues its activity under two stimuli—the inner formal stimulus and the stimulus of pleasure in Knowing. It moves always towards the completion of the analytico-synthetic process—which, as an absolute synthesis of the conditioned and unconditioned, is for ever impossible.

It is *Things* which Will takes up in the processes of its dialectic movement. It mediates its own percepts but only by taking up *things* as mediated—as causally constituted thus and not otherwise.

This mediating or causal movement in things is, as being a movement, necessarily involved in a terminus of movement—an End. The end of the movement in each case is simply the thing itself as determined-so.

What is true of the individuum is true of the total concrete. This total—this universe—is, in so far as representable in imagination, affirmed as the sum and completion of a mediating or causal movement.

The moments of the dialectic are the elements of a unity which are necessarily conceived (as all else) in a time series, but which are seen to involve each the other. The End is in each step of the process and in the initiation of it.

The question of "purposed" end involves the question of Being and its Dialectic as subject—as itself universal Consciousness. I shall not complicate my argument by entering on this question here. It suffices to say that if the universe is not a purposed end, it is at least a fact. It is, moreover, a fact resting in the universal of Being, and mediated or caused. A fact caused is a result, an outcome of the causal movement and implicit in it; and, as such, an end. The causal movement contains in its very heart an issue, and that issue is "end"—the achievement of an initiated movement.

This achieved end is the universe of things as datum of Recipience. But so far as the inner determination of the Dialectic goes, it advances no further than the "determined-so and not otherwise." In that final moment it is, as dialectic, not yet the finite phenomenon. It is the specific ground of the specific phenomenon whether that be an individuum or the universe. This specific ground is the "essence" of the individuum.¹ The end of the dialectic movement is achieved in a determined-so, which is the essence of the concrete thing, just as a thought is *prius* of its word. The word is, in the case we are considering, represented by the finite expression or manifestation in quantity of the "determined-so" of the Dialectic.

Just as my thought or your thought, when it has reached clearness, finds the necessity of vocal utterance, so does the universal dialectic find a necessity for its

¹ *Vid.* "Essence" below.

utterance in the universe of Space and Time, that it may complete itself as Being and Thinking—*realize* itself by becoming Existence and *Thought*. It is this expression of Being and Thinking as the system of things which reaches us—parts of that system and within it—in sense recipience. The ascertainment of what the total truly is, as a concrete of Mind and manifestation, is the function of our finite thinking. Sense alone can give us the outer phenomenal: thinking alone can penetrate to the inner thinking.

We thus have given to us in the formal process of finite reason the mind-reality of the universe, though not without debt to feeling as regards the universal ground, Being.

“Being” we have found to be the sole universal, simple, one, absoluto-infinite, infinitely-during, the potential, ground and thesis of all that exists—the universal bearer of finite matter and finite mind. This Being, as universal ground, moves towards difference and determination in a dialectic process which is Reason or thinking. Beënt Reason is the inner truth of the whole system of coherent differences.

For shortness, then, we may name this Being and its process, Absolute-Causal-Being. It is not within the chain of phenomenal experience and so itself conditioned. In feeling, it is true, it is given as Being. But it is given also in dialectic—given in and through the first synthetic act of reason, which is percipience, and it is thus *à priori*. It is conditioning.

Absolute-Causal-Being is always immanent in its world; and there we first and last find it. But it is not to be conceived either as identical with the world or as limited by the finite totality of things, as if the finite were an alien limitation: its limitations are always within itself.

We do not impose the Dialectic on the phenomenal; it is seen and affirmed in and through the phenomenal of which it is the mind-verity. We grasp the phenomenal just so. The finite dialectic is not merely formal nor yet regulative; it is first and last operative as constitutive of the phenomenal. Consequently whatever is felt or thought is felt and thought, whether we are explicitly conscious of it or not, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Each and every simple perception in truth implicitly affirms God as Being and Reason.

The "thing in itself," finally, is the essence of the concrete thing, and essence is simply "Being determined-so." It is only in the finite expression of the determinate that the question of identity becomes a *quaestio* at all.

We saw that it is the Causal Predicate in the Dialectic which demands a cause within the time-series of phenomena: that the nexus within phenomena as a necessary nexus is the necessity of a partial identity of concepts. We now see that End is in each thing for itself alone, and in the total for itself; and that this end is the "determined-so" of the dialectic. End is Essence, as we shall subsequently see.

SIXTH PART.

ON THE CATEGORIES.

CHAP. I.—GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE CATEGORIES.

“THERE are only two cases possible in which synthetic representation and its object can correspond, can relate themselves to one another necessarily, and, so to speak, meet one another: Either the object makes the representation (perception in consciousness) alone possible, or the representation (the perception) makes the object alone possible.” This Kant says, by way of introduction to the Deduction of the Categories. In consistency with Dualism, we must hold that the mental experience is, within the whole sphere of Recipience, determined by the object presented to us; and that, consequently, the true *à priori* contribution to the object is restricted to that which sense-presentation cannot possibly give. These *à priori* contributions come to the help of mere sensibility in order to constitute the complete notion of the object for consciousness as that object *actually there exists*.

I know a quantum and I know Quantity, but my thought of quantity *is* not quantity. And this remark applies to all that is primarily given in feeling—all

which givens are not products of the finite subject in any sense whatsoever.

What I have now to say on the Categories is substantially only the formulation of the argument and conclusions of preceding chapters.

If by Categories be meant generalizations of the different kinds or classes of predicables, we shall, it is manifest, have to look for them both in the *à posteriori* elements of Receptivity and in the *à priori* Dialectic moments of Percipience which are together constitutive of the object as known.

The Intelligible or the Noumenon we know as fact and reason-form: but nothing more can we know of this without characterization; and all characterization is, as such, to human intelligence phenomenal. The noumenal which is simply another name for the synthetic *à priori* categories whereby we take up the phenomenal, is given to us as *in* things, but not *by* things. These categories are wholly unrealizable by thought even as empty abstracts until we have first found them in the synthesis of experience. They are the engine whereby intelligence intellects what is actually *there* independently of it and already determined for it. This dialectic machinery exists for the purpose of arranging the phenomena of presentation and making knowledge (but not existence) possible; and this machinery is further *in* the world, and not merely formal.

The *à priori* Categories are not, however, to be regarded as shapes or moulds that subsist like indepen-

dent faculties in the activity of consciousness, and into which the fluent sensible is run. Their genesis and *modus operandi* have been already exhibited.

Nor can they be applied to themselves. As the primary moments and forms of Reason, their true function is discharged in dealing with the matter of knowledge and *finding themselves there*. Reason cannot legitimately turn back on itself and apply the *à priori* forms to the forms themselves. This would compel us to speak of the possibility of possibility, the being of being, the cause of cause, or the cause of being, and so forth. Such application of the *à priori* categories can have no validity. We cannot carry our heads in our mouths. The almost irresistible impulse to make the application ought, however, to be recognised as a phenomenon of consciousness, and explained.

The *à posteriori* Categories also are the product of Reason, but only *in so far as they are predications*; e.g. a *quantum* is a datum of sense, but the predication of a quantum, which we may call a *quantificate*, is the fruit of Reason inasmuch as it is the result of the action of Reason mediately determining or affirming a quantum. Quantity-universal is a datum of sense—of the attitudinal state of consciousness; it is an attitudinal fact which reaches me before Will with its dialectic appears on the scene at all. For the *affirmation* of Quantity, Reason is of course necessary; but Quantity exists both in fact and in my consciousness prior to the emergence of human reason. So with *quanta*: they are out there to begin with, and

are attutied by the conscious-subject before they are affirmed. Quality again is the determination by the Will in percipience of actual and externally-subsisting *modes* of existence. Degree is simply the more or less in attuition discriminated and affirmed. So with all relations; they are in the things. What we call physical laws are merely processes *within* things, generalized. Time, again, is vaguely sensed and attutied by animals, and is through the active prehension and arrestment of During as "now," merely determined and predicated.

It has to be noted accordingly that the *à posteriori* Categories are given by the outer, and that it is only in so far as they are raised to predications that they owe anything to Will-reason at all.

To ascertain these categories, accordingly, we have to think ourselves back into the animal state of attuition, before the Will-potency has emerged to give birth to Reason; for the *à posteriori* categories are simply the classification of actual and possible predications of the already existing data of Sense. The impressions on the attuent subject are affirmed, and all possible affirmations are then generalized. These possible predications of the data of sense are the predicaments; and I doubt if we can improve much on the generalizations of Aristotle, after we have thrown out those which are not truly *à posteriori* in their nature, if there be any such. I doubt if there are any, unless we first read into Aristotle what does not appear on the surface. Relation in Time might be held to

include the causal nexus, but as *à posteriori* it is to be regarded as denoting only the sense relations of antecedent and sequent in Time, and nothing more.¹

To illustrate the *à posteriority* of Categories let me repeat that quantity is a datum of sense, and that quanta also are data. The act of affirmation converts the quantum, already present to the attuent intelligence, into a quantificate. The quantum, as is the case with all impressions, is simply the object in sensibility awaiting the action of Reason on it. An animal is attuitively conscious of the *à posteriori* categories in their particularity, but it cannot categorize, because it cannot affirm. They are present to it as sense-attuits; the emergence of Reason in man makes it possible for him to predicate, and so to raise these mere attuits to knowledge. Accordingly the *à posteriori* Categories are, strictly speaking, the classification of received *attuits*, which Will on its emergence subsumes and affirms, thereby raising them into predicates and predicables.

This being so, we have, in strict regard to a consistent Dualism, to exhibit the classification of attuits, whereon the Will acts in order to constitute them predicaments. To call them Categories (which means predications) prior to this action of Reason is inaccurate. They might, however, be called pre-categories.

¹ Attempts to generalize still further the Aristotelian predicaments seem frequently to be based on a misapprehension, and are either illusory or introduce *à priori* notions. Descartes and Wolff do not distinguish between Categories of Sense and Categories of Reason.

208 *General Statement as to the Categories.*

But Will in percipience accomplishes much more than this mere predication of the phenomenon. Nature interpreted by the above *à posteriori* Categories would still be anarchic—at best, a colligation of facts. In the Form of Percipience there are brought into play the Categories of pure Reason—the universal and necessary synthetic predicates. These convert confusion into order, and order, again, into system and organic unity.

The dialectic process in Percipience consists of the kinetic movement of Will containing in itself the empty form of end and effecting that end—the subsumption of an object into the unity of consciousness—mediately, through the moments of excluded middle, negation, and sufficient reason. This subsumption into the unity of consciousness is the affirmation of *a determined somewhat*. Now if we look at this primal process, we shall see that all true *à priori* Categories grow out of it. We thus find unity and a genetic construction for these categories. For example, the category of possibility is simply the moment of excluded middle. The moment of being or is-ness yields identity ($A = A$); and as this is-ness is given as a determined somewhat which *is*, we have the category of Essence which is simply Being and its dialectic in its final moment; it is the “thing in itself.” The *à priori* categories must have a unity of genesis whether we are able correctly to enumerate them or not; for the Form of Percipience is the Form of Reason whereby it grips and marshals the sensible. It is the network of reason and of the universe, thereby constituted for us a cosmos.

CHAP. II.—PARALLELISM OF SENSE AND REASON.

WE have in permanent union the *feeling* of being and the feeling of phenomenal shapes, the former as ground of the latter—a system of differences cohering in “Being.” (Part I.)

In the reflex action which externalizes these feelings as objects, the mere subject has exhausted all its function. This conscious subject now moves in order to deal with these objects. This kinetic energizing which emerges out of the conscious subject has always been regarded, under whatever name—reason, intelligence, understanding—as an activity. What I have desired to demonstrate is that its activity is pure activity, and that the essence of reason or intelligence is the pure activity of a subject consciousness; further, that this pure movement has, by the very fact that it is a movement, an end; a formal end, for as yet there is no content: and, further, that it moves towards its end (which end is a percept) by a certain way or process which is not at all determined by the facts of feeling, but by itself and through its own necessary nature. This process is the Dialectic of Reason, and it terminates in a judgment of the identity of the phenomenal or synoptic A of Sense.

This judgment is by no means a simple affair, but,

on the contrary, highly complex. The identity of the thing with itself is affirmed, $A=A$: the being of A is affirmed, A is A : the finitude of A is affirmed for the final dialectic moment is determination, and the whole process has determination in view: the objectivity (but not necessarily externality) of A is affirmed, viz. A is *there* (not me the subject) as object: still again, the oneness of A is affirmed, A is one as opposed to the multitudinous expression of the rest of the alphabet of sense: finally, the "nowness" of A is affirmed.

By the use of italics the complex contained in the resultant unity of the percept may be exhibited to the eye:

a is a (finitude, determinate).

a is a (being of a).

a is a -*there* (object).

a is *now* (time or *punctum durationis*).

a is *one* (unity).

$a=a$ (identity).

Now, all these issues of the dialectic are already factually there in *feeling*. The dialectic in seeking for content merely re-discovers them, so to speak, and transmutes them out of the sensible into the rational. Thus reason will be seen to proceed on parallel lines with nature (the totality of feeling). For example:—

The *feeling* of the being of A is a fact. The dialectic again carries the fact of being and the judgment of being implicit in it from its very initiation of movement: its first emergence out of the confusion of

passive feeling is in this form, "A is either A or B," A is not B: A is A.

The *feeling* of the sameness of A with A is a fact, *i.e.* the sameness of the first and subsequent impressions which A makes in sense, and which enables a dog to recognise its master; the Dialectic judgment carries this mere sameness of A in Feeling into the Identity of A after a process, raising it out of feeling into a truth of judgment—a necessary of Reason.

The *feeling* of the finitude of various impressions, each excluding the other, and each as object excluding consciousness as subject, is already a fact: the dialectic raises this into a judgment, and affirms determination or finitude of this or that, A or B.

There is in mere sense a *feeling* of "nowness" which the Dialectic raises into a judgment.

The *feeling* of singleness and its co-relative multiplicity is already a fact of consciousness: the dialectic affirms as an act of judgment the *one*, and, through one, the many.

So far as the Dialectic is concerned, there is no judgment of *externality*, but of *objectivity* only; the affirmation of externality being an *à posteriori* predicament.

The Dialectic thus comes to the support of Feeling, and runs on parallel lines with the phenomena of feeling. But it is not yielded by the phenomena of feeling. It is a subject-sprung free movement seeking for content. If the thinker will cancel the dialectic in himself, he will find that the matter of the dialectic was already experienced in feeling after a fashion. He will

find, in short, that he has simply interpreted that experience, and by a free act converted it into knowledge for himself, and, therethrough, found the reason in it.

I may now illustrate this position further by taking the moments which are the *priora* of the issue. The first moment in the dialectic as a process, as distinct from the mere kinetic Will-initiation, is the Law of Excluded Middle; A—the attuit before me as object—either is A or B (B being here equivalent to all other possible things, *i.e.* to not-A). Now, the feeling, pre-rational, consciousness of an animal presents to it an endless variety of diverse finite objects. It stands before them in confusion and is *led* by some inner impulse or natural affinity, or what comes to the same thing, by the salience—even we may say prosilience—of A to go to that, and then by some other object (B) is led to B and so forth; and it cannot help itself. There is no Law of Excluded Middle working in the animal consciousness here, and none *in man* as a *merely æsthetic* being; but there is unquestionably an impression of many objects and a feeling (however vague) of possible alternatives. Nature itself here may be said to operate in terms of the Excluded Middle by the presentation of alternative objects, and attracting to A and not to B through its power of impressing the particular feeling-organism before it more forcibly *thus* than otherwise. Accordingly, the formal movement of Reason, when it emerges, operates on what is already there in the rudi-

mentary form of feeling,—and as possibility of alternatives. In this sense, then, dialectic may be said to add no fresh *matter* to consciousness, but only to raise impressions that are loose and non-significant into the necessity of Reason by affirmation. Nature in feeling suggests alternatives, and, so far, Sense runs on parallel lines with the Dialectic; but the dialectic is a free movement to meet a nature which is clamant for interpretation. Were only a unitary atom present to consciousness and, beside this, nothing—the dialectic would still move as it does. It would say “*that*” is either A *or* nothing; it is not nothing, and so forth.

Negation, again, in the dialectic process already exists in the feeling of the mutual exclusion of diverse objects of sense; but there is no judgment of negation and therefore no necessity of negation until the dialectic acts.

There is nothing in Sense corresponding to Cause as a universal predicate. It is only in the relations among phenomena that the universal predicate has its sense-parallel, and that in the form of a time-sequence.

Speaking generally, a system of dualism must hold that there is a real logic of things which the formal logic of mind recognizes, and, in recognizing, interprets.

It would be a strange thing indeed if the energy of Reason seizing the external found that the one did not answer the other—that the datum of sense defeated the process of dialectic, that the plastic power of Reason encountered material which it failed to mould. It

would be equally strange if the datum of sense failed to find its knower and interpreter, if it for ever remained what it appears to a dog or a horse. The datum *truly* is as Reason cognizes it—Reason cognizes it as it *truly* is. The consciousness of an animal does not err so far as it goes, but it is inadequate to the task of cognition, of thought. A criticism of knowledge is thus a criticism of things.

It may seem then, for a moment, that the formal Dialectic adds nothing to the matter of feeling.

But, in truth, the Dialectic adds everything by the mere act of transforming feeling into knowledge. Will-reason advances imperiously on the manifold in sensation, and *affirms* that the object before it in feeling is, and must be, either A or not-A. It lifts the object out of feeling, and a second time presents it and relates it to consciousness as *affirmed*, as known; and secondly, this affirmation in all its implicit moments is an affirmation of necessity. It *is* so, and it *must be* so. Finite mind cannot act *save so*. Thus it is that the Dialectic contains not only the whole interpretation of Nature (Feeling), but the *necessary character of Nature* as such. It is *res*, phenomena, feeling, nature that the Dialectic takes up—not as itself being that nature, but as being the meaning of that nature, the reason or thought-side of the phenomenon, whereby the phenomenon is an *actual*. How could I know Reason in things (supposing it there) except in and through a reason-act in myself? To the attitudinal consciousness

this vast and complex phenomenon in space and time is an actual through the Being in it as *felt*; this is all that mind at this stage can attain to. To the rational consciousness this phenomenon in space and time is an actual through the Being in it as *known*; and not only now through the Being in it as known, but through the whole dialectic in it as known in it and through it—the ground and actuality of it.

Thus the formal of Reason may seem to repeat the record of experience, and do nothing more for us, and we may be refused the right to call it *à priori* at all. But, as a matter of fact, all movement of reason as such is pure and formal, and all is *à priori*; and I am bound to follow and record its moments of inner determination as clear additions to the matter of consciousness effected in me independently of my activity. The dialectic then is a synthetic *à priori* series of affirmations; and yet the position is this:—The Dialectic, apart from the datum of sense, is like a cheque on a banker duly signed, but which meets with the response “no effects”; the datum of sense without the dialectic is a cheque on a bank where there are “effects,” but it wants the signature.

CHAP. III.—THE CATEGORIES.

A. *Categories of Recipience.*

WHAT then constitute the dialectic percepts, the *à priori* synthetic categories, the necessary moments of Reason, the necessary ground of the actual, in themselves necessary simply because they constitute the *modus rationis*?

It will be seen, from the preceding chapter, that before entering on this question we have to consider the categories of Sense or Receptivity.

In this connection we have the traditional Aristotelian predicaments. The discussion as to the precise significance and the historical genuineness of these, and as to the final acceptance of all of them by Aristotle himself, will not occupy us here. It seems to me that this discussion is just as interesting as any other question of philosophical antiquities and not more so, and it is desirable rather to use what we have, so far as it will go, as an aid to the settlement of the predicaments themselves.

The essential thing to note, it seems to me, is that these categories are *à posteriori*, and based on the issue or final moment of the activity of percipience as exercised on the pure datum of sense. The point of view

from which I regard Mind suggests this interpretation of the Aristotelian categories. In any case it compels me, as recognizing a veritable datum outside acting on me a conscious-subject, to generalize the modus of the presentation of the external to consciousness. The categories of activity are implicit in the Dialectic and *à priori*, proceeding by an inner determination; the categories of impression or presentation, on the other hand, are strictly to be called Universals in Sense.

It would be vain to pretend that the subject is not a difficult one, and that it is an easy matter to keep one category so clear of another that there is no intercrossing. It certainly will occur to a thinker that just as the *à priori* categories are moments in a unity of process, so *à posteriori* universals, as the universals of externalized thought, are also moments in the unity of the process of universal Mind; and in a synthetic cosmic construction, an attempt might be made so to present them. Meanwhile, however, our business is to see what the datum in experience actually conveys *into* me and to generalize its forms. We must beware of outstripping experience at the bidding of the constructive and speculative impulse.

Now, just as the *à priori* categories will be found to be based on our analysis of Percipience, so the *à posteriori* categories are based on the analysis of Feeling or Recipience as that appears in Part I. All that has to be said in this Treatise constitutes at least a logical unity, and rests on a very simple basis.

We receive as Universals and affirm :—

- I. Being.
- II. Quantity in general, *i.e.* Space, Extension.
- III. Quality, *i.e.* Quantity *qualified* into single individua by figure, colour, and so forth. Diverse individua or “ones.”
- IV. Rest and Motion of individua; *i.e.* of the above qualified quanta.
- V. Relation of the individua :—
 - (a) In respect of quantity or space, the greater and less; and the locality—*Where*.
 - (b) In respect of quality or the How—Degree.
 - (c) In respect of coexistence and successions of motion. This latter involves *Time-Sequence* and the *When*.¹

These data of sense are in sense and reflected by the conscious-subject into externality: they are then generalized and affirmed by reason and become predicaments of the real.

Nature interpreted by these *à posteriori* categories would still be anarchic—a mere colligation and placing of facts at best. It is in the Form of Percipience, whose issue is the affirming judgment of the identity of A, that we find implicit the categories of pure Reason—the necessary *à priori* synthetic predicates. These convert confusion into order, and order again

¹ (a) (b) (c) are the basis of the perception of likeness or unlikeness among individua.

into system and organic unity, and so interpret the world and constitute knowledge.

The *à posteriori* categories may be called the *summa genera* of recipience—the generalization of what is given in Sense. As a matter of historical fact no one object in sense does of itself yield all the categories, but, properly treated (put through its paces so to speak), any one object can yield them. Inasmuch as the *summa genera* are the generalizations of the experience of this, that, and the other in Sense, the exhaustion of them in their application to any one object would be the completion of all that can be said of that object as a datum—or to put it otherwise, all its determinations as an externalized “somewhat.” Accordingly, it is not incorrect to speak of the categories as the *summa genera* of possible predication—so long as they are restricted to the record of sense.

The genetic deduction of these categories from a principle of unity seems to me impossible from the point of view of Dualism. They can, to the finite subject, be merely generalizations of the data of sense, simply because they are given *to* the subject and not *in and by* reason. Such an attempt at genetic deduction would, consequently, while quite possible, be merely an exercise of the constructive and speculative imagination; and, therefore, not science. The arrangement of them under some more general conception, such as Substance and Accidents, is merely logical and external.

B. *Categories of Percipience—Dialectic Percepts or
Synthetic à priori Categories.*

The question now recurs, How did the conscious attuent subject proceed in order to take possession of *à posteriori* receipts and convert them into percepts, thus raising them from the plane of feeling to the plane of Reason?

Just as in the case of the Categories of Recipience or Feeling I had to refer the reader back to Part I., which deals with the facts of reflex passivity; so now, in the case of the Categories of Percipience, I have to refer the reader back to the chapter which deals with the elementary facts of pure activity. I have to watch the Subject as it functions Will, and discriminate the successive moments of the one movement whereby it affirms. The *à priori* categories thus ascertained do not stand in the human mind side by side, but are themselves the process of mind as reason—they constitute reason. They are a unity of living movement.

The first moment in the Dialectic, viz., Will, is not *in rebus*. We can place it in nature only by placing it there and giving no reason (a common enough speculative feat), or by showing that it is implicit in Cause as a movement. It cannot be said that we take up things as *willed*. The will-movement constitutes them for us, it is true; but it is, as such, pure movement and has not yet at this initial stage come into contact with matter at all, or content of any kind. At this point the con-

scious-subject is as yet only on the way to the prehension and comprehension of things—the resuming of the data already in feeling and the subsuming of the same into the subject for knowledge. The *à priori* categories are to be found in the *process* of this Will-movement, not in the movement as initiation of the process. On this subject I would say that when I throw myself on the diverse and manifold of matter in feeling, I force my way among the anarchic elements of sense in order to reach an end in them and for myself. The movement is carried on by me *in* and among them. Kinetic or initiating movements in me provide the *analogy* of a primal moment in the constituting of Nature; but as a matter of fact I do not take up Nature as “willed,” but rather I *will* to take up nature. The arbitrary placing of Will, as mere kinetic or dynamic, in Nature, would be to imitate the false method of certain systems, and to shoot a wonder-working principle out of a pistol. And, when we have got Will there, it is not distinguishable from a mere *primum mobile*. We must guard against speculative temptations.

We know the dynamic moment that exists in nature only as implicit in the causal or mediating process generally. We must not confound the *à posteriori* category Motion (obvious enough) with the *à priori* nisus or energizing in Mind or in Being. This moment of kinetic initiation—this nisus in the objective universal—is not ascertained as in any way necessarily given through the conatus or nisus in the

conscious-subject (Will). This, rather, is itself an instance of the universal fact.

The functioned Will, or rather the subject functioning Will, issues in determination: this is the resultant, the issue, the completion of the dialectic in percipience as determined from within itself, and in no way determined by the things with which it deals. But further—

The functioned and functioning Will has attained its result after an “either-or,” and the form is the Law of Excluded middle—the Category of Possibility.

The next moment in the process is *a* is not *b*, (not-*a*)—the Category of Negation.

The next moment is “*Therefore*”; that is to say in and through the two antecedent moments as premisses, *a* is *a*. This is the Category of Sufficient Reason: Determining-so.

The conclusion is as above explained, and contains the Category of Identity, the Category of Being, the Category of the Quantum (determination or finitude in thought), and the Category of Quale (determined-so in thought).

Through the whole of this process runs the Category of Being. It *is* either *a* or *b*; it *is* not *b*, therefore, it *is* *a*. Being is the sole universal. The explicit statement of the process accordingly ought to be put thus,—Being is either *as a* or *b*, Being is not-as-*b*, therefore Being is *as a*. Universal Being in short is *thus* quantified and qualified. Steeped as man is in

universal Being, he cannot shake it off either in the sphere of Feeling or of Reason.

Let us note, again, how the thing is taken up by and in the dialectic movement. It (the determinate) is taken up as a possible somewhat and as a caused somewhat. The whole process from first to last is a mediating or Causal Process.

From the point of view of an actual consciousness (or generally of mind), Cause formal or qualitative, and final Cause or End, and Cause efficient (meaning by this here initiatory movement or *nisus*) are all moments in a unity both of act and thought. So patent is this that even when we deal with a sense organism, *e.g.* a plant, no one can separate, except in time-sequence, the fruit from the potentiality of that fruit in the seed. The end is already in the beginning, and the beginning is in the end, and the initial movement of effectuation is in the final result as effectuated. So in the *à priori* categories, if I have Cause and End as moments, I have implicit in these a beginning—an initiating *nisus*.

Thus, in taking up Nature as Caused, and as having End, the initiatory *nisus* is posited; and what we, finite minds, really do is to grasp or grip the universal whole as teleologically constituted. The constitutive *à priori* categories compel us to hold all in thought as a teleologically grounded whole.

I think that if we keep strictly to the *à priori* record, the above brief statement exhausts it. That record does not give us organism or organization.

For this, the contribution of the *à posteriori* of sense is necessary. It is complexes which are presented to my sense, and the condition of my knowing them is a diathesis of the complex into the parts and a synthesis of these parts back into the complex before me: and this, so far, is knowledge. But this very process itself proceeds on the presumption that they combine into a whole which is a unity—the resultant “thing” before me. Here now enters the necessity of reason, which *à priori* demands a constituted whole as end of a movement simply, and nothing more. The phenomenal fact of *parts aggregating into a whole which is a unity* is thus necessarily conceived as a unity whose parts are governed by the whole, and which are in a reciprocity (causal relation) that determines the whole as a one; and thus we get our concept of organism or organization.

Accordingly, the notion of organization arises in the coalescing of the *à posteriori* fact and the *à priori* teleological category.

Thus, we take up and interpret experience as a caused and purposed system resting on the ground-universal of Being, of which Being-universal all things are, through the Dialectic of Reason, the determinates. These categories not only arise as *in rebus*, but we cannot by any effort of mind construe them to our own self-consciousness as an object of knowledge save as *in rebus*.

We are now in a position to enumerate these *à priori* synthetic predicates.

*Categories of Percipience or à priori Synthetic
Predicates.*

- I. Being-universal (absoluto-infinite, and ground of all possible determination).
- II. Possibility—the Excluded Middle.
- III. Negation.
- IV. Sufficient Reason (Determining-so).
- V. Determined-so-ness of Being¹ (Essence and Finitude).
- VI. Identity.
- VII. End or Purpose (Final Cause).

Implicit in these :—

- VIII. Kinetic nissus.

Derivative Categories.—(a) The Causal Nexus; (b) The Notion of Organization.

The Causal Nexus of *ab* is a derivative category : it rests on the Causal Category as operating within a phenomenal series and demanding that *b* be caused, and on the Category of identity which determines the particular synthesis *ab* (see chapter on Cause).

Again, what is merely the teleological moment as regards the “singular,” becomes the notion of Organization the moment I have a phenomenal complex before me.

There are certain terms which have the air of categories, but which are not so.

¹ In concreto *quantum* and *quale*.

For example, "substance" is simply the Being of a thing as opposed to the finite phenomenal determination in quantity and quality. "Subject" arises only as co-relative of Object: in itself, it is, in the universal sphere of mind, from its lowest to its highest forms, merely what Substance is in the sphere of the sensible.

The general result is that there is *given* to the subject an external world, the forms of which datum are generalized in the *à posteriori* Categories of Recipience. Thereupon, the said Subject by a free movement takes up the whole *à posteriori* matter with a view to the knowing of it in a certain way, which is a necessary way. The way in which it takes it up constitutes a series of moments that yield the *à priori* categories. And the further result of this is, that the total of *à posteriori* matter is necessarily conceived as "Being proceeding to the determination of itself causally and teleologically." The individual thing is so subsumed by me, and consequently the totality as a *system* is so subsumed.

Any attempt to reduce the empirical laws of nature to a unity is thus justified. These categories interpret and systematize Nature. For it is under the inevitable and self-determining movement of the *à priori* categories that we approach the *à posteriori* categories of recipience, and, taking up the matter of Feeling, grasp the world as an organism in the final unity of Thought.

We thus find the conception of nature as an ordered system and organic unity implicit in the simple act of Percipience—the first and rudimentary act of Reason—

in which act all the *à priori* categories are wrapped up. In other words, the network of all that is, or can be, object of knowledge is the form of Percipience, which is both reason and reasoning; for syllogizing, inductive and deductive, mediates through positive generals, just as Percipience mediates through negation.

First and last, we become aware of this formal element only in the act of prehending nature, *i.e. in concreto*. So it arises and not otherwise. Thus it is that this form of thought is not only the net of reason, but also the net of nature itself—constitutive of nature. The Categories not only interpret nature for me; they interpret nature for itself. The great Datum over against me, given in and through feeling, is simply, as such, a mysterious fact in extension, motion, and relation, which, as a fact, overpowers me spiritually, just as it finally overpowers my natural frame, by dissolving it into its elements. Nature is the vesture in which the Absolute-Causal-Being presents Himself to sense, and in and through which He lives and works. Thus far we may see; but the whole realm of feeling seems to defy reduction to any lower terms than extension, motion, and relation.

It is something, however (is it not enough?), to be assured that the outer is not merely an *x* negating my self-consciousness, but that, on the contrary, it is Reason externalized; and that, as universal reason, it is one with the moments of my finite reason. My finite reason goes out to find *itself* in nature, and finding it there, also finds God, as Being and Reason.

When under the free Reason-nisus, we finally reach physical truth—the statical and dynamical laws of things (*i.e.* relations and correlations) in and through which Reason-universal expresses itself and lives—we shall, even then, possess only the ground-plan of the world as extension, motion, and relation; but we shall be no nearer God than we are now, if we will only open our eyes. Philosophy watches the physico-scientific movement with an interest which the mere physicist cannot comprehend. It desires to see a construction of the ultimate physical categories. The concentration of the gaze of the physico-scientific mind on physical conditions unhappily blinds it to philosophy; but only for a time. Antagonism is ridiculous. But the metaphysician must remember that the phenomenal can be explained only by the phenomenal: metaphysics cannot do it. Metaphysics is summed up in the exposition of the forms of free Reason, whereby it grips the whole, and in exhibiting this as *also* the form of existence, *i.e.* as Reason-universal. It thus reveals the universal principle which underlies and constitutes the whole. The relation subsisting between this Reason-universal and the phenomenal, between the Infinite and the Finite, we vainly endeavour to penetrate. We make guesses, and inevitably involve ourselves in contradictions.

CHAP. IV.—REDUCTION TO UNITY.

THERE is, I repeat, an identity between the Cosmic Reason and the Reason of man. We ascertain the moments of reason *in rebus*. The Form of Reason is immanent in nature, and it is immanent there before I know it to be so, or find it in myself. Man, alone of all creatures, is conscious of the immanence in himself as constituting his reason, and he uses it as an instrument for the interpretation of the universe. Thus, and so explained, *Ratio essendi* is *Ratio intelligendi*, and *vice versâ*. The Universal Mind-process is first known through the dialectic of the personal mind. But when we lift ourselves out of a personal to a universal standpoint, we see that the universal Reason-movement functioning in and for the conscious-subject (as in all else) is re-functioned by that conscious-subject in its free will-movement for the purpose of taking hold of nature as a reasoned whole. Taking hold of itself too, it rises into a self-conscious personality. Human reason is the universal reason conscious of itself under finite limitations. The moment that the will-movement initiates itself in a particular sentient organism and raises it to a free lordship, that organism is thereby reflected on itself, and must become a person and a reason. The same Mind, accordingly, is in

nature and man alike. Man is, in his attuent receptivity, a perfect mirror of the natural, and in his reason-activity a counterpart of the rational. *My* thinking-power is thought-universal reflected into me as a finite consciousness and become me. When once I see this, all things are reconciled. Being and Reason, or, we may say, Beënt Reason, constitutes the sole noumenon in endless differentiation. This, I am well aware, it is easy to say ; but my aim has been to demonstrate it. For I have shown *how* it is that, to use a Schellingian phrase, "Nature is visible Intelligence and Intelligence invisible Nature." There is a true Unity.

Accordingly, man's knowledge of the Universal Reason in nature is Divine knowledge—knowledge of God, who is nearer to us than the "things that are made." The reason of man is one pulse of the Universal Reason, in which we verily live and move and have our being. I am not speaking the language of religious emotion, but of sober fact.

Our function as *knowing*-beings is to interpret nature to itself through reason ; our function as "doing" beings is to reconcile, in and through the universal, our particular reason with nature and other finite spirits, as a given total of facts and conditions.

While saying thus much, I shall not allow myself to be betrayed into vague expressions of a high-sounding generality, and identify, with a view to a spurious unity of conception, either the subject with the object or the object with the subject. This is either to abolish the individual ego or to abolish nature. Knowing is

never final: it is a gradual evolution of mind in the human race and therefore an evolution of self-consciousness. But knowing is not something in the air which is neither you nor me, nor any other entity. To all eternity it presumes a knowing subject and a known object, and it is not for me or any man to reduce these to a unity which is not merely, at best, a parallelism. Enough if we can see that the necessary *modus operandi* of finite Reason is the *modus operandi* of the Thing—the not-me. But that Thing is not constituted by me in itself, but given to me and constituted by me for me, *i.e.* for knowledge, as the thing actually there is and exists. And this is Dualism.

On the other hand there is a sense in which the Subject is the Object. For the object-universal to my recipient consciousness is nature, of which my body is a part, and with which, consequently, my body has infinitely various relations in a never-ceasing reciprocity. There is no breach of continuity between the organism of nature and my organism. Further, this nature as determined in me is determined as a consciousness which, liberated from the prison of nature, thinks nature, and, so thinking, finds that very thinking in nature. For, finite mind in constituting nature for itself, reveals its thinking self as, at the same time, in nature. Thus, as part of nature, man's body is in continuity with the Object and is not an isolated unit—the Object is the Subject: again, as self-conscious ego liberated from the necessity of nature, he liberates nature, and the Subject is the Object as Beënt Reason,

and is in continuity with it. From this point of view alone lies the possibility of an absolute synthesis; but there can be no synthesis where there are not differences to synthesize.

Dualism, in fact, means finitude and individuality. Any and every attempt to reduce the "other" to the one always silently carries that "other" with it. *It will not be cancelled.* To cancel it is to cancel creation—*inter alia* to cancel me and you. There is no formula which can help us, no formula which can save the truth of existence while at the same time losing it in, what is after all an illusory, One of Being. Dualism is for God as well as for Man, with this difference, that the spirit of man itself, and all nature, are embraced in the universal Subject, and that all is *within* the Divine movement.

And yet the shapes and motions which are summed in the *à posteriori* categories are "phenomenon," and as such the "not" of Being. Its "notness," however, is possible only as a *positive* "somewhat" other than that which it negates. And again, this positive "somewhat" is positive only in so far as it contains the Being which it negates. That seems to me to be the record. All I know is that I have, before me, Being in or as phenomenon, expression, externalization, the other, the negative:—equally, I have before me the same phenomenon, etc., *being*. The phenomenon *is*, isness *is as* phenomenon (space, motion, etc.): the One *is as* difference and as individua. It is the conflict and union of Being and not-being that gives me the actual. This is the

Datum with which I have to deal. So long as a man holds that the phenomenon, the individuum, *is*, he is a dualist: so long as he holds that isness *is qua* phenomenon or individua, *i.e.* through its own negation, he is an idealist. There is no inconsistency in holding both. There is and can be nothing save mind and its externalization. To cancel the one factor or the other is impossible without first cancelling all feeling, and consequently all thought. I keep by the old-fashioned term "Dualist" as good enough, and because I doubt if a better can be found. Ego is the apex of Negation; and yet, *is* it not? has it not a for-itself-existence which is so far from being a mere shadow of the universal—mere *schein*—that it is the centre from which I take the measure of the universe and myself, and to which I return, after many excursions, to find therein the truth of God?

It will, however, be already apparent to the reader who has followed the argument, that the phenomenon, while it is wholly independent of each individual subject, is not in itself independent, has no in-itself-subsistence, but only a "for-itself-existence." Of the Ego itself this is true. The One is always in the many, the affirmation in the Negation.

To explain everything is impossible; but I shall endeavour to show more fully, though it involves repetition, in what sense we may say that the subject is the object.

The "Subject is the Object" might as well be put the "Object is the Subject," were it not for the possible mis-

apprehension that the Object constituted the Subject. Such phrases are vague and require to be carefully defined and closely looked into.

The finite subject *as feeling*, we may say with Aristotle, is itself the "form of all sensibles." It is the mind-side of them. But it is only as *feeling* that Mind can become aware of Quantity, etc.; not as Reason.

There is, again, a sense in which the Subject is the Object, *i.e.* in which the Object may be said to be the activity of the subject. Nature, as well as the mind of man and of all other beings, is the external of the *universal* subject—the determination or finitizing of the universal subject,—its *modus existendi*. The *esse* and the *cogitare* are always immanent in the phenomenal *existere*. Such seems to be the true and simple record of experience. Observe now that my finite subject is this universal subject finitized—involved that is to say in the series of Space, Time, etc.; and when my Subject energizes to grasp the universal Object it does so in one certain way, which way is not only its own dialectic, but *in rebus*—the dialectic of that which is grasped—immanent reason of the universe. The object then as a *Reason-object*, and not simply as an external of Quantity, Motion, etc., is *found to be my subject as a reason*. The result then of my thinking act is to find *myself* in the object. To *find myself*, I repeat, not to constitute the fact of the immanent Reason in its own objectivity. That immanent Reason is the *prius* of the finite subject, and

the finite subject interprets it through its functional (not personal) identity with the universal immanent Reason. How, indeed, could *ratio mundi* be seen except by *ratio*?

The Universal Subject, in constituting the universal object in space and time as the "other" of itself, has not let this object escape from itself, and let it go as an external and independent "somewhat." It is mind-universal which thus externalizes itself; and universal Being, as we have found, is in all, through all, sustainer of all. The all in Quantity, etc., is simply universal mind *so living*. Mind-universal first appears as mind-individual—mind separating itself from nature though always in it,—*in* it but not *of* it,—in the form of feeling or consciousness. This is Being-universal as an individuum that feels, receives, and reflects the Object-Nature, which, in so far as it is mere phenomenon, is dead. Dead, that is to say, to all save the infinite creative Subject, until finite, individuated mind emerges to tell it what it truly is as the outer of Being Reason immanent. From this point forth, God is both felt and known—the universal by the particular, the infinite by the finite, the Creator by the creature.

Is the doctrine of God immanent in nature and man Pantheistic? So it would appear to be, as immanence has hitherto been understood. The question will not be discussed here; but I may point out that God immanent as Being and *Thinking* is, however put, implicit Pantheism. But what shall we say of God

as immanent *Thought*? Nature and man are not simply the eternal Subject in a constant process of *determining*, but the eternal Subject *determined*. Eternal *thinking* is necessary ground of all; but in the world and man this *thinking* has determined itself into individua, and is now Thought. This is to say, that the Absoluto-infinite has had to reckon with the finite—the negation of itself—and has become the finite as determined into this or that. Thinking-eternal is continuous, never-failing ground of all, but the resultant *Thought* has claims of its own.

Such immanence is not Pantheism. It may so appear to minds which cannot conceive separation of Being-thinking from its fulfilled thought, save as a spatial separation. Such minds are slaves of Sense. I am content, meanwhile, if the reader will simply accept Absoluto-infinite-Causal-Being as ground of all that exists—the universal mind-thesis. If he will dwell on this, he will quickly find himself contemplating *an* Absoluto-infinite-Causal Being.

SEVENTH PART.

CHAP. I.—THING—ESSENCE—IDEA—DEFINITION.

1. *A Thing.*

AN aggregate of units of sensation impressed on the attuent consciousness is a “thing” in sense. But *this* thing, as we have frequently said, is to be called a totality only; and from the point of view of the subject impressed, a synopsis in sensibility. Even when the totality is first *perceived* as a one object negating other objects, the parts of it are as yet in a vague and attuent synopsis in the consciousness of the (now) rational percipient. The differentiation of parts, to which Will is next by inner necessity impelled, transforms the aggregate of qualities or synopsis into a synthesis, which is no longer a mere totality, but a unity in percipience,—an individual sense-concept. Even when we have exhausted the *à posteriori* Categories on the object, we still have only a synthesis in sense—a sense concept. We have made considerable progress, doubtless, in a knowledge of the thing presented to us, but we do not yet know it. The colligated sum of its sense qualities is not the true “thing.”

The *à priori* Categories have now to come on the scene. They have been, it is true, implicit in percipience and concipience, but they have not, as yet, been in self-conscious operation. These now tell us that the object *is*, that it exists as an end in and for itself, and that it reaches this end as caused. That is to say, that the parts are inter-dependent ; that there is a fusion or (more correctly) a correlation of parts determined *so* as to effect the thing. This inner reciprocity of parts is inevitably thought under the pressure of the dialectic *à priori* forms.

The unity is now no longer a mere synopsis, no longer a mere synthesis of qualities—a mere composite ; but a complex of inter-related, inter-dependent, reciprocal parts effected under the pressure of the *à priori* Categories. The “thing,” as soon as the *à posteriori* and *à priori* Categories have both received their full content in and through it, is *known*, and, accordingly (in etymological consistency), we may say that the concept has now become the *notion*. The notion is truly the “thing” (the thing being, of course, all the while *there* subsisting outside me). The notion is the reasoned unity of the synthesis. All the moments of the dialectic are shut up within the object or thing.

Our knowledge has thus various stages, and must always be provisional, though continually gaining in richness, till we have finally filled both the *à priori* and *à posteriori* Categories. Meanwhile, one man’s knowledge is another man’s ignorance ; and this, till physical science has completed itself.

The inter-relation and reciprocity of parts necessary to the constitution of a "thing" reveal to us that the fusion which we call the "whole" is known only through the parts, and the parts equally through the whole. This is to say, that the "thing" is an organism. Even the dynamical and chemical conditions which constitute a stone are, from a philosophical point of view, organic.

The "thing," then, as *datum* is, so to speak, the product of the *à posteriori* Categories; as *known*, as the notion, it is the product of the *à priori* Categories. But I should like to repeat, *usque ad nauseam legentis*, that the *à priori* Categories are first known, and only known as *in the thing*, as veritable content of, or within, the "thing." They are formal, it is true, but this only means that they are, and are possible to us, through the pure movement of Reason. They are the thought that, first passing into us, then emanates from us, not to be imposed on, but to be found in, the phenomenal, which phenomenal taken along with that thought or thinking is the actual.

Again, the thing may be said to be a system of organized predicates and as such an independent entity (*an sich*): and yet it is not independent (in the strict sense), inasmuch as it is in and through the universal dialectic, and, moreover, in universal reciprocity with all else.

2. *Essence of the Thing.*¹

By a process of continuous analysing and synthe-

¹ In dealing with this subject I must assume that the reader keeps in view the chapters on "Generalization," etc.

sizing we may suppose ourselves to have reached the Notion. But the restless will is not yet content; it ever seeks difference. The thing is there, and its notion is here; but the thing, as notion, subsists as itself part of the totality of nature. There are, in the ultimate truth of a thing, not merely its parts and the inter-reciprocity of these whereby it constitutes itself, but there are also its infinite relations to the larger whole of actual (or, for that matter, of possible) existence.

And at this point, it seems to me, enters the vexed question of *Essence*.

Of the *à priori* categories, "Essence" is one. Thus it emerges:—The dialectic movement of Percipience terminates in the prehension and subsumption of the "being determined-so-and-not-otherwise" of an object. This is the essence of an object. But the "determined-so-and-not-otherwise" is the Notion of that object—its completed record. Consequently the essence of an object is the Notion—its determined-so-ness in its totality.

In the category of Essence two moments are involved—the *is* or positive, and the *is-not* or negative. The moment of negation in the Dialectic necessitates the negative relation; the "determined-so" of the issue contains the positive character of the thing relatively to itself. All-important is negation if my sum of knowledge is to go on growing through differencing. In the light of the Category, then, metaphysically and really, the Essence is identical with the Notion.

But the determined-so of Being expresses itself as a

concrete complex, and the question as to the essence of the visible phenomenon is forced upon us, as distinguished from certain variable qualities which are of small, or no, account. What is that whereby the thing before me is what it is—its *quantum* and *quale*? The total concrete before me is mind and matter (phenomenon): as mind, the essence of the said concrete is exhausted in the determined-so; but in the finite exhibition of this determinate, I have facts in space and motion, a complex; and experience compels me to recognize a possibility of variation which does not affect the “thing”: The question of essence in this relation again arises.

(1) Here we first encounter the popular use of the word which is also the logical.

All things are in a more or less of community of properties, and we seek in each thing (under the differentiating impulse in percipience) to detach that property which, though only one element in the notion or real essence (from a cosmic point of view) of the thing, yet *negatives* all other things, and this we call its essential property or essence.

The negative element in the notion “Man,” for example, whereby he is differenced from all other animals, is rationality. But rationality does not exhaust the infinite series of determinations which constitute man as a real, and as known, and as a “determined-so.” Rationality is the essence of man, truly; but I merely mean by this that the qualitative element in man, which negates all else outside man, is “ration-

ality." Essence is here logical. Thus far, then, when I say that the essence or essential quality of man is rationality, I merely isolate and emphasize that positive element in the notion which negates all other things. There may, however, be more than one characteristic which negates all else. In that case the synthesis in thought of the sum of the differences—negative relations to all else—would constitute the *essence* of the Notion.

Essence, popularly and logically, accordingly, is not that "without which A would not be A," for this is the Notion, the *real* essence,—but "that whereby A being A, is *not* B or C," etc. And this result will be recognised as a well-worn definition of essence. A "thing" is "being or determined-so, and not otherwise"; and we may say that, when we speak of the logical essence, we are merely emphasizing the "not otherwise," because therein lies the negative relation to *all else*.

And this explanation of what we mean by the essence of a thing is supported by the vulgar use of essence as simply difference, when we speak of things of the same class, *e.g.* the "essence" of a "black" pansy is its "essential" difference from other pansies,—*viz.*, its blackness. The essence, in other words, is its negative relation to other pansies; but it is only as being first a positive that it can be a negative.

(2) *Essence of an Abstract-Concept.*—Take that *ens rationis* a generalized or abstract-concept, *e.g.* "Man" or "Horse." The synthesis of qualities common to individuals of a Class, can (according to the above explanation) manifestly have no "essence" in the

popular or logical sense: the term is inapplicable. For the common or general is *itself* the synthesis of the essential characters of a series of individuals. It itself posits and exhausts the negative relation of difference, and is, in relation to the series of individuals, the Essence.

(3) *Essence of an Abstract-Percept.*—The essence of an abstract singular again, *e.g.* a percept, “redness,” is the percept itself in its nakedness.

(4) *Essence of an Individuum.*—Now in the above uses of the term “essence” there lies concealed the suggestion of the truth as regards the essence of the concrete individuum. For in this use of the word, as applied to a complex object, we virtually say that there is a synthesis of properties in A, and, as long as it exists *as* this synthesis, it remains A; that is to say, it may indulge in certain changes and yet remain “essentially” what it is and *was*. This is the conclusion of mere common sense, and it is a just and valid conclusion. But how is it to be explained in face of the fact that the “essence” has been identified above with the “notion” in its totality? The answer is to be found in the form of the Dialectic, which compels us to take up a “thing” as a “caused, synthesized, organised unity of parts.” Each individuum, as the result of a determining or differentiating causal movement, is *itself* so long as that *causal synthesis* holds, whatever changes may take place in it which are indifferent as regards this *causal synthesis* of parts. In brief, it is the causal process or functioning within the thing which is necessarily (under the pressure of the dialectic) conceived by

us as the true "thing"—all else being indifferent and variable. The goal of all thinking as regards the individuum is precisely this "essence."

This "essence" is the true ultimate ground; it is that whereby the thing not only is itself but whereby it negates all else. It is that differentiation of functioning in the finite of time and space which is the primal manifestation of the determining-so of the Dialectic of Being.

Thus, "essence" which, relatively to the universal of Being, and within it, is final cause, relatively to the complex object in sense is ground-cause. It is manifest that we can never attain to the final and true notion of a concrete thing until we have the "essence" of it.

3. *Idea.*

"Idea" is simply "Essence" hypostasized, and this in all the uses of the latter word, except that which we identify with "Notion."

We say that we have the *idea* of a thing when we extract and emphasize the so-ness of a thing in its negative relations—that whereby A is A as *opposed* to all else. The notion of this or that man is the totality which constitutes him as a positive and negative: the idea of this or that man, as man, is rationality—that whereby he is negatively related to all else. Idea then is "essence," only we are now holding the essence apart in thought as a "somewhat."

(a) *Idea in reference to the Abstract-Percept.*—The Form of percipience is a ceaseless striving to get at the

is-ness of a percept as “determined-so and not otherwise”—to see that whereby it is what it is as *not* other things: in other words it is a search for the essence. In the region of mere *percepts*, essence, notion, and idea are necessarily synonymous, for percepts are *de singulis*. What difference there is lies in this, that the idea is the essence hypostasized as an *ens rationis*—the idea (as we say) of a line or a point, for example.

A mathematical line is length without breadth. It is of course impossible for the human mind by any amount of minimizing to imagine to itself a line which has no breadth, or a point which has no magnitude. This is the question of infinite divisibility. But it is not impossible to *think* a line which is only length. As in the case of abstract concepts and abstract percepts, the Will here liberates a certain quality (or qualities) inherent in a sense-object, and affirms it or them to the exclusion of all others; it is only a case of abstraction. Again, no *minimum visibile* (or *imaginabile*) is without magnitude: but I can abstract, and affirm, mere position as point of departure without magnitude. Geometry even in its simplest percepts is a science of Reason—an ideal science, *i.e.* a science of idea. When I project its abstractions into space and construct them, the figures I draw are only approximately correct; and, while reasoning by help of them, I think away all sense-element at the very moment that I use it, or seem to use it.

The Will, under the stimulus of the form of end which prompts to continuous diathesis, having once

got within range of any object, be it concrete or abstract, restlessly pursues it and hunts it down until it has isolated it and grasped it in itself as it truly is. It is thus enabled to affirm *that* whereby the object is what it is—its essence as a positive and negative (the notion), and only then reposes. The empty form of end has received its content. In the case of a singular or percept essence and idea are, manifestly, one and the same.¹

When we explicate in words our thought of the (essence or) idea of a line we call it a definition. Having once got this, we can proceed by necessary demonstration under the laws of Identity and Contradiction. Our demonstrations are then necessary, that is to say, analytically necessary.

So with axioms of equality, etc., which are simply concrete perceptions raised to the *idea* by the force of Reason.

¹ Hume tells us that if extension is infinitely divisible (which it certainly is to consciousness), we could not conceive a point or line—that is to say, in realizing to our imagination a point as the termination of a line, the said point would break itself up into parts at once, and go on doing so *ad infinitum*, and thus the termination of a line would be inconceivable. This was a necessary outcome of Hume's philosophical position. The answer seems to be sufficient that in mathematical points, lines, and surfaces, we are not dealing with extension as a concrete fact at all, that imagination is entirely excluded from the field—that what we are engaged with is a thing of thought which we (by pursuing, as above explained, a concrete abstract percept to its end) have ourselves created out of the concrete. "A point is position without magnitude," this is a reason-product; the sensible or the imaging of the sensible is quite out of place. So with all the fundamental ideas of Geometry.

(b) *Idea in reference to the Abstract-Concept.*—The percepts which, first given *in concreto*, enter into an abstract or general-concept (e.g. “man,” “horse”), are not, when taken together as an *ens rationis*, the essence of any possible individual. They are not that whereby an individual is what it is, but only that whereby a certain class or kind of individuals are synthesized in the unity of thought. In other words, these colligated percepts are the essence of the *kind* or *class*, which is constituted by them, and essence and notion are here identical. The “idea” or essence of a particular tree is not really before us when we think the abstract-concept “Tree,” but only the idea or essence of the class which we ourselves have analytically and synthetically constituted. The idea, then, is here merely the hypostasis of the generalized kind or class, and is co-extensive with it. Idea in brief, in reference to the generalized concept, is εἶδος hypostasized; and Plato himself cannot help passing and repassing from the one term to the other.

(c) *Idea in reference to the Individuum.*—The idea of a particular concrete thing is simply the essence of that thing (see above) hypostasized.

These intercrossing questions — General Concept, Kind, Essence, Idea — have exercised the minds of metaphysicians for more than two thousand years, and not without good reason. If we accept the conclusions above given, the only question that would now invite to discussion would be the precise bearing of the

Abstract general or εἶδος on the Essence or Idea of an individuum, in order that we might see how it came to play so large a part in philosophical debate; and on this I shall say a few words.

4. *Essence—(continued.)*

Relation of the General to the Essence of an Individuum.—The essence of a general-concept is the total synthesis itself; and of a singular or percept (whether particular or general), the essence is the percept itself. As regards the individual concept, again—a thing, we find that there is no difference between the Notion and the Essence, from a cosmic point of view. “Essence,” used as synonymous with “idea” and logically, denotes the isolation and emphasizing (for logical or popular purposes) of the negative elements of the thing in relation. As regards the *individuum*, essence and idea mean the said differentiating negation (itself of course a positive), conceived not as a quality or predicate, but as causal functioning in the thing.

I have said that essence and idea, as synonymous words, merely emphasize that part of the notion of a thing which signalizes its *negative* relations to other things. And this I think may help us to extract from the complexity of thinking the relation of a general-concept to the essence of the particular things comprehended under that Concept—a question both of the old and the modern world. Εἶδος is idea or essence—of *what*? Each of the multitude of cows, for example, that have existed or do exist, is said to differ “essentially”

from every other. The "essential" difference of the particular and individual sense-concept cow *a* from *b* is in the *length* of its hair or the *colour* of its hair (it may be) or anything else you please. They "essentially" differ; but they are also said to be "essentially" *alike* in so far as each shares in a certain synthesis of characters which I have detected, and hold together by the mere dynamic force of Will, and call a general concept. Thus the cows are at the same time essentially different and essentially alike. In saying they are essentially different I sub-affirm their essential likeness, and in saying they are essentially alike I sub-affirm their essential difference.

Let us consider now this general concept or *εἶδος* in relation to the *individuals* themselves of a group or class, in order that we may detect the reason for using the general-concept as, in some special sense, the *essence* of each.

I am a second Adam in a second Eden naming the beasts, and I have already got hold of the concept "animal" by my experience of fishes, reptiles, and birds. To-day there pass before me in columns sheep, goats, and cows, and give me a multitude of new sensations. I see that they are animals, but unlike those of yesterday, and I name the crowd by their most salient common quality—"four-footed." Suppose I remained satisfied with this: I have then a percept which is a general-percept because it has a plural reference to a multitude of individuals. I am now justified in saying

that the essential characteristic of the animals of to-day as compared with the animals of yesterday is "four-footedness;" but this quality is no more of the "essence" of sheep and goats and cows than any other quality possessed by these animals. Further observation justifies me in saying that they are also *mammalia* and *graminivorous*. My general-percept has now become a general-concept—a synthesis of qualities or percepts which *as a synthesis* has a plural reference. *Each* animal has now this synthesis of characteristics, whatever other qualities it may or may not have. But even this synthesis has no more to do with the "essence" of each animal than the general single percept "four-footed" had. It is merely a statement in sum of certain qualities which each possesses alongside a multitude of others not mentioned.

And yet I rightly say that this synthesis of qualities distinguishes the various multitude before me from other animals hitherto seen and named, and so is their essential synthesis (or synthesis essential to them) *as a group*.

Just then as in the case of individual objects—the essence of a black pansy is the single percept *blackness*, and of a red billiard ball *redness*, as opposed to other pansies and other billiard balls; just as, further, the "essence" of a multitude of objects is the single percept "four-footedness," under which common likeness they are grouped or classed as that whereby they are opposed to, or differenced from, all other animals (hitherto observed). So now, the synthesis of percepts,

i.e. the general-concept, under which combination of likenesses they are now grouped, is called the essence of the group or class because it sums the differences of each of that class as opposed to all other objects. I, in fact, use the terms "essence" and "essential," now as formerly, to signalize or emphasize the negation of other objects by the group of objects before me—a negation which they exhibit in common. But the sum of qualities or percepts which constitute the synthesis has no more to do with the "essence" of each individual in the class relatively to itself than the *other* qualities which I have already described, or may hereafter detect, in each of them.

When I say the essence of the general-concept "Cow" is *a, b, c*, etc., I say what I mean, viz., that *a, b, c*, etc., constitute the essence of *the general-concept*—its notion; and, as its notion its totality. But a fallacy at once enters when I go on to say the "essence" of a particular cow is *a, b, c*, etc. The qualities *a, b, c*, etc., are "essential" only to the constitution of any particular object seeking admission to the already constituted "class." Relatively to the general-concept the term "essence" is wrongly used, for *a, b, c*, etc., is the *totality* of the Concept or Notion, and there is nothing in a totality to emphasize. Relatively, again, to each individual under the general-concept, the said concept gives no more information regarding the essence of said individual than the as yet uncounted other qualities possessed by it, so far as I am yet supposed to know. The essence of *a* cow merely means the possession by

an individual animal of a synthesis of certain qualities (whatever else it may possess) which entitle it to be called a Cow.

In fact thus far we are manifestly in a purely logical as distinguished from a metaphysical sphere. The process of generalization is an almost mechanical device under the synthesizing impulse of reason for shortening and easing the process of thinking: it is the erection of temporary reserve magazines and signal-posts as we march into the enemy's country.

And yet, there must surely be something more to be said in justification of the history of the world-shaking battles round the standard of *εἶδος*, etc. The explanation lies, it seems to me, in the importance of the intellectual device of generals. The synthesis of percepts is a synthesis of likenesses in a group of individuals, which likenesses *in their combination* constitute the "difference" of the said group from other things. In short (as I have frequently said above), Essence, in its historical usage, is distinguished from the totality of the Notion of an individual only in so far as it conspicuously signalizes or emphasizes the *negative* relations of the individual (or class of individuals) to all else;—the ultimate negative relations being its specific causal functioning.

Accordingly, the significance of the general or *εἶδος* lies in this—that it is always a step on the way to the *negative* relations of an individual, the sum of which negative relations constitutes its differentiation. The synthesis of likenesses contained in the general-concept

is, *as a synthesis*, a valid explanation of each of a class of individuals, and, as such, may be used as their provisional essence. It thus helps us on the way to the final diathesis of the individuum.

5. Definition.

The word Definition is used in two senses. In one sense it is equivalent to limitation or determination, which is merely the formal process of knowing. Having accomplished this process, however partially, and fixed the issue of it by a sign or symbol—be that symbol, *e.g. rhinoceros, state, or piety*, we may then have to define these terms to one who, not having accompanied us in the process of determining, has an inadequate and confused conception of what the terms contain by way of denotation and connotation. To define, in this the second and ordinary sense, is simply to explicate the implicit—to take out and expose to view the determinations which primarily constituted our knowledge. It is manifest that here we do not determine, but merely recite the determinations already made. We thus seem to be defining a *term*, which is a dead, unmeaning sound or sign: we are in truth defining the *thing signified* by the term. No definition of a term as such is possible. The term itself is a dead label. We merely recall what the term symbolizes.

The natural history of naming, however, is not adequately described above. Having more or less clearly perceived one or two prominent characteristics, we

hasten, and hasten prematurely under the pressure of the impulse of articulation, to fix the objective reality by a word. Our knowledge may be thus far little but illusion: it is certainly inadequate. Thus we use names which we have prematurely coined, and we pass them as intellectual and moral currency, while all the time they are base metal. Hence all sorts of intellectual evils. Hence, too, the constant and legitimate demand we make on ourselves and others to define terms. Hence also the fact that definition, which is, strictly speaking, mere explication, is used as equivalent to exact *knowing*—determination *ab initio*. As almost all our intellectual inheritance is in the crystallized form of words, the exact definition, as denoted and connoted by them, is the essential condition of our entering into the possession of our estate. Until we have done this, we are like men who have received their title-deeds, but have not yet seen or enjoyed their property.

Thus we again see how the fallacious opinion arises that definition is of terms; as a matter of fact it is not so.

Logicians tell us that Definition is by genus (*genus proximum*) and differentia (*nota specifica*), and the two together constitute the essence. Certainly definition to this extent sufficiently indicates, in most cases, the intellectual whereabouts of the thing indicated by the term, and is sufficient for all ordinary purposes. But in such definition there is a subaudition of a whole world of determinations and relations which are merely indicated by the generic and differentiating terms.

Accordingly it is to be concluded, as I have already stated, that real, as distinguished from logical or grammatical, Definition is simply explicit recitation in words of what we have ascertained regarding a thing. The definition will be as complete as our prior knowledge. If our attained knowledge of a thing is scientifically complete, our explication in words *may* also be complete. But the definition of a concrete thing can never be other than provisional; though always extending, just as our knowledge is.

What we define then is not the word, but the thing which the word symbolizes. We attach words to things to mark them off from other things, although we know next to nothing about them; but even in such rudimentary cases, we define, if called upon for a definition, not the term, but the thing denoted, in so far as it is known. So in defining a thing of imagination which has no actual existence, we yet define the thing of imagination as a thing of imagination.

Definition is, in brief, a re-knowing in explicit terms of what we already tacitly know. To be complete it must be the evolution of all that is in the notion of the thing. All our knowing is a search for the true Notion, and all our definition is merely a re-knowing of that which has already (probably prematurely) consolidated itself in terms. Our definition consequently will partake of the obscurity or clearness, the confusion or distinctness, the adequacy or inadequacy of our knowing of the reality which is symbolized by the term.

Definition then (if we do not confound the primary and secondary uses of the word) is explication, and, as explication, it consists of analytic propositions. When the thing to be defined is a singular or percept, the proposition which purports to define it is inevitably an identical one—*e.g.* “a straight line is the shortest between two points”: the predicate merely repeats the subject in other words.

If we would escape confusions and falsities in reasonings, we have, for our guidance, from time to time to re-know words and that which they denote and connote. The education of youth consists largely in introducing them to true definitions, for words are the vehicles of previous thought. And precisely to the extent to which we give many words ready-made with a view to define some other word, instead of leading the learner through the processes of observation and reasoning which terminated in the invention of the word as their symbol, to that extent do we give signs for things, the dead for the living, a phantasm for a reality, and choke the channels of nascent thought.

Leibnitz pointed out that we constantly reason with words as mere symbols, without having in our consciousness the realities they connote and denote. In such cases the realities at one time known, *i.e.* distinctly present in consciousness, have been allowed to fall back out of knowledge into the degraded form of intuition, in which they lie, and where they are generally available when we want to recall them.

CHAP. II.—RETROSPECT.

IN past chapters I have avoided, as far as possible, all collateral subjects of inquiry, however seductive, in order to concentrate attention on my main line of argument. The thesis which I have ventured to expound may be thus briefly summed up.

Kinetic Will-movement as functioning of the conscious-subject is the root of Reason; and, as it is in its rudimentary activity contentless, it is Free. Its movement as such is not in and through another, but in and through itself; it goes out in its essential freedom to find the "other."

Pure formal end is implicit in this fact of Will.

The Will-movement in effecting itself (which effectuation is, in the first instance, a simple percept), contains implicitly in its own bosom certain moments which, as so contained, are pure *à priori*.

These Moments of the Will-movement in Percipience yield all the *à priori* Categories, and thus furnish the formal scheme of nature. These Categories thus genetically exhibited, are, in truth, the Laws of Nature awaiting phenomenal filling from the physicist.

This process of knowing is a dialectic unity; each moment being present in the others. So also in Nature. All Reason-activity is simply the repetition under different conditions of the primary act of simple Percipi-

ence. The conclusion of the Syllogism, for example, is only a judgment mediated through a positive "general."

The formal scheme of nature revealed in this primary activity of finite reason is revealed from the first as the universal immanent Reason: it is *in rebus* only that we first and always find and affirm it; and apart from which no affirmation is possible. The formal dialectic is the real of finite reason, and the real in the universe.

Transferring ourselves to a cosmic stand-point, we then say that the Universal Mind in nature, by becoming conscious under finite conditions, constitutes Human Reason; and that, accordingly, Reason in nature and Reason in man are identical.

Man, in seeking to know nature, is in truth seeking there the reflection of his own reason. Having found this, he at once sees that his individual reason is again itself but a reflection of universal reason.

This universal Mind in Nature, thus discovered, is God—that is to say, God as Being and Reason, or Beënt Reason (Absolute-Causal Being).

Apart from this, there are physico-theological and ethico-theological considerations (not here to be discussed) which have their due place in our final notion of God.

All this I put forth not as speculation, but as phenomenological fact.

As to Dualism: Absolute-Causal-Being or Mind-Universal can only exist (or only exists) by self-determination, which is self-conditioning.

This conditioning is a process actually going on outside each finite individuality, but embracing each and all. It accomplishes this realization in Time through the numberless shapes and individua which we generalize as quantity, quality, and relation, and *these truly mirror themselves* in our (attuent) consciousness. This effectuated and conditioned side of Mind is spread out there before me and exists, as I see it, if I see it truly, and independently of me. There is a veritable Dualism.

But this phenomenon (or matter), while apart from *me*, is *not* given as self-subsistent; but merely as one side of immanent Mind. These two are necessary to actuality, just as an Apollo impressed on wax is the artistic image of Apollo, only by virtue of the impression as product of the artist's mind and the wax taken together.

A consistent Kantianism ought to be prepared to create the whole existent world out of a chaotic series of stimuli, arising, no one knows whence or how, in the æsthetic consciousness. According to the view here given, Form finds itself already there in matter: Being infinite, universal is "given" *there* as determining itself in the infinitely finite of Extension and Motion with their relations; and *here* as determined into a self-referent *one* that feels and reflects the whole, and re-thinks the thought in the existent for its own growth and enrichment, interpreting, not constituting, the object; capable of receiving the phenomenal nature through Feeling, capable of interpreting the Reason in nature through its own rational movement.

CHAP. III.—NATURE.

IF the preceding analysis be a true analysis, it is impossible to hold that the sensible object has self-subsistence in any sense in which this term can be used. It exists only in, and by, and for mind—that is to say, not *my* mind but Mind-universal. That, I conceive, has been shown to be a simple record of fact. But though not self-subsistent, it subsists for itself, that is to say, it has a for-itself subsistence; and, as a total and as infinite particulars, it is separate from the universal movement which we call mind and yet *in* it, receiving its whole reality and significance from it. So, my body is not *me*. As long as there are personalities, there can be no difficulty about the possibility of myriads of individua. The individuality of a stone is the same question as the individuality of a self-conscious Ego. Yet these myriads and the total of sense-possibility are also, as a matter of fact, given to me as in, by, and for, Mind-universal.

It is given to man alone to recognise the immanent unity in difference of the one Being and Life and, in the very act of recognition, he abolishes himself by fulfilling himself in God. Abolishes himself in the sense

of subsuming his personality into the universal, but not cancelling that personality: on the contrary, filling it.

Thus finite mind contemplates infinite mind; though finite, it is conscious of the Infinite and of its own infinite relations.

The contemplation of nature as here presented is the contemplation of each and all as necessarily in God, in other words, *sub specie aeternitatis*.

I do not see why certain thinkers should trouble themselves about the relation of a finite subject to a finite external world. Nor do I catch what they mean by a mechanical process being necessary to connect the two. Where is the mechanical process? The *becoming of experience* in a consciousness—that is all. Mind-universal becomes finite mind in my self-consciousness: nature, as such, reaches its ultimate expression in my body (the manifestation in Space and Time of my self-conscious Ego). Nature is conveyed *into* me through this my body—itsself a part of the same nature-organism. There is no breach of continuity here. *How* these nature-shapes are transmuted into Feeling, the basis of mind, we cannot say; nor does it in truth much matter, except to the philosophy which affects to explain everything. Coming from universal mind they are re-converted in me into mind; and the result is my feeling them. Again, the “Being” *there* finds “Being” *here*, and requires no transmutation. The *here* of the subject and the *there* of the object *are* in perfect community

as *Being*. It has been said, above, that the self-conscious subject goes forth to find itself as reason in Nature; it is equally true that Nature enters the finite subject to find itself in it. And yet it seems impossible to construe Space, Motion, and Time in terms of Thought-categories. There must in any such system of categories, however plausible, or however strictly they may seem to be constructed by a genetic necessity, always be an externalization which is *not* itself thought-categories; and we cannot dispose of it by merely labelling it the outer of an inner, still less by libelling it as nothing more than a metaphor.

The supreme function of philosophy is to search for God, and to vindicate the fact and implicates of human Personality; and I would venture to say that it is demonstrable, that if there be not Dualism, there is no God possible for man, or no man possible for God. God becomes simply a name for a system of Nature, and is not the God we seek, and man is not so much as a puff of smoke.

And yet we can say with Hegel, the Absolute is Subject, and the Subject is Begriff, *i.e.* eternal activity of Reason—a unity constituting itself in and through dialectic moments. But this Reason-activity not only *is*, but lives. Spread out before me is its life—the Real: here within me is the reflection in feeling of that life, and also its truth as actuality, for the dialectic in me is that very universal dialectic which, as constituting my reason, is knowing. The universal Begriff is also my Begriff. My reason truly lives only in the universal

Reason. All my life of reason is the becoming of the universal in me.

I am sufficiently well aware of the contradictions to which dualism gives rise, but any other doctrine fails, still more than dualism, to explain facts. Subjective idealism, whether in the Berkeleian or Kantian form, seems to me (perhaps through some intellectual impotence) the *reductio ad absurdum* of speculation.¹ The contradictions which arise under a dualistic conception have to be faced, and pronounced insoluble; but philosophy, I admit, has not accomplished its task until it can show *how* these contradictions are and *must be* insoluble, and perchance find in their insolubility a significance both for the intellectual and the ethical life of man.

The construction of "Matter," on which some have wasted their powers, is, from the philosophic point of view, a futile occupation. For it is evident that there can be no "construction" of matter which does not assume matter, that is, Space, Motion, Time: it is a circular process. I defy any man to construct Space without the help of Space. I defy any man to construct Motion or Time, or the Finite, without surreptitiously making use of Motion and Time, and the Finite. All physical science is wholly within the finite sphere, the phenomenal series, and can find, at best, finite causes for finite effects.

¹ And after all, the Kantian cannot get rid of the contribution of the senses as *data*.

We are quite entitled, and indeed bound, to reduce *à posteriori* categories to their fundamental and final expression, if we can. But when all is done, the philosophical question will remain precisely what it is now.

Nor are the physiological conditions of feeling and thought at all in place in the great questions of philosophy. How and by what process can certain vibrations, atmospheric or etheric, plant space and motion in a conscious mind, is a question the answer to which will always be arrested precisely at the critical point. Mind has *become* Nature: it is just as easy for Nature again to *become* mind through the nature-organism (body) of *a* mind. Nature is mind-universal *become*; an individual mind, as feeling nature and knowing nature, is nature passing back into mind or consciousness under finite conditions.

Assume a Reason-movement within nature; this can be known only by a Reason—nay, more, by a Reason which is itself that Reason-movement, not an alien reason-movement. So, given a subject which receives impressions from a without, it cannot receive them, since it is itself part of the system, save precisely as they exist, without dislocating the whole and reducing it to absurdity and chaos.

The *process* whereby external nature maintains its continuity with nature as my body is, doubtless, a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. This is the physiology of the senses and the brain. But the transmutation out of nature-conditions into mind-

experience, is as impossible of solution as the prior transmutation of Mind-universal into Nature-universal, of the Infinite into the Finite, Being into Existence, eternal During into the finitude of Time. They are given as a Concrete.

I, however, as Mind and Body, contain within myself (as an Actual)—both Subject-mind and Object-nature—a complex of both. But no analysis of either one or the other can ever cancel either, any more than it can cancel both.

EIGHTH PART.

CHAP. I.—TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS (SO CALLED) AND THE SOLUTION OF THE INSOLUBLE.

THE Will—that kinetic movement which lies at the root of human reason and makes it possible—is in its essence activity. In its ceaseless effort to reduce all things to the unity of apperception that it may perceive or know them, it recognizes no limit save exhaustion of the physical organ. It even passes beyond the bounds of possible knowledge and plays with fictions, in a vain attempt to categorize the dialectic ground itself of possible knowledge—to condition that which conditions!

The primary perception of an external object is, as we have seen, the first crude attempt to bring some sort of order out of mere attitudinal presentation; but, even in that first affirmation of a crude synopsis, there is implicit a certain blind analysis, for it cannot take place till one totality in presentation is separated from another and subsumed into the unity of apperception. Even this rudimentary act of reason, accordingly, is both analytic and synthetic. Will-reason, in so energizing, involves itself in two tendencies of movement;

—on the one side, the differencing or diathesis of the individual percepts in a complex, and, on the other, the synthesizing of the concept, which, in so far as it has been preceded by an analysis of the complex in presentation, is now no longer a mere totality but a unity.

Thus it is that the two tendencies of Will-reason are determining and ever determining till it reaches the absolutely simple percept; and synthesizing and ever synthesizing, until it reaches the absolute unity of the cosmic whole. The diathesis of the single and the synthesis of the whole (and the former as the sole ground of the possibility of the latter) constitute the termini of Reason-activity towards which it is ever striving and, too often, prematurely hastening.

What we can alone by these processes legitimately strive for is the diathesis and synthesis of the conditioned, that is to say, of phenomenal presentations; and even this can never be an absolute synthesis. But a locomotive, which may have reached its destined terminus with its full steam on, still presses forward, though the next advance may plunge it into the inane. So with the Reason-activity; on the side both of diathesis and synthesis, not content with the dialectic percepts as ground, possibility, and truth of the phenomenal, it seeks to press, with the same weapons, into this region of the Absoluto-infinite and unconditioned; an illegitimate procedure yielding invalid results.

Let us consider these aspects of Reason briefly, in the light of the preceding analytical exploration.

The first crude synthesis, we found in our earlier chapters, is the synthesis of the attuited aggregate or totality. After analysis of the constituent elements of this aggregate, we reach the synthesis of the sense-concept. After the completed analysis, under the impulse of the *à priori* categories, of the dynamical and causal inter-relation of elements, and the relation of the object to other presentates, we have the synthesis of the "notion" in which the moments of the Form of Percipience—the dialectic percepts—are themselves constituent elements. But we are *not* yet satisfied that we know: under the continued impulse of the diathesis of Reason we seek to isolate the essence or idea of the notion—that, namely, whereby it is what it is, as negating all else; in other words, the notion in its relations of difference to all else. With this, if it could attain to it, Reason would rest content in the sphere of the synthesis of the conditions of the "Thing."

Now, as a matter of course, the protension of Reason in dealing with the whole of nature follows the steps which Reason has taken, in dealing with the particulars of nature. It endeavours through imagination to form a synthesis of the attuitional aggregate—the totality of the sensible. This is entirely in the Category of Quantity.

Again, it endeavours to reach a completed synthesis of the unity of the "notion"—a Unity of Quantity, Quality and Relation, and these as permeated and organised by the formal or dialectic elements. Though

we may never be able to reach either the completed totality or the rational unity, none the less must we, at the bidding of Will, under the stimulus of the bare form of end within it and the impulse of the perception of the Infinite, seek for a completed cosmical synthesis.

It may be said that, since the matter or content of pure activity is everything that is, or can be, a presentate to consciousness, the aim of ultimate diathesis and synthesis cannot be restricted to the sphere of the presentates of outer sense, because the dialectic percepts Absoluto-infinite, Cause, and Being are, through self-activity, themselves also presentates to consciousness. The answer is, that when we reach the absolutely simple percept we cannot carry the analytico-synthetic process into it, and that these dialectic knowledges are not concepts but percepts, simple, absolute, infinite; they defy synthesis, for there are no elements in them to synthesize. They are products of pure activity; they are the never absent ground and constituent elements in the synthesis of the phenomenal: as immanent in the phenomenal, they *are*, and are known. There is nothing deeper by which to interpret them. Nor do they consist of parts: as mind-reality they pass into each other and are *one*, because they are moments of the *one* living dialectic of Reason. It is as a unity they are given, and it is only logically that we can separate the moments. Thus it is that the synthesis of Reason—the synthetic *à priori*—is possible to knowledge only as that synthesis is given, that is to say, in its bare simplicity; but further, nothing is given. Mark,

however, that this unconditioned and conditioning is precisely that which we, thus far, *do* know. It is the essence and reality of our Reason. It is itself the synthesizer of the universe: it is God. There is no contradiction here.

The conditioned it is which gives rise to contradictions; and these arise from the attempt to carry the conditioned into the unconditioned, or *vice versâ*, and to translate the one into terms of the other.

On the whole question I would venture to say, in accordance with what I have before said, that while our difficulties must ever remain, and have, simply as such, an important, nay vital, relation to the spiritual life of too self-centred man, they are in one sense capable of solution. They do not admit of an answer in themselves, but we can ascertain *how* it is that we get involved in them; and a metaphysic *out of which* the solution does *not* arise is futile. I say *out of which* the solution does not arise.

It will be found that our difficulties are caused either by our losing sight of the very conditions of perceiving and thinking the matter of sense; *or* by our inevitable tendency to sensualize, or phenomenalize, the pure product of Dialectic. Let us take these in order.

1. *Conditions of Perceiving.*

(a) There can be no complete synthesis of the conditioned, because any such must be a complete synthesis of Quantity or Extension. And why is this impossible? Because, as we have again and again seen, the *very act*

of perceiving extension, or any part of it, is determining or limiting. If perceiving is limiting, how is it possible to perceive and *not* limit? And if we limit, there must by the very nature and necessity of the case be a not-limited and a not-limitable outside any possible percipient act. It is not, surely, necessary to say more by way of solution—simple though the solution be.

(b) Passing from Space to the synthesis of a regressive series—*Time*. We found the Time-affirmation to be an arrestment by an act of Will of the continuity, or protension, of Being as During. The act of determining any presentate of consciousness is a determining it as *now*. To the fact of duration we call “Halt.” If the act of determining—of perceiving and thinking—be *this*, how is it possible to hold in thought a completed synthesis of a regressive series? This is to subvert the very possibility of thinking—a suicide of reason. There can be no conceivable beginning in Time by the very nature of the case, any more than there can be a limitation of Space. The Hamiltonian will tell us that of two contradictory inconceivables, one *must* be true. This is an unphilosophical conclusion. In the region of the inconceivable, what right have we to predicate anything?

(c) The *procurrence* and *protension* of Reason presses, on the other side of the percipient-movement, to what I have called the final diathesis of the determined, and is here met by a difficulty as insuperable as the synthesis of determinations. In the region of the phenomenal (sensible) it seeks for the absolutely simple—the

atom ; and in its search is met by the problem of infinite divisibility. Now there seems to be nothing in the nature of the act of determining or thinking to make it impossible to reach the final diathesis, and to envisage the simple atom. But we are here met by the condition of all external sensibility—Space. We have no knowledge of Space or Extension as an abstract, but only of a thing spaced or extended. But whether we have or not, the fact still remains that a point is a mere rational entity, and exists nowhere save to the eye of Reason. A simple point of space is an impossibility to all conception of the external, simply because the very nature and definition of Space—its *modus existendi*—is “extension”; and this, let me remark, whether we regard space as given to sensibility or projected by sensibility. Accordingly, when we imagine we have isolated the atom, we find that it *must*, after all, itself consist of co-existent coterminous points, and is therefore divisible; *as atom*, consequently, it eludes us.

To endeavour to outflank the difficulty by calling the atom a dynamic centre of energy will not suffice ; because dynamic energy without extension is not thinkable : we really affirm dynamic energy in, or of, or through, extension or matter. Vortex rings won't save us, for these presume a dynamic centre working after a certain fashion in ether, which is matter. Doubtless there is a dynamic centre which is *non-phenomenal*, for Absolute-Causal-Being works *so* ; and the very term “work” shows us, that to say it works dynamically is a tautology.

Nay, even the intelligent atom—the monad—does not give us the atom we are in search of, because, if it be a thing extended, the old difficulties recur; and if it be a noumenal intelligence it has (as Kant says) representations, which would thus constitute its parts. An atom, by its notion, must be such that any attempt to divide it, even in thought, would cause it to vanish into the non-phenomenal or non-existent.

The solution then, of the difficulties raised by the inevitable impulse after a final diathesis of the simple, is to be found in the very nature of Extension itself, and there is no use in battling with the difficulty when we see it to be insoluble. None the less is the idea of the ultimately simple, as such, a reality, and physical science must proceed on the assumption of the atom, if it is ever to construct even an approximate synthesis of the conditioned.

It will be seen that the explanation of infinite extension differs from the explanation of infinite divisibility thus: The former is explained by the very nature of the *act* of knowing merely as such; the latter by the nature of given Quantity, which contains in its *fact*, whether as presented or imagined, continuity and *therefore* discretion.

The question of the infinite divisibility of Time is explained in the same way, for we can construe Motion and Time to ourselves only in terms of space.

It does not follow from the rational necessity of infinite divisibility that any quantity consists really and objectively of an infinite number of parts, but only

that quantity must always, from its nature, be conceived by finite reason as made up of parts. Hence we may fairly surmise that the atom, as a simple, though it can never be seen or imagined, may yet exist; and Physics may proceed on this hypothesis.

(d) *Identity*.—The identity of an individuum is in the “essence” of the individuum, as that has been explained in a past chapter. And yet it may be objected, this causal organizing functioning which controls and determines the parts to a unity of end and constitutes the “thing,” is *in* Time and Space, and thus can effect itself only under the conditions of Time and Space. Thus Identity encounters the old difficulty—the infinite divisibility of Space, Motion, Time. May we not get over the difficulty thus? The motion *b*, into which, in the ceaseless flux, *a* is always passing, may be merely a repetition of motion *a*; *c* may repeat *b*, and so on, as long as there remains a unity of organic function.

Identity, like Essence, is an *à priori* thought-determination; but the moment thinking passes into finite forms it becomes involved in those contradictions of the finite that arise out of the very nature either of the percipient act or of its object. In fact, strictly speaking it is never 12 o'clock; but inasmuch as there was a time antecedent to 12 and now a time subsequent, we may reasonably conclude that there was a point at which it was 12. Everything concrete and phenomenal is at any one point something else; and yet “either-or” holds, and *a* is *a* and not *b*. Such is the potency of the *à priori* category; but it seems to

me impossible to explain identity in the phenomenal, save in some such way as that indicated above, and which amounts to this:—May not the identity of a concrete individuum be maintained for a certain period in Time by the continual *repetition* of the same motions of the same atoms by means of which its functioning unity effects itself?

2. *Sensualizing the Dialectic.*

The second class of insolubles arise out of the pure *à priori* dialectic precepts, and have nothing to do with the phenomenal or *à posteriori*.

Having once grasped the percept of the Absoluto-infinite, it seems to me that no sane man could proceed to think the ground of this ultimate ground without being amused with the fallacies and fictions of his own imagination. But it is equally, though not so palpably, absurd to speak of the Causality of Cause or the Being of Being.

The dialectic movement of Reason yields Cause and End, just as it yields the Absoluto-infinite and Being, as immanent ground of all that exists, and formal possibility of our synthesis of the conditioned. The Reason in the universe, thus and not otherwise, passes into us as children of nature; and, as it is the form of the Universal Reason, so it becomes the formal movement of that Reason as finite, in its attempt to take nature to itself. Reason can be seen only by the eye of Reason. And yet we would in our perverseness reduce Reason itself to a sensible and phenomenal!

(a) Cause universal, simple, infinite—the process of the dialectic, a thought not a thing—is given as a moment in the immanent dialectic of nature. Inasmuch as Cause is in the necessary form of the reason-movement, I am compelled to think every presentate of consciousness *so*. Thus I may also, unfortunately, be led to think Cause-universal itself *so*, oblivious of its true character. I thus hypostasize Cause, constitute it a “real” of some sort as the very ground of the possibility of thinking *it* as caused. In brief, I destroy it by phenomenalizing it. The Causal as necessary ground of the phenomenal I find. How can I even speak of what is called the infinite regression of Causes? To do this I must begin by transmuting the dialectic percept Cause into an empirical “somewhat.”

The regression of Causes, again, within the series of the conditioned, is simply a disguised attempt to limit Time, although I already know that an infinite series of past times is necessary to the act of perceiving a “now.”

(b) So with Being. Being is there and here, immanent. As fact, there it is: the simple, the One, the unconditioned universal, the first and the last, the potential, the same, the during, eternal now.

I may doubtless abstract Being, as I may abstract Space, or anything else; but if in doing so I commit the banality of contemplating it as “thing,” the product must, according to the necessary form of thought, be again affirmed as Being; thus I get Being of Being: nor, of course, can I stop here, but I must go on *ad infinitum*.

Being, it will be said, is thinkable only as the antithesis of not-Being. Be it so. But here, again, I have made "being" a thing *per se*, a fiction; and I may accordingly go on to say that not-Being as a positive can be thought only through not-not-Being, and so on for ever. And this because of the negative moment in all determination. But to pursue this line of fallacious and illusory thinking would be, it humbly seems to me, the delirium of speculation. Being is the ultimate—the thesis—the reality—the diffused potentiality: and there it must rest.

(c) *Ens realissimum*. Kant tells us that we transfer, analogically, the concepts of Substance and Causality to the Supreme First Intelligence when we hypostasize that transcendental idea. The answer is that the so-called concepts are, in truth, percepts; and further, that they are given in a necessary unity as the ground of the sensible and as immanent in it. The "Supreme Intelligence" is not a hypostasized idea; it is itself Cause and Being; cause, within the limits of the empirical, being merely transmutation of an already existing energy in a conditioned and necessary series, while particular "being," again, is merely the specific determination of Being. All this is given in the primal act of reason, viz., percipience. In brief, the very governing ideas which Kant says cannot be applied outside the empirical sphere, and which, as only regulative, have for their sole legitimate purpose the systematic unity of knowledge, are the sole fundamental categories and themselves constitutive of the whole

sphere of sense. As such they are themselves God—the moving, all-embracing, conditioning Mind, which conditions and determines itself as a universe. True, we cannot apply the ideas of Absolute, Cause, and Being to the further explanation of themselves any more than we can rationally put forward A as an explanation of A. But this is very far from being Kant's ground of objection to the categorizing of transcendental ideas.

The idea of an "absolutely necessary Being," says Kant, is a mere concept of pure Reason—an idea having no objective reality. But what underlies this position of Kant? Nothing save his definition of "reality" in the *Analytic*. "Reality" is, according to the *Analytic*, given in and through sensation, and there are no elements of "reality" in the idea of an absolutely necessary being. Certainly not in the Kantian sense of the term: if it were so, how could it be "being," how could it be "absolute," how could it be "necessary"? But surely had Kant not burdened himself with a restricted definition of reality, he might have accorded to the *necessary* idea of the "absolutely necessary being" a reality for thought, for Reason:—nay, he would have seen it to be the sole veritable reality. It would not have followed from this that we were bound to provide predicates for this "Being" as if it were a Thing. To do this would be to destroy the idea by bringing it within the sphere of Kant's reality.

As against the Cartesian and Leibnitzian "idea" we may admit the force of Kant's argument; but it is

wholly invalid if the "idea" can be critically shown to be at once a datum of feeling, and the pure and necessary product of Reason. Is there no reality in the ground of all possible determination, no reality in pure thought, as thought? Does Reason exist for the mere purpose of co-ordinating the phenomena of sense and of enabling us to adapt ourselves to that co-ordination?

Kant considers that the idea of a Supreme Being for which there is no object is the hypostasizing of an idea. What is hypostasizing? It is predicating *being*, and consequently reality, of any concept. But in the ultimate concept (or rather percept) we do not *predicate* being: that which is given to us *is* Being; and, as such, it is through its own inner dialectic not merely regulative, but constitutive, of the cosmos.

The more recent argument for God, which resolves itself into the necessity of a self-distinguishing one basis to which nature as a mere system of relations must be referred, is simply the old argument of the necessity for a First Cause dressed up in new clothes. Not by any means an argument to be despised, but stopping short of the truth through an inadequate analytic of knowledge.

Of this Absolute-Causal-Being, with Will and End implicit in its notion, we can know nothing save that it *is*.

Cause and End are one, and they are one with Being and the Absoluto-infinite.

And this is given to us with a certainty greater than the assurance of an external world, because it is intimate

and close; not merely *in* us, but, in truth, ourselves as beënt reasons. The finite Ego—the ultimate antithesis of the absolute universal, contains in its very rudimentary act of mere percipience, the ground and beginning of reconciliation to the universal, for in all perception I affirm God. To give ultimate explanations is not always the business of Philosophy, whose duty is discharged when it exhibits what is, and defines its own limits. But of this we may be assured, that the God which Being and Dialectic give us is no speculative thesis of a mystic imagination.

Nature, as mere phenomenon, we see to be the mere quantitative and qualitative expression of the life of immanent God. The connection between the latter and the former—the concave and convex of the same circle—we shall never penetrate, although we may render a plausible and probable account of it. To us finite reasons, this duality—which in truth from a universal standpoint is only a quasi-duality—is a true duality. It is external to us and independent of us. Man is himself one of the finite objects in the phenomenal world of Nature placed outside other objects, except in so far as there emerges in him the eternal Reason, which continues its own *modus essendi* in him, and thereby constitutes his reason, so that thereby the finite may know Him and interpret His universe, and be a sharer for ever in the eternal life in which it already, even now, may participate.

All further knowledge of God outside the pure dialectic is accessible to us only inferentially, either by

analogy or through the "things that are made." Nature and finite mind are the only *predicates* of the universal Being; and to these we must look for further instruction. Even Kant admits that, given the fact of an *ens realissimum* ontologically, we are then entitled to learn what we can regarding its nature, physico-theologically; and, if so, then, *à fortiori*, ethico-theologically, for man also with his ideas and ideals is the work of God. Still, knowledge, though adequate for the ends of life, must still ever be partial; in Shakespeare's words,

"It is not so with Him that all things knows
As 'tis with us that square our guess by shows."

The knowledge we have is at once negative and positive:—

It is negative in that, while God is in the phenomenal and contingent, He is not *of* it. For what is matter? Not (as we have seen) a crass reality which defeats the eternal mind, but merely the manner in which that mind effectuates its life as an infinite series of finite individua. *So* effectuates these, it has to be admitted, as to confer on the manner of its doing so, *i.e.* on matter, a restrictive power—so restrictive, indeed, as to be ultimately dominant as regards each individual thing; for each finally disappears in a dissolution—

"All that lives must die,
Passing through Nature to Eternity."

But the limitations and the conditions of the pheno-

menal are not applicable to this eternal Mind. Change and pain, decay and death, are not affirmable of that which is the ground of the phenomenal and makes it possible.

Again, on the positive side : the laws of nature and of the soul of man, as they are discovered, reveal truly the way of God's working—Absolute Reason unfolding itself, Being implicit becoming explicit in the consciousness of man ; and to this revelation the physicist, the metaphysicist, and the poet alike contribute. To know is part of the allegiance we owe to the universal reason of which we are the finite reflection. As finite Reason explores the territory of the unknown, light is from time to time vouchsafed. But it is not given to us in this mortal state "to know even as we are known" ; and there will always be room for the *faith*, that "all things work together for good to them that love God."

As to pain, death, evil—these are inexplicable. Every fresh attempt at an explanation only resolves itself, on examination, into a new way of stating the fact. We may easily state the fact in terms which seem to explain it, the more abstract the better of course if we desire to impose on ourselves. It is inevitable that we should try to reconcile the stern fatalities of existence with the idea of God and the Good, by sublating them into some universal law of the divine working ; and so presenting to the eye, of Faith at least, if not of reason, a possible harmony. But reduce the question to what

terms we may, there still remains the fact that God seems to be engaged in a struggle in which nature and man are involved, and which it is man's duty loyally to undertake, sacrificing himself on the altar of the Eternal. This for his personal guidance he may know, if he will, viz., that the truth of each thing, and of the whole, lies in its idea. In the realized idea of each and all lies the perfection of each and all—the Good. Towards this, all is laboriously moving, and in this Good we believe, save in transient periods of unmanly doubt or despair. Discords, however, are certainly there, unresolved: the music of the spheres is not yet audible. The ideals of religion and art proclaim the truth of things and sustain the sinking spirit of man; for they are prophetic of what ought to be and a guarantee of what truly *is* to the open eye. In each man's struggle God is with him if he chooses, working in him to will and to do and to suffer. The Zeus of Prometheus has been dethroned, and the father of spirits now governs the world.

Questions can be put which cannot be answered by Metaphysic: for true metaphysic is a science, and cannot content itself with mere hazards and guesses. It is for Speculation as distinct from Metaphysic to take up these questions; and to find, if not an answer, yet such a point of view as shall indicate a probable answer. And these answers may be so clearly in harmony with the general scheme of things as to yield a "subjective conviction" of their truth. A subjective conviction may be rich in motives, ideals, and ethical inspiration.

Such a subjective conviction is the basis of rational Faith—the evidence of things not seen.

To exaggerate the insolubility of the riddle of life, and to retire from the contest into the arms of languid resignation—there to indulge the cheap luxury of scepticism and assume the cynical, but affectedly tolerant, superiority of one who knows too much to dare to be happy—is the resource of unmanly minds. Resignation is, at best, an understrapping virtue. It is the duty of a man to accept his conditions like a man, and, in a virile spirit and in the name of God, to mould the fatalities of his existence to ethical purposes: and, withal, to be of good cheer.

If this philosophical investigation be but another illustration of the old saying "*Omnia exeunt in mysterium*," may we not say that a philosophy which left no region of mystery into which Faith and Hope might stretch out their arms, must be a false reading of human Reason and of the conditions of the highest life of the human soul? A philosophy which does not contain within it the infinite and inexplicable is simply a form of Positivism, by whatever name it may call itself.¹

¹ At the same time, I would not be understood as denying that a synthetic cosmic construction is impossible on the basis of the preceding Analytic. There are certain ascertained objective truths from which a beginning might be made—viz., God as the Being and Dialectic of finite determination, and the teleological idea in that determination. Beyond these facts, however, we cannot (for want both of materials and machinery) take a step save on the basis of Analogy, which to some minds may give the conviction of certitude, to others only the assurance of faith.

(d) As to Kant's psychological paralogism it falls to be said, from the point of view of this analytical exploration, that the function of determining and of all thinking is itself a unity—that it is one, self-identical, and not the “other” (or object)—all which Kant himself admits. What then do we want? We do not care in these days to enter into discussions as to the simplicity of the substance of the thinking self. We are content to recognize its being and its functioning unity. We do not now discuss the immateriality of the soul, because we do not accept the concepts of matter which were dominant in the past; nor do we consequently affect in these days to base any argument for immortality on the simplicity of the soul-substance, for we know nothing of matter save as that which is given as quantity and quality in sense. We are content to say of this functioning unity which we call Subject and Self—that it *is*. The affirmation of Being, which we make of the phenomenal, is *à fortiori* true of the self-identical thought-function itself, which brings the phenomenal into order and coherence and is the transcendental condition of the possibility of all knowledge.

Kant redargues the proposition that the soul is a simple “substance,” but this does not touch the position that it is a functioning, spiritual, self-identical being, and as such a unity. Nay, further, though we cannot affirm the categories of the categories themselves, we can affirm them of the thinking unity when we make it itself an object of thought. And when we so apply

them, we find that Absolute-Causal-Being exists in this Ego-determination primarily for the purpose of thinking and affirming itself as immanent in the universal sphere of actual and possible existence. This Ego-determination is, in short (as I have already frequently pointed out), the universal Reason-movement of the cosmic whole reflected into itself in the organism called man, which organism at the same time holds relations of antagonism to the universal, and is therein and there-through finite and conditioned. And this is what is meant by saying that man is created in the image of God. The finite reason is, however, not subject to any alien content of reason. Hegel says (*Encyc.* 382) that finite reason is not free in its immediateness, but only in its actuality. If I rightly comprehend Hegel, I would say that, on the contrary, finite reason is constituted by the pure will-movement, and therefore in and by freedom.

Let us note further that it is the unity of consciousness which alone constitutes, and renders possible, the functioning of unity in all knowledge; and that the fact of that unity of the subject-self is not constituted by the percipient act, but merely brought into relief in consciousness by the act of Will which prehends it, as it prehends all else. It first throws *itself* as object out of itself, again to reduce that object to the unity of apperception which, all the while, it itself is. Mind or reason is thus seen to be not at all simple, but, rather, a complex *one* of inner determination.

In conclusion, the spontaneous kinetic movement—

Will, emerging out of what has been till then mere attuent and animal consciousness, and, by means of a dialectic process, mediating and subsuming the matter of knowledge, and in that process giving birth to the *a priori* categories, is manifestly *free* in its relation to the whole sphere of the phenomenal, including the pathological conditions of the individual consciousness. We see, moreover, this reason of man to be a true manifestation of the Universal Reason. As free, the Will, in its finite relations, is responsible to Law of Conduct in so far as it knows Law. Its primary function and end is knowledge, but its supreme end is conduct, that is to say, knowledge with a view to life in feeling and law in conduct. Just as the final aim of mere knowledge is the true—*i.e.* the divine—ideas in things, so the final aim of conduct is life in those ideas; for through these alone can there be perfect conciliation of the particular with the universal, and life in God be effected. Thus it is that reason alone is ground and possibility of the true life of man, both in knowing and doing, and that the light of reason is the only light of life—"the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

CHAP. II.—THE TRANSCENDENT AND THE IDEAL.

THE Absoluto-infinite is ground and *prius* of the determined and determinable; the sensuous infinite is a characteristic of the already determined, and is necessitated by the nature of the percipient, or reason, act.

Finite reason is never satisfied. It seeks continually for the completeness of the idea, in the particular and in the universal whole. The achievement of to-day is the beginning of to-morrow, the goal of one generation of men is the starting-point for the next. Hence the transcending impulse which would carry finite reason beyond the finite, in its search for a final and absolute synthesis which must for ever escape it. How is this to be explained?

The preceding chapters furnish the explanation, and that a simple one. To begin with, Reason is the pure activity of the conscious-subject, and pure activity must by the necessity of the case be always active. Add to this the fact that this formal activity or Will, which is root of reason, has implicit in it the form of End as unceasing stimulus of Will, and we might then hold that the restless discontent of reason is sufficiently explained. And certainly, the analysis of the nature of Reason as pure activity containing End partially

explains the phenomenon ; but not wholly. The never-ending *nisus forward* and *upward* in art, in science, and in the moral life is left out.

Further, if pure activity with formal end implicit were the whole explanation, why should we not be content with the attainment of a succession of percepts as end of the will-movement ? This, it may be replied, we cannot be, because the dialectic of the reason-movement, as mediating or causal, compels us to relate and correlate the said percepts with a view to an organic view of the total of sense, in which the percept, as a singular, will have its due place, but no more, in a complex unity. If we further say then that Reason must, by its very nature, always seek organic completeness as End, have we finally explained the ideal and transcendent *nisus* ? We have not.

For, if this were the final explanation, a very rough and superficial correlation of experiences—sufficient for the practical needs of life—would content a man, and he would rest in his first thoughts of things as organisms. He does not do so : one rung in the ladder is here also, as in more rudimentary acts, only standing-room for the next. It is clear that the notion of the Infinite somewhere enters :—

And, accordingly, the further explanation is that the infinite transcendency of movement which characterizes reason, is an act of limitation—an explanation which, at the first blush, looks paradoxical. Reason as a limitating act, in and by that act (as we have seen) perceives and affirms the not-yet limited, and

further, the illimitable in a series—infiniteness. That is to say, it perceives that its knowledge not only is, but *must be*, always partial, and it is thus, through the perception of infiniteness, compelled to fresh endeavour after a somewhat not yet attained. It is the infinite then as necessary element in the very fact of finitude, and in the act of finitizing, which necessitates discontent and stimulates to ever-renewed striving.

But we have not yet done with the problem ; for this striving, ever renewing itself, pursues completeness or the ideal. The ideal simply means the perfection of a thing after its kind. But, since my knowing always necessarily contains in it the suggestion and fact of the illimitable and the beyond, how and whence do I get the notion of ideal perfection ? The consciousness of the more and the better is easily explained, for we have it in sense-experience ; but what of this *completed perfection* ? A most important and significant conception this, because, stimulated by it, all Art, whether it be the industrial arts or the fine arts, exists, and through it alone is Art, as distinguished from mere imitation and adaptation to use, possible. Nay more, stimulated by this conception, the soul of man seeks the perfection of the ideal life.

Now I do not think there is any explanation of this possible save what is to be found in the preceding remarks. Reason as I have shown is a dialectic of Will and it contains in it the form of End : that is to say, the dialectic is teleological. To say that Reason

is in its *à priori* form teleological is to say that it prefigures a completed end, organic or other, in each and every thing and complex of things.

It may be said that the more or less of degree in things actually seen, suffices for an explanation of the ideal (*idea in concreto*). I see many birch trees varying in degree, and one I have seen which is better than all the others, inasmuch as it impresses me more pleasingly. Among a series of birch trees this last I pronounce the best—nay, the *perfect* birch-tree, and it is the standard by which in future I measure the place of all others on the scale :—

But it is precisely in this very experience-process that the formal prefiguring of Reason is seen at work. A dog or cow has seen all these birch-trees as often as you have, and though both the one and the other seems to be in closer intimacy with nature than you, neither has any feeling on the subject of the less or more of perfection. And this because they are not rational. It is as a Reason that you take up all the material of sense as having, each thing after its kind, a beginning, middle and end—that end being the completion of itself—the purpose of perfection. And this purpose of perfection in things is a necessary outgrowth of the formal dialectic which we call Reason. As formal it is a prefiguration (which is yet without figure) seeking for its filling in the world of sense. The pursuit of the ideal, in brief, is determined by a *principle*, which principle is in the formal of Reason; and also (let me add) in the form, or the thinking, in Nature.

Formal end implicit in the Dialectic is a prefigurement of possible repose, to be sought for and found in the achievement of itself. So far the Ideal in thought is explained. But not yet wholly: for, just at this point, we must fall back on the infiniteness of the reason-movement and recall the fact that the mind never rests in an achieved end, but ceaselessly pushes forward under an impulse of transcendency. This is due to the nature of the Reason-act, which, in affirming an end attained, exhibits itself as a determining or limitating act, however complete that end may seem, and therefore is, at the same moment, under the necessity of affirming that which is beyond any assignable limit. For the finite Ego there is possible (to borrow a phrase from Professor Seth) only the "infinite progress of approximation."

To sum up and repeat. The "ideal" or (generally the) transcendent is a fact of Reason: it is not a mere accident or accessory of Reason, but the necessary issue of the form of Reason itself. It is not to be explained by the fact that Reason is pure activity which as such can never rest, because this would not necessitate the distinctively *forward* transcendent movement of mind. It is to be explained by the nature of essential Reason or Dialectic itself: (a) As taking up all matter of consciousness teleologically which compels it to formally propose to itself End. This essential character of the dialectic process, however, would content itself with affirmed ends as these might be first apprehended

were it not for, secondly, (b) The essential character of Reason (not now as dialectic process simply, but) in the *issue* of its movement as determination or limitation. Limitation carries with it the illimitable or the infinite in the finite. There is thus a stimulus in the heart of Reason which, as formal end, compels the search for real end; and the *further* stimulus of the perception of the infinite in the finite, which urges to infinite endeavour, illimitable progression.

Thus the Ideal in this, that, or the other is, as a Real in experience, impossible; because, however it may be constituted, there enters into it the affirmation of the Infinite. It is a prefigurement, as I have said, of pure Reason. This term, however, is to be accepted as a metaphorical expression of a reason-fact. The explanation of the necessariness of an infinite series in the sphere of the conditioned (as has been frequently shown) is explained by the nature of percipience as an *act* in its final moment: the Idea, in the Kantian sense, and the Ideal have their explanation in the said necessary infinite finitude. These explanations are so simple and emerge so obviously out of the analysis of reason in its primal act of percipience, that they may possibly be less acceptable to some minds than involved propositions which leave thought undefined, and give to mere mental confusion the air of mystical profundity.

I do not here work out the ever-present action of the Dialectic—always the same dialectic—in the differing

spheres of experience—Knowledge, the Beautiful (the Ideal of the Real), and the Good (the Ethical). These spheres are not isolated one from the other. They do not each demand separate explanation. They are fundamentally one. And let me add (merely dogmatically here), true reality—or, in brief, Truth—lies in the Idea and the Ideal. It is not necessary to invent a separate faculty of mind to explain the “ideas which Reason employs in seeking to complete experience” (Kant’s *Transc.-Anal.*, conclusion of B. I.), any more than it is necessary to distinguish between understanding and reason, as if the latter were a specific faculty—a mind placed on the top of a mind. Reason is a one living movement, and contains *in* its movement the explanation of all that is explainable.

Let me add that the completion of the totality of conditions which would yield the Ideal (the idea *in concreto*) would have two results: first, it would convert the ideal into the real of experience, and abolish the ideal; and secondly, what I call the protension of Reason, which is infinite, would stultify itself, for it would terminate in a completed conditioning of actual and possible matter of thought, and so pass into finitude. This protension of Reason accordingly is, as regards the conditioned or finite, merely regulative, but yet of vital significance in science, art, and ethics.

It is scarcely necessary to add (after all that has been said in past chapters), that we are not here speaking of the true Infinite, but only of the Infinite in the finite, that is to say, the Infinite implicit in the act of

conditioning all matter of thought—the sensuous infinite. The true Infinite, the Absoluto-infinite, is to be found in feeling first, and thereafter in the Reason or Perception process,—in the feeling of Being universal and unique as yet undetermined and unconditioned, itself the conditioning ground of things and, thereafter, in the affirmation of the same Being in and through the Dialectic. If we do not see this, we are compelled to go on for ever in the search for God; and to go on in vain, because we find ourselves involved in the banal process of positing being of a being and cause of a cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. The true Infinite, the Eternal *One*—God Himself—is all the while lying close to our hand in both feeling and reason, and, even in denying Him, we unwittingly affirm Him.

THE END.

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